

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE "CHRISTIAN RIGHT"

By

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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2006

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To my wife, Angela.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work would not have been possible without the helpful contributions of many people. I am grateful to all of those who granted my interview request for this research. Many of the insights found in this work were only made possible by their generosity. William Murray and Jack Thompson also deserve thanks for allowing me to sit in on the Family Forum meetings.

Thanks to all the members of my committee—Lawrence C. Dodd, Philip J. Williams, David M. Hedges, and David G. Heckathorn. They have assisted me to not only better understand my work in its current form, but where it might lead me in the future. Erik A. Rosenbaum and Jeff Gill also provided assistance in earlier stages of the research. My chair, Kenneth D. Wald, deserves additional thanks for the expert guidance he provided throughout this project.

Thanks to all the “prayer warriors” who thought of me during their quiet times with God. There are too many of you to name, and, likely, more of you than I realize. Jack Strong deserves special mention. Having a friend and mentor who is my theological twin, yet political opposite, has helped me to grapple with many of the issues raised by this book.

Thanks to my family for supporting me throughout in more ways than I can imagine. My mom, especially, has made many sacrifices to help finance this project to its end. And to Angela, my bride, who I married the same month I started my graduate program seven years ago this very day. I thank her for all she has endured. She is a

reagent. I dedicate this to her because I could not have done it without her. Last (and least-not only in nature), I thank my daughter, Kylee, whose birth in the midst of this project provided additional motivation for its completion.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF TABLES	iv
LIST OF FIGURES	vi
ABSTRACT	x
CHAPTER	
1 INTRODUCTION	1
Historical Background	3
Interest Group Theory	5
Social Movements	7
A Theory of Institutionalization	13
Determinants of Social Movement Success	21
Data	24
Methods	29
Summary	37
2 HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT	43
The Fundamentalist Movement	44
The New Evangelicals	48
The New Christian Right	48
Rogers and the Christian Right	53
The Christian Coalition	58
Clinton and Impeachment	62
Clinton Support	66
George W. Bush	69
3 THE BEHAVIOR OF CHRISTIAN RIGHT INTEREST GROUPS	71
Institutionalization Theory	71
Interest Group Theory	99
4 SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY	104
Identity	104

	Resources	120
	Opportunity	121
5	CONCLUSION	134
	The Future of the Christian Right	144
APPENDIX		
A	GROUP DESCRIPTIONS	146
	Core Groups	146
	Peripheral Groups	153
B	RESENTS SURVEY	159
	WORK CITED	165
	BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH	167

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1-1. Diagram of Institutionalization.....	19
1-2. Keywords Used for Content Analysis of the Washington Post, 1994-2000.....	60
1-3. Identifying Christian Right Interest Groups.....	61
1-4. List of Interviews.....	62
3-1. Hypotheses.....	102
3-2. Christian Right Leadership.....	103
4-1. Values Action Team Members.....	127

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 1-1. The Components of a Social Movement.....	10

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT

by

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August 2008

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Major Department: Political Science

I sought to understand what happens to social movements as they go from outsider to insider status. I did this by conducting a case study of interest groups that represent the Christian Right social movement. Such a case study will aid in understanding of how social movements institutionalize and how institutionalization changes them. Data were collected by interviewing interest group representatives and participant observation of interest group activities (such as press conferences, press releases, petitions, and conferences). By maintaining their strong social movement ties, Christian Right interest groups have been able to overcome some of the weaknesses of institutionalization and more effectively deal with the free-rider problem. As a result, I found that social movement theory provides a better mechanism for explaining the behavior of these groups than interest group theory or institutionalization theory.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

My aim is to understand how social movements change over time. A common challenge faced by social movements is how to sustain the energy and enthusiasm of the movement long enough to cause desired change in society. To sustain them long enough, organizing structures must be built. However, there are also dangers involved in institutionalizing a social movement.

- Original goals of the movement may change to accommodate the needs of its organizing structures.
- Organizing structures may moderate the goals of the social movement.
- Movement leaders may behave oligarchically, ignoring the concerns of movement activists after gaining power in the movement.
- The movement can become “captured” to serve the electoral interests of politicians or political parties.

These changes may diminish the enthusiasm of movement activists. How social movements deal with these challenges, therefore, is an important area of research.

As social movements institutionalize, they form organizations, or interest groups, to further their goals. Therefore, the study of social movement institutionalization finds a confluence of three different theoretical approaches—*institutionalization theory*, *interest group theory*, and *social movement theory*. Understanding how these three theoretical approaches relate to each other will necessarily encompass part of this project.

Historically, social movement scholars and interest group scholars have traveled separate theoretical paths, with few firm efforts to bridge their theories. In one effort to bridge their differences, Datta et al. (2005, 10) noted two ways—*aggregation theory* and *social*

movement theory can inform each other—a unified theory can be developed to understand the behavior of organizations and social movements or theories developed in one field can be used to inform the other. While Davis et al. (2002) and the rest of the authors in their edited volume do not attempt the first option, they provide several examples of the latter. This study also follows that pattern. More specifically, it shows how social movement theories can be used to understand the behavior of certain types of interest groups.

I attempt this by conducting a case study of the Christian Right. I find that institutionalization and interest group theories did not accurately predict the behavior of Christian Right interest groups. Social movement theories, on the other hand, proved a useful tool for understanding them.

Institutionalization of a social movement is an area of study that has been poorly developed among social movement scholars. While institutionalization of social movement organizations (Zald and Ash 1966) and institutionalization of protest within society (Kaufik 1978; McCarthy and McPhail 1990) have been studied, no scholar has described in theoretical terms the institutionalization of a social movement. This is curious considering that the Christian Right social movement was described to have become institutionalized (Johns 1994; Wilson 1996). In other words, while the term “institutionalization” has been used to describe the change that occurred with the Christian Right, institutionalization has been poorly defined in relation to social movements.

Therefore, after giving some historical context and defining my terms, I discuss theories of institutionalization, interest groups, and social movements. Then I discuss

why social movement theory is a necessary component for understanding the institutionalization of the Christian Right and the behavior of Christian Right activist groups. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of the methods and data used for this research.

Historical Background

The Christian Right social movement that began in the late 1970s included social conservatives across the country. This movement brought these conservatives into the Republican Party and helped the Party to gain power at the national level and in many state and local governments (Green, Howell and Wilson 2008; Oldfield 1998; Wilson 1994). The Christian Right social movement remains a powerful force in the Republican Party today. At the national level, the Republican Party often reflects the goals of the Christian Right social movement. Currently, the Speaker of the House, the Majority Leader of the Senate, and the President of the United States are evangelical social conservatives and commonly portrayed as sympathizers, if not members, of the movement.

At first, the movement's core constituency was drawn from fundamentalist¹ evangelical Protestants. Quickly, however, the movement began to draw from other wings of evangelical Christianity. Recently, it began drawing from many varieties of conservative religious adherents. Our study shows evangelical Protestants to be most influenced by the Christian Right, followed by fundamentalists, mainline Protestants and

¹ As we will see in this next chapter, the term "fundamentalist" is used here to refer to evangelicals who were mostly separatist. They prefered to build their own communities and share engagement with the outside world was generally confined to evangelism. Black evangelicals, neo-evangelicals and Catholics are usually excluded from this group.

major Catholics (Bjornson, Sikkink, and Smith 1999). Christian Right support among religious adherents should not be overstated, however. Slightly more than half of evangelicals, the strongest supporters, had not heard of the Christian Right or did not rely on its advice for voting decisions (Bjornson, Sikkink, and Smith 1999).

To support, sustain, and expand the movement, social movement organizations, or Christian Right interest groups were created. Some of these Christian Right interest groups remain an important part of the Christian Right social movement today. Others have been disbanded and other groups have been created since the beginning of the movement. Christian Right interest groups were created to bring a structure to the social movement that could organize and give focused direction for the beliefs, energy, and emotions of the Christian Right social movement. The creation of interest groups was a way to institutionalize the Christian Right social movement. Institutionalization of the Christian Right social movement (as represented by Christian Right interest groups) is the focus of this study.

Today's Christian Right is also characterized by its very relationship with the Republican Party. The Christian Right has devoted much effort to gaining influence within the Republican Party (Bartel and Wilson 1998). This relationship has been described as "symbiotic", where the Christian Right provides loyal voters in exchange for political power (Domokos 1992). An important question then becomes, how does this relationship change the Christian Right? Has an earlier crisis changed the movement? I argue that the Christian Right has received the benefits of a social movement—a passionate, energetic focus on a cause—while also achieving some of the benefits of

institutionalization, such as increased sophistication and financial stability. This institutionalization accounts, to a large degree, for the success of the Christian Right.

Interest Group Theory

Since this is a study of interest group behavior, we should first look at what studies of interest group behavior tell us is expected. Interest group theory attempts to describe the behavior of organizations that seek to influence public policy, and as such, should describe the behavior of the groups that represent the focus of this study.

The observable behavior of interest groups will be described as "actions." The actions of interest groups include (but are not limited to) press releases, letters to members, lobbying, seminar/trials, protests, conventions, and publications. Actions are what interest groups do.

An "action domain" of an interest group is composed of the types of actions in which the interest group engages. A wide action domain means that the interest group engages in a wide variety of actions. A narrow action domain means that the interest group engages in few types of actions. Interest groups also have "issue domains." An issue domain of an interest group is the number of issues for which an interest group engages in actions. An issue domain can also be wide or narrow. A wide issue domain means that there are a large number of issues for which an interest group engages in actions. A narrow issue domain means there are few issues for which an interest group engages in actions. The number of issues for which each interest group engages in an action is considered its issue domain width. The number of types of actions used by an interest group will be considered its action domain width.

The free-rider problem suggests that groups will have difficulty maintaining the participation of its members. According to this theory, potential members will only participate in certain group activities if the benefits of participation outweigh the costs of participation. Interest group theory has tended to focus on how interest groups overcome this free-rider problem. They do so, interest group theory suggests, by offering incentives for participation to overcome the gap between costs and benefits. These theories can broadly be described as an exchange hypothesis, wherein the interest group offers benefits to its members in exchange for participation in the group. Interest group scholars have identified three types of benefits—material (goods and services that groups provide to members), solidarity (the socializing aspect of group membership) and purposes (the expression of personal goals or values that the group embodies) (Olson 1963, Salisbury 1989, Mac 1983). These theories help us understand how interest groups persist in spite of the free-rider problem.

Some interest groups have greater financial resources than others. It is hypothesized that the behavior of these groups will vary based upon their financial resources. Those with greater financial resources will have wider access and more clout than those with lesser financial resources. Also, interest groups with greater financial resources are more likely to place greater emphasis on material and collective action benefits, and less likely to place greater emphasis on solidarity benefits than groups with lesser financial resources (Olson and Walker 1993).

Interest groups that represent institutions have important differences from interest groups that represent individuals (Salisbury 1989). Institutional groups tend to have wider access than membership groups (Salisbury 1988, 64). Also, institutional groups

are more likely to provide solidarity in collective action benefits than membership groups (King and Walker 1993). This means that groups that represent institutions will use more of their resources for more solidarity than groups that represent individuals.

The size of an interest group also is expected to influence its behavior. As interest groups enter the political arena, they find they must compromise and bargain in order to accomplish some of their goals. As they accept getting only part of what they want, participation in the movement becomes diminished and withdrawal support. As the state fails, as interest groups age, they gain experience and efficiency in their activities become routinized. Therefore, their grassroots support becomes diminished as they become more skilled at utilizing lobbying tactics. So, older interest groups will rely more on insider tactics than younger interest groups.

Since the objects of analysis for this project are Christian Right interest groups, these interest group theories are expected to accurately describe the behavior of these groups. As we will see, however, they do not. They do not because Christian Right interest groups behave differently than other types of interest groups. Understanding why this is the case is a focus of this study. I will argue that these groups status as part of a social movement enables them to overcome the free-rider problem in ways not available to other types of interest groups.

Social Movements

Social movement scholars have difficulty making clear distinctions between social movements, social movement organizations and interest groups (McCarthy and Zald 1977, Berman 1998). This poses some challenges for drawing clear distinctions among the many forms of social movements for this study. The definitions set forth here are not

an attempt to resolve this debate. Rather, these definitions are shown to lend themselves to an understanding of the subject matter while paying some respect, in a general way, to how these terms have been used by previous scholars.

Social movements are “collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity to sustained institutions with elites, opponents and networks” (Tarrow 1994, 3-4). Tarrow (1994) also emphasizes the use of contentious collective action by political outsiders.

The irreducible act that lies at the heart of all social movements and revolutions is contentious collective action ... It becomes contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, act in the name of new or unaccepted claims and believe in ways that fundamentally challenge others. (Tarrow 1994, 3)

Unlike Tarrow, I propose that social movements do not have to be composed solely of political outsiders. Rather, social movements can have a dual status—simultaneously outside and inside the political system.

Russett and McCauley (1993), for instance, note the importance of “institutional activists,” social movement activists who have obtained a position inside government. By comparing the Civil Rights and Women’s Movements, they conclude that institutional activists will be more important in movements that have “institutional access” to government, strong opponents in government, and when the policy in question is complicated or highly technical (Russett and McCauley 1993, 314). The first two conditions describe the Christian Right well. As we will see, it has gained much access while facing stiff competition in government. Many of the policies that the Christian Right opposes with us are highly technical. Later, we will take a closer look at some of these, such as federal confirmations and faith-based initiatives. These findings also

suggest that the Christian Right requires an insider status to have any success as its substitute agenda.

Therefore, the Christian Right social movement can accurately be described as having a dual status. It challenges the political system using conventional and nonconventional collective action strategies, and it has sympathizers holding seats of power to further its goals inside government. The movement's ability to maintain the advantages of a social movement while achieving a degree of political power accounts for much of its success.

Social movements can have a potential constituency, core constituency, members, activists, leaders, and organizations. These elements of a social movement can be thought of as concentric circles nested within each other² (Figure 1-1). The outermost circle is the potential constituency, which represents all those in society who share or are potentially receptive to the beliefs of the social movement. The core constituency is those among the potential constituency that are most likely to become mobilized. Within the core constituency lies the members of the social movement. The members divide among in social movement organizations. Social movement organizations (SMOs) are formally organized groups designed to further the goals of the social movement. If they attempt to influence public policy they will also be an interest group. Movements can be distinguished between small dissent and large dissent. Among the members there are the activists. The activists are those who are vigorously involved and identify closely with the goals of the social movement. Some of these activists will be involved with SMOs

² This idea was originally from a 1976 DGL model regarding how those involved view their dissent.

The leaders of these organizations as well as those who are looked to for guidance among the activists are the social movement leaders. These leaders represent the movement circle of the social movement (deCuir and Zald 1977, Oberschall 1973, Tarrow 1994).

This research project assumes that social movements may become institutionalized. Further, it argues that SMOs may be one manifestation of this institutionalization. But what does it mean to argue that a social movement has become “institutionalized”? For a social movement to become a lasting part of the political process it must become organized. For a loose collection of beliefs to transform into specific policy goals with plans for implementing them, structures must be built for this purpose. The building and maintenance of these structures represent one aspect of the institutionalization of a social movement. Indeed, most often when specific social movements are discussed in the media or academics, they have already become institutionalized because they are often recognized by their institutional structures and the exploits of these structures. But, can the Christian Right legitimately be characterized as a social movement?

The Christian Right as a Social Movement

Some may object to the idea of the Christian Right as a social movement for two reasons. First, the Christian Right is conservative and most studies of social movements have focused on leftist movements.¹ Second, the Christian Right has now gained a measure of power in government and become an “insider” rather than an “outsider.” As with Tarrow (1994) social movements are often stereotyped or compared to outsiders

¹ For an exception, see LaPa 1986 study of the California property tax revolt.

non-object class-based strategies in favor of mass actions such as demonstrations and rallies.

However, the Christian Right has much in common with liberal social movements. For instance, both need a common identity, resources, and an appropriate environment in order to develop, and, they both must deal with the “progressive versus conservative” split that often arises in movement leaders. Therefore, the theories developed by studying leftist social movements will prove useful for understanding rightist movements as well.

Some may also argue that an “outsider” status is a requirement of a social movement. While the Christian Right has made great gains in government institutions, it would be farfetched to say that it “controls” the government. Therefore, at some level it will continue to have some combination of insider and outsider status. It will continue to petition the government through lobbyists and grassroots organizers, and it will continue to have sympathizers in government that push its agenda. This is not unusual among social movements. This could describe the Women’s Movement, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Gay Rights Movement as well. Indeed, this remains at the core of the problem we consider.

If the Christian Right fits the social movement model, we must nevertheless ask if social movement theory helps us understand the Christian Right. An affirmative answer is sufficient justification for using social movement theory to study the Christian Right. From this perspective, therefore, the judgment of whether or not I appropriately categorized the Christian Right as a social movement should be reserved for the conclusion of this dissertation.

A Theory of Institutionalization

To understand Christian Right interest groups we have looked at interest group theory and social movement theory. Since these groups represent an institutionalized form of a social movement, there is one additional theoretical tradition that is important for our analysis—institutionalization theory.

Institutionalization According to Weber and Michels

Max Weber argues that as charismatic leadership becomes routinized, or replaced by bureaucratic structures, it loses its authority and is abandoned by its followers (Tadmor and Mills [1944] 1983). Similarly, Michels (1911) argues in “notion of oligarchy” that voluntary organizations, over time leaders will dominate the decision making process at the expense of supporters, thus making voluntary organizations unrepresentative of their supporters. These leaders will, seeking to preserve their position, steer the organization in a more conservative, or less radical, direction if that is deemed necessary to preserve the organization and enhance its influence. When expediency and predictability are preferred, leaders will not make bold moves that may upset the status quo. Weber and Michels lead to the expectation that as social movements institutionalize their leaders will pursue more attainable goals, will become more concerned with institutional maintenance, and will become more oligarchic (Tadmor and Mills 1983). Moss (1996) has made a similar case with respect to the Christian Right of the mid-1990s:

They [the Christian Right] intensify as they reshape and institutionalize the moral consensus. In a typical case, charismatic leadership yields to bureaucratic leadership, attainable goals are replaced by diffuse goals, organizational maintenance becomes an objective in itself. (441)

The institutionalization of the Christian Right social movement, therefore, fits the Weber-Michels model of institutionalization, but as we will see, there are other reasons to expect the Weber-Michels model to be insufficient to understand the institutionalization of the Christian Right social movement.

Institutionalization According to Huntington

Huntington (1965) also proposes a model for evaluating the level of institutionalization of a political system. This framework was found useful for understanding the institutionalization of the US House of Representatives (Priddy 1988), and the model is broad enough to apply to many types of institutionalization.

Huntington's theory also shares some similarities with the Weber-Michels model:

Institutionalization, according to Huntington, is an important measure of the strength of a political organization. The other is the "scope of support" (Huntington 1965, 1966). The level of institutionalization can be defined by four variables: adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. The higher the degree of these four characteristics, the higher the level of institutionalization there is.

The adaptability of an organization is dependent on its age and the amount of challenges it has endured. Age can be measured in three ways. First, chronologically, the older an organization is the higher the level of institutionalization. Second, generationally, the more an organization has successfully replaced its leadership, the higher the level of institutionalization. And third, functionally, the more an organization has adapted its functions to changes in the environment, the higher the level of institutionalization.

The number, variety and functionality of subunits can measure the complexity of an organization. The more complex a political system is, the more stable it is. Thus, complexity is a characteristic of high institutionalization.

Autonomy means that a political system is "insulated from the impact of socio-political groups and procedures" (Huntington 1963, 481). There are many types of social groups that may try to influence a political system. An autonomous political system will be able to shield itself from the influence of these forces. A subordinate political system will be the instrument of some social group.

A highly institutionalized system is also coherent and unified. There is consensus on the boundaries of the system and the procedures for resolving disputes within those boundaries (Huntington 1963).

Huntington's theory of institutionalization predicts that as social movements institutionalize, they will essentially replace their leaders and change to adapt to new environments. The number of subunits serving the needs of the social movement will increase, with some becoming highly specialized. There will be a consensus within the movement about whom and what ideas are a part of the movement and disputes will be dealt with internally. And, those outside the movement will find influencing the movement to be difficult.

There are some similarities between Huntington's theory of institutionalization and the expectations created by Weber and Mahler. When Huntington describes institutionalization as increasing adaptability, this change might be the pursuit of more valuable goals, as expected from Weber's *ethische*. Also, an increase in autonomy might be associated with an oligarchical leadership. And, an increase in coherence is similar to

the movement away from institutionalism and towards atomism. Therefore, the variable that Hargrave adds to the Weber-Michels model of institutionalization is complexity

Additionally, Hargrave's theory is less normative. He does not assume that conditions worsen with institutionalization, only that conditions change. This approach is more congruent with the research. I found that, while the Christian Right has definitely changed while becoming institutionalized, it has not reduced some of the negative aspects that Weber-Michels expects.

According to institutionalization theory as set forth by Weber, Michels, and Hargrave, social movement change can be understood by observing how the goals and structure of the movement change. Bureaucratic leadership will replace charismatic leadership. This leadership will seek goals that are more measurable, more concerned with institutional maintenance, more concerned with structure than substance, and less concerned with the goals of the members. And, the structure of the movement will become more complex, meaning the number and variety of interests will increase.

Challenging Institutionalization Theory: The Institutionalization of SMGs

Rald and Ash (1984) believe that the Weber-Michels model is insufficient for understanding the institutionalization of SMGs.⁴ They hypothesized that, under some circumstances, institutionalization does not lead to goal transformation, can lead to more radical goals, and may enhance linkages between leaders and members. Unlike the general study, they looked solely at SMGs rather than the social movement as a whole. Yet, by taking the characteristics of social movements into consideration, Rald and Ash

⁴See Table 1.1 for a summary of the main points of the Weber-Michels-Hargrave model and Rald and Ash (1984).

(1966) provide some important considerations that can be applied to an understanding of social movement institutionalization.

While the Weber-Mohrle-Huntington model may be well suited for other homogeneous organizations, it fails to characterize SMOs because of the unique nature of these organizations. SMOs are different in two ways. Their goals are aimed at changing society as a whole and individual behavior, and, purpose motives are more important than material or solidary motives in maintaining their membership (Zald and Ash 1966, 327). Based upon the behavior of SMOs, Zald and Ash (1966) derive several proposals regarding how social movement organizations change:

Some SMOs, especially those affiliated with a religion, have as part of their goals the changing of individuals rather than simply changing public policy. The Temperance Movement, for instance, sought to end drunkenness and to make the selling of alcoholic beverages illegal. The commitment of members to this type of group is less dependent on the success of the group. These groups also are more likely to maintain their original goals (Zald and Ash 1966, 331-2)

Goal transformation also can occur depending on whether an SMO has achieved its goals, if goals remain relevant but its chances of success are unlikely, or society has decisively opposed its goals. All three of these cases offer particular challenges to an SMO.

A failed SMO is one in which the goals of the SMO have been thoroughly repudiated society and there is no longer any hope that these goals will be achieved by the SMO, or the SMO has been dismantled and is viewed as illegitimate by its supporters (Zald and Ash 1966, 334-5). Members of these organizations will either seek "new

radical means to achieve their goals within the movement, decrease the importance of their goals, or change the focus of discussion" (Zald and Ash 1966, 331). Bates (2000) offers a case study of a Christian Right organization, the Oregon Christian Alliance (OCA), to declare: "The point is that a multidimensional approach, that takes account of the political opportunity situation, the OCA's relationship to the Republican Party, and weaknesses in the structure of the OCA, best explains its decline."

There are two ways an SMO can be successful: its goals can be achieved or it can gain the power necessary to achieve those goals. "When an SMO 'wins in power,'" Zald and Ash's analytical techniques no longer apply (1966, 331). Instead, "analytic concepts applicable to party structure and governmental bureaucracy become more relevant" (Zald and Ash 1966, 333). However, Zald and Ash never define what it means to "win in power." Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any SMO according to power in the United States because the US system of government was designed to diffuse power and insure that no single group or interest is able to gain hegemonic control over the government.²

There are two types of SMOs that represent neither total success nor total failure, the *breathless* SMO and the *stable* SMO. The *breathless* SMO has had some success in the past and gained some portions of power, but the sustained intensity of the social movement has subsided, the SMO's growth has slowed or ceased, and there is no noticeable expression of future success (Zald and Ash 1966, 334). The *breathless* SMO is most likely to believe according to the Weber-Minkels model, because, the lack of resources produces equity and distress among members, leaders depend more on

material resources, and leaders pursue conservative goals to avoid disrupting their secure status (Told and Ash 1966, 104).

The most viable scenario for an SMO is to have a steady stream of resources while never fully achieving its primary goal:

In a sense the perfectly viable [SMO] which avoided problems of organizational transformation, goal-displacement and the like, would be one which over time always seemed to be getting closer to its goal without quite reaching it. (Told and Ash 1966, 103)

The viable SMO is more likely to survive than the successful, beleaguered or failed SMO, because it is never faced with the challenges of complete success or failure. While total success is the best scenario for implementing the goals of a social movement, “viability” is the best case scenario for the long-term survival of a movement’s organizational structure. Similarly, I will later argue, best describes the Christian Right.

A social movement may be represented by many SMOs. The relationships between these SMOs can have important effects. These relationships can be characterized to reflect a competition or an interaction.

Some SMOs must compete amongst themselves for the scarce resources provided by the social movement’s stability, success and/or consistency. For this reason, SMOs must be responsive to changes in attitudes about the goals and/or tactics of the social movement among the constituency, which can lead to goal transformation. Told and Ash contend that these changes “are a major determinant of the transformation of organizational goals” (1966, 112). While the Weber-Michels model predicts that organizational leaders will become more assimilated to society in order to maintain

¹See James Mahoney’s *The Federalist No. 49* (Stanford, Michigan and Bay [1787] 2004).

their purposes. Zald and Ash points out that, because of inter-organizational competition, the goals of an SMO may become more extreme, rather than moderate (1966, 103). This might be the case, for instance, if part of the core constituency has become alienated by more moderate SMOs.

Changes in the goals or tactics of an SMO can also result from interaction among SMOs of a common social movement. Zald and Ash note three types of interaction—cooperation, conflict and merger (Zald and Ash 1966: 115). Cooperation among SMOs is thought to be unusual:

Except during full scale revolutions or total movement activities, [SMOs] do not engage in a complete division of labor. It occurs primarily in situations where special competencies are required for legislative lobbying or legal work, and a simple symbiotic relationship may develop that does not lead to interdependence or other organization. (Zald and Ash 1966, 111)

When cooperation involved specialization, a coalition “pools resources and coordinates plans” (Zald and Ash 1966, 111). Conflicts are more likely when a social movement appears close to achieving a goal because “the costs of keeping on the coalition seem small in comparison with the potential benefits” (Zald and Ash 1966, 111). With cooperation and conflict, SMOs will keep their distinct identity. With a merger, two or more SMOs will become a single distinct identity. In this study, cooperation and conflict were both found among Christian Right interest groups.

Fissions and splits can also occur within an SMO. An SMO is more likely to split into two or more groups when the core constituency of the social movement is heterogeneous, the SMO is “concerned with questions of ultimate ideological truth and with theoretical matters,” and when the goals of the SMO are unlikely to be achieved (Zald and Ash 1966, 117).

Zald and Ash note two types of leadership functions—articulation and mobilization (1966, 136). *Articulation* seeks to link the goals of the SMG to other groups or the larger society in order to expand its support base. *Mobilization* seeks to reaffirm the goals and tactics of the social movement in order to strengthen the commitment of the support base. These functions are similar to Franco's ([JNTB] 2003) two stages in the course of a congressionalism—expansionist and protectionist. During the expansionist stage, members of Congress are working to expand their election constituency by reaching out to more groups. Later, during the protectionist stage, members of Congress become satisfied with their election constituency. They no longer seek out to try to include new groups. Rather, they seek to keep the groups they already have on their side. Like the career stages of a congressionalism, Weber-Mitchels predicts that articulating leadership will be followed by mobilizing leadership. Early leaders, who reach out to expand their base, will be replaced by leaders who no longer reach out but seek to solidify the support of their base. However, that is not necessarily the case. SMGs that focus on changing the individual are more likely to have mobilizing leadership, and, those that focus on changing society as a whole are more likely to require both types of leadership (Zald and Ash 1966, 136).

The Weber-Mitchels model predicts that as bureaucratic leadership replaces charismatic leadership, leadership will become more oligarchical and pursue more conservative goals. However, group leaders may be more radical in their goals than the vote constituency. In this case, the movement towards oligarchy would lead in the opposite direction, to more radical rather than conservative goals (Zald and Ash 1966, 136).

Institutionalization theory must be adopted to take into account the characteristics of social movements in order to effectively describe social movement change. Wald and Ash's hypotheses will prove useful as I attempt to better understand the institutionalization of the Christian Right social movement.

Determinants of Social Movement Success

Social movements will be characterized along the three dimensions of identity, resource mobilization and opportunity structure. These dimensions have been described as similar to the requirements for a crime suspect—MOM, or motive, means and opportunity (Wald, Silverman and Frisly 2005). The success of a social movement is thought to rely on whether it has an identity, or motive, to mobilize around, whether it has the resources, or means, to mobilize, and whether there is an opportunity to mobilize. All three dimensions are considered necessary for the movement to have some degree of success.

Social movements form around a common identity. Identity is a term used to cover a broad range of concepts. In other terms it has been called beliefs, worldviews, culture (or subculture), incentives, and grievances (Dancels 1990, Gansley and Tierney 1982, Opp 1984, Smelser 1963). The identity of a social movement provides the impetus for social movements to become involved in the public sphere. Identity provides a view of how the world is and how it should be. It provides social movements with the vision or direction for the changes it seeks in society. It also can be a source of passion or energy for those involved in the social movement.

Identity alone is not enough to explain the emergence of a social movement, because it does not explain why some movements become mobilized while others do not.

There are many types of situations in society, but not all of them form into social movements. Resource mobilization theory understands that the groups that become mobilized are the ones with the resources necessary for mobilization. These resources often include communication networks, leaders, and political entrepreneurs (Johns-Corby and Fold 1977).

While resource mobilization pays attention to factors within the movement, the opportunity model pays attention to factors outside the movement. It argues that the environment within which a potential movement lives is an important factor in the emergence and success of a social movement. The emergence of a social movement, then, represents a change in the political status quo (Johns-Corby 1982, 176). Opportunity can also represent non-political factors that are congruent to a social movement. For instance, changes in technological advances can increase opportunities for political action. Therefore, social movement theory tells us that, when there are changes in society that create a greater opportunity for political action, any group that is ready (conscious) and willing (strategy) may move into collective action.

This paper will utilize these social movement theories to explain the behavior of Christian Right interest groups. While social movement theory tends to focus on explaining the beginnings of social movements, I will use them to understand the behavior of a social movement in a much more institutionalized form. Additionally, interest group theories and institutionalization theories will prove inadequate for explaining the behavior the more institutionalized form of the Christian Right social movement, namely modern Christian Right interest groups.

These studies have looked at the Christian Right at the state level and come to slightly different conclusions about the movement's sophistication and moderation. Feld, Bender and Manning (2002) studied the Christian Right's efforts to pass a covenant marriage law in Louisiana. This law gave couples the option of entering into a covenant marriage, a status that required they undergo marriage counseling before getting married and have stricter requirements for getting a divorce, such as additional counseling. This effort succeeded where others failed because the Christian Right focused on selling the merits of the bill that respected personal choice while being careful to not characterize non-covenant marriages as inferior. Since the Christian Right's performance would have been to abolish no-fault divorce altogether, this study shows a Christian Right that is willing to accept achievable goals about its ability to achieve what they really want. It also shows the movement focusing its efforts on state as opposed to effectively pass legislation.

Wald and Camp (2002), on the other hand, show a Christian Right that is ineffective because of its unwillingness to compromise. They examined members of the 1999-08 Florida Constitutional Revision Commission, a body charged with reviewing the state's core document and offering changes to its documents. The Commission included a group of members appointed by the Speaker of the House, a Christian Right network, who had strong credentials in movements for home schooling, anti-abortion efforts and other socially conservative causes. The Christian Right members of the commission held a power position, unwilling to compromise with the other members, even with fellow Republicans who were from the party's mainstream wing. As a result, they were less successful in achieving their objectives. They preferred no-half-to-half-a-loaf

While the Virginia Christian Right, Russell and Wilson (1994) show more mixed results. They find a movement that has become an important factor within the Virginia Republican Party and strong interest groups that display pragmatism along with waves of movement activists that display a purist position. This coalition worked with moderate Republicans to elect George Allen as governor—a pragmatic compromise. Yet, it helped nominate the less electable Michael Parris for Lieutenant Governor and Oliver North for Senator—a purist position that led to defeat for both candidates. Part of the difficulty in assessing the Christian Right in Virginia, Russell and Wilson (1994, 121) conclude, is because there is “no single Christian Right in Virginia, but rather elements that have institutionalized into interest groups and electoral coal elements of an ongoing social movement.” The institutionalized elements display pragmatism whereas the social movement elements show more purist positions.

As is true with other social movements, the Christian Right is decentralized. State-level Christian Right organizations do not take their orders from a central organization. In some states, the local organizations even act independently (Russell and Wilson 1994). Therefore, it should not be surprising to find differences in the Christian Right in three separate states. Also, as Russell and Wilson (1994) point out, most groups may behave differently based upon the incentives provided by the electoral rules at a state. How are party nominees chosen? How does one become a party delegate? How are party leaders chosen? The answers to questions such as these can also explain differences in the behavior of Christian Right activists at the state level. A political party that is easy to affiliate would encourage involvement in party activities. Alternatively, a system that finds political parties difficult to affiliate would discourage those activities.

Unlike these three studies, my work looks at the Christian Right at the national level rather than the state level. A study of this type has not been done since Moyn (1992, 1994, 1996). By looking at the movement from 2002 to 2006, I can observe how the movement has changed since Moyn examined it in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Moyn (1992, 1994, 1996) described a Christian Right that had transformed itself from a movement, but naive and unsophisticated social movement to an institutionalized set of interest groups that have learned how to play the political game, and play it well, but have become more concerned with maintaining these institutions than achieving the original goals of the movement. The movement had lost some of its zeal as it became integrated into the political system. The updated study, on the other hand, finds that while the Christian Right has maintained the fiscal stability, sophistication, and pragmatism that Moyn (1992, 1994, 1996) found, it has not lost sight of its original goals and purpose. Explaining why this is the case is the task of this study.

The Christian Right also fits the description of a "new social movement." New social movements are distinctive from "old" social movements in several ways. They are based on abstracts rather than class or economic that had not previously been mobilized. They have a broader cross appeal, making them harder to characterize as politically left or right. They focus on more personal issues of human life, such as health and sex. Their tactics are less violent. And, they are structurally more decentralized (Johnston, Landolt, and Gaudfeldt 1994).

Data

Before discussing my findings, I will discuss how my data was chosen. How did I know what to study and what not to study for a project about Christian Right interest

groups? I began to answer this question by looking at the groups that previous scholars of the Christian Right had identified. Moon (1992) identified ten groups founded between 1976 and 1989: National Christian Action Coalition, Believing the Bible, Christian Voice, Moral Majority, Concerned Women for America, Freedom Council, American Coalition for Traditional Values, Liberty Federation, American Freedom Coalition, and Family Research Council. Wilson (1996), looking at the movement in the mid 1990s, focused on three organizations that he identified as the largest and best organized of the Christian Right organizations: Christian Coalition, Concerned Women for America, and Family Research Council.

Some of these organizations had died off while others had been formed by the time I began my research. To get a better sense of which groups I should be looking at before I entered the field, I also used a content analysis to further refine my list of identifiable Christian Right organizations. This content analysis used LexisNexis to search the *Washington Post* in all of 1999 and 2000 for keywords related to the Christian Right.² I got 143 hits. From those news accounts, I determined the main Christian Right interest groups and the issues they were involved with. This list became a starting point for conducting my participant observations and interviews.

The groups selected for this study were confined to those that have a prominent presence in Washington, DC. This limitation was necessitated, in part, due to limited resources and the selection of the Washington, DC area as my field research location. Nonetheless, the groups that are most active in direct lobbying of the institutions of national government represent an important part of the overall movement that is widely

of the academic attention. Due to this emphasis, however, two groups in particular that are important players in the movement have been left out—Focus on the Family and American Family Association. Neither of these had an office or lobbyist in DC during my fieldwork. American Family Association previously had a full-time Washington lobbyist on their payroll, but the position had been cut before I had arrived. I did, however, monitor its website and its email communications. While it would often address the major political issues that other Christian Right interest groups addressed, it tended to focus more on lobbying non-governmental institutions, especially media organizations, over issues of obscenity.

The primary mission of Focus on the Family is to counsel families on marital issues and child rearing, mostly through its daily radio program. Nevertheless, Focus on the Family has also been involved in political issues during most of its existence and even more so in recent years. James Dobson, its founder and radio host, is appropriately considered a leader within the Christian Right. Additionally, Family Research Council, which I did study, is sometimes referred to as the political arm of Focus on the Family. While this is an overstatement (they are technically two separate organizations), Focus on the Family has a close working relationship with Family Research Council, with Dobson as Chairman of its Board of Directors. By leaving Focus on the Family out of this analysis, I do not intend to minimize its importance as a Christian Right organization.¹ It simply fell outside the boundaries of the groups I intended to study. You will notice that Dobson is cited often, however, acknowledging his importance as a major player within

¹ See Table 1.2 for a list of these arguments.

² See Spivack (2000) for an analysis that focuses entirely on Focus on the Family.

the Christian Right. Also to narrow the focus of my research, I included groups who focus on the legal arena, such as the Christian Legal Society, the Heritage Institute and the American Center for Law and Justice.²

In addition to its prominent DC presence, the groups were required to have a strong focus on changing public policy and policy goals based upon the following beliefs:

- The US was founded upon Christian principles.
- Life is sacred and begins at conception.
- Sex is only morally acceptable in a monogamous marital relationship.
- Religious beliefs should be able to compete equally with secular beliefs in the public square.

The beliefs were found to be the most consistent Christian Right beliefs in previous research (Larsen 1993, Wilson 1994). There are groups that share these beliefs but are not engaged in political activities. Since this is a study of the political mobilization of these beliefs, those groups are not included.

Most of the time, this information was easily gathered from the group's website. Occasionally, these groups would advocate their beliefs and purpose through a mission statement, statement of beliefs, or something similar. When data were not available, I relied upon my participant observation and interviews to gather this data. The groups share all of the characteristics and are considered the core groups of Christian Right interest groups. The rest of the groups will be considered peripheral groups (Table 1-3).

Methods

To understand the behavior of Christian Right interest groups, this study attempts to understand the behavior of elites, more specifically, the elites who make programmatic decisions within Christian Right interest groups. To understand this behavior requires an

understanding of these individuals. It also requires a depth of understanding that is conducive to particular types of research methods. Therefore, for this study, I needed methods that would lead to a voluminous understanding of a small group of people. In other words, sample size was sacrificed for more descriptive variables. While this type of research, sometimes called “thick description” (Geertz 1973) or “making and meaning” (Friedson 1970; 2003), is more often associated with anthropology than political science, it is the most appropriate for my research questions.

Participant observation and depth interviews were used to collect data for this study. I conducted depth interviews with representatives of Christian Right interest groups and engaged in participant observation of those interest groups’ activities. I attended press conferences, seminars, strategy meetings, conferences, and meetings, visited websites, and participated in E-mail and mailing lists. In other words, anything a Christian Right interest might do. This research took place between September, 2002 and January 2004. Consequently, I will make reference to events that occurred after this period, but the bulk of my data collection is contained in this time frame.

Many of the groups I studied conducted press conferences, conferences, or symposiums. I often spent at least one or two days a week attending these types of presentations. Occasionally, there were more than one of these scheduled at the same time and I had to choose which one to attend. At these presentations I was able to listen to the point of view being presented by these organizations and I often asked questions during the “Q & A” at the end of the presentations. These events were also important for the mingling time before and afterwards. It was a chance for these organizations to

² See also (Hall, 2004) for a study focused on these groups.

provide some snacks and beverages afterwards. This encouraged attendees to work around and discuss the presentation with each other or to talk more directly with the speaker. I used this time to meet other people or to build relationships with those I had come to know from previous meetings. Occasionally, I would use this time to request an interview as well. I took notes during the presentations and added additional thoughts while riding home on the Metro, and then typed them onto the computer when I got home.

I attended three large conferences with Concerned Women for America, Christian Coalition, and the American Conservative Union while in the field. I also attended several smaller conferences. The conferences were helpful because they were some of the few opportunities I had to observe some of the members and activists who traveled to Washington, DC to attend these conferences. It was also interesting to see the many visitors that attended some of these conferences.

I also had the good fortune to attend the Tuesday morning "Family Forum" meetings, held every other week while Congress is in session. They were located in a small conference room at an office building that is also occupied by Free Congress Foundation. Anywhere from 10 to 20 people were in attendance. Coffee and doughnuts were served and time was spent mingling before the meeting. The meeting began with a prayer.

In these meetings representatives from different Christian Right, and other conservative interest groups would gather to listen to speakers who were invited to discuss issues of importance. The speakers were often also representatives from Christian Right interest groups. Other speakers included congressional staffers or staffers from executive branch departments. Occasionally, speakers from outside DC addressed

the meeting. For someone who would only be in town for a day or two, an opportunity to address several groups is an efficient and effective use of their time. Among those attending, the smaller Christian Right interest groups seemed to be better represented than the larger ones. Many of the groups also seemed to prefer to send their younger staffers to the meeting. Often, the median age in the rooms appeared to be less than 30.

These meetings were important for both gathering and disseminating information. Additional information was often provided in the form of paper handouts or published studies. It was rare, but not unheard of, for actual debates to take place. I was required to pledge not to divulge anything that was said at these meetings—a pledge that was not unique to me; everyone who attends must make the same pledge. Nonetheless, if I wanted some information from the meeting “on the record,” I could still ask for the information outside of the meeting. Plus, the meetings kept me up-to-date on the topics that those organizations were dealing with and it provided additional time for me to meet people and build relationships.

Bernard (1993) notes several reasons that participant observation will improve the validity, or accuracy, of research on cultural groups: 1) there are certain types of data that can only be collected through participant observation, 2) subjects being studied are less likely to change their behavior as a result of the presence of the researcher, 3) it helps the researcher formulate suitable questions for the interview, 4) it gives you an intuitive understanding of the culture you are studying, and 5) only participant observation can address certain research problems (140-5). I found Bernard’s observations pertinent when applying this method to my own research. Developing myself to the culture of the Christian Right through participant observation helped me to gain types of insights

that no other research method could have provided. The depth interviews alone would answer many questions about the Christian Right but they would do a poor job at helping me to understand those answers.

Even much of what I learned about the Christian Right was achieved through participant observation; occasionally, you will find me providing specific information about the movement without a reference. In those instances, the information came from my participant observation, but I could not pinpoint a particular conversation or interview that provided the information. For the most part, however, I have tried to reference as extensively as possible.

Seven of the ten Christian Right activist groups granted my interview requests and Erika interviewed eight peripheral groups.¹⁷ Only three organizations, Christian Legal Society,¹⁸ Traditional Values Coalition and Tradition, Family and Property, denied my interview requests and there were seven who agreed to an interview but were unable to fit me into their schedules, American Values, Values and Religious Liberty Commission, and Proseal Right to Life Committee. The interviews took between 45 to 90 minutes and were conducted in an open-ended style. I had a several questions that I planned to ask but left time to ask follow-up questions based upon the answers given. The largest part of the interview was usually when I named each of the other groups I was studying and asked them to describe their groups relationship to this group. Other questions included:

- Which issues does A/C's spend most of its resources addressing?
- How do you prioritize your resource allocation?

¹⁷See Table 1.4 for a list of these interviews

¹⁸Since this is one of the legal groups, it was not included in my final research.

- How do you most often go about addressing these issues? What methods do you use?
- Where does your financial support come from: individuals or institutions?
- Among the individual supporters, does your support come from many small donations or a few large donations?
- What is your budget?
- What is your staff size?
- How many members do you have?
- What are the requirements for membership?
- The scholarly literature notes that interest groups often struggle with deciding how much they are willing to compromise the goals of their organization in order to pursue policy objectives. How do you deal with this dilemma? Can you cite some specific examples?

I also duplicated a study by Katz and Walker (1992) in which I asked them to rank on a scale of one to ten the importance of various benefits for retaining their members, with six indicating one of the most important benefits and one indicating that the benefit is not provided by their group. A copy of this survey is found in Appendix B and the results are discussed in chapter four.

Pen and paper were my only recording devices. While a tape recorder may have captured more information, I was concerned that its presence would discourage openness or change the interviewee's answers in some other way. A few times I was asked whether the interview was being recorded and each time I was told something in confidence after I confirmed that I was not tape recording the conversation. These incidents confirmed my concern that the presence of a tape recorder was taken into consideration by at least some of my respondents and would have affected their forthrightness in answering my questions.

The interviewees were generally very friendly and seemed to appreciate the opportunity to talk about their organizations and help me with my research. One even

brought me lunch, was brought me coffee, and another brought me coffee. Only one, The Cooperative Circus, seemed genuinely concerned that I might misrepresent them. The interviewer asked for a copy of the informed consent form that we both signed. That form was required of all those I interviewed by the University of Florida and contained insights as a research subject. That gave me the impression that previous interviewers had misrepresented him. Nonetheless, he seemed to grow more comfortable with me as the interview went on. Some interviews seemed poised for lunch as the interview went on and I tried to finish up quickly. It was more when the time, however, that the interview went longer than an hour due to a talkative interviewee. My interview with Priscilla Fellowship lasted nearly three hours. One of my interviewees expressed appreciation for the interview because it helped her to think about the nature of her work (American Association of Christian Schools, personal interview, June 11, 2005). Much of what these groups do entails getting people to listen to what they have to say. Therefore, they may appreciate the opportunity when someone is willing to sit and do nothing but listen to what they have to say.

Objectivity and empathy are important disciplines that I strove to achieve during this study. I aimed neither to tear down nor build up the Christian Right with the information provided here. My primary goal is to help my reader understand the Christian Right. Objectivity and empathy are central to this end.

Objectivity helps me to achieve my goal because if I let my preconceived ideas or judgments about the Christian Right control my research, then the research is only showing my biased view of the Christian Right rather than a true understanding of the Christian Right. If I only seek to justify my opinions about the Christian Right, through

my research, thus the research itself has been problematic. If I do not approach my subject with a willingness to learn, I will not gain the understanding I desire. To achieve greater objectivity I had to become more consciously aware of my biases. Without this awareness, I would be unable to detect when these biases influenced my observations. Secondly, I had to maintain a critical eye on what I was writing. I would continually ask myself, "is this how it really is, or how I want it to be?"

Empathy is necessary to achieve my goal, because, I cannot truly understand my subject without seeing the world through its eyes. Many times throughout this work you will find me expressing a viewpoint of the Christian Right. This is not meant as an endorsement of that viewpoint; it is only meant to help the reader understand how the Christian Right views the world, as I have tried to do.

My own judgments about the Christian Right are complex. I am an evangelical Christian, part of the "political constituency" discussed earlier. I share many of its goals while differing others. Therefore, my emotional connection to the movement can range from appreciation to detestation.

One dilemma I dealt with when conducting the interview was how much of this information to reveal if asked. On one hand, revealing information about myself could influence the how the interviewee answered my questions. Would this, in effect, corrupt my data? On the other hand, if I refuse to answer this question, would I be considered untrustworthy? Why should they answer my questions when I refuse to answer theirs? In this instance, I would still be influencing how the interviewee answered my questions, thus corrupting my data. I had not decided how I would deal with this dilemma before I began my demands. As a result, I was inconsistent in how I responded when the dilemma

presented itself. In one early interview I was asked what my own bias was in regards to the Christian Right. I answered that I was an "objective observer" with a learning mode on my face. He answered with a scenario, "yeah right," but did not press me further. This happened toward the end of the interview and I ended up not including his organization in the final dataset for unrelated reasons. In a couple of other interviews, I was asked about my religion, but not my views on the Christian Right. After revealing that I was an evangelical Christian, the interviewers seemed more comfortable and open to talking to me. Therefore, revealing this information may have provided me with additional access that I would not have had otherwise.

In the vast majority of interviews I did not have to deal with the question of how much to reveal about myself, because I was not asked. Instead, those I interviewed were very open to answering my questions. They only rarely refused to answer a question and those refusals were generally related to the finances of the organization, though the majority was open about their finances as well. It was also rare to be treated with suspicion. In those rare cases I took extra time to elaborate on what my research was about, which seemed to help the situation. The informed consent forms probably helped strengthen the legitimacy of the interview in the minds of the interviewees.

These interviews should be recognized as elite interviews. And, for the most part, that is a study of elite behavior. Any attempt to apply the Ecoburg lens to mass behavior would be misguided. If one wishes to understand the potential constituency, core constituency, or membership of the Christian Right, they should look elsewhere (Manninen 1994, Smith 1990, Smith 2000, and Waddock and Reish 1998, for example). The only time that study reaches beyond elite behavior is when I interviewed with the activists during

my pre/post observations. These observations brought insights, but the focus of the study, or what I am attempting to explain, is elite behavior, namely Christian Right interest groups.

Summary

Social movement theory better explains the behavior of Christian Right interest groups than interest group and institutionalization theories. This is my claim. To build this argument attention will be paid to three Christian Right interest groups and groups related to them, and how they address their chief concerns. Chapter two will discuss the history of the movement. Chapter three will examine what I expected to find according to institutionalization and interest group theories. Chapter four will discuss in further detail how, respectively, the identity, resources and opportunities of the Christian Right social movement help us understand the behavior of Christian Right interest groups. And chapter five will summarize my findings and conclude with some thoughts on the future of the Christian Right.



Figure 1-1 The Components of a Social Movement

Table 1-4
Theories of Institutionalization

Key Intellectual Proposition	Test and Job
Charismatic leadership will be replaced by bureaucratic leadership	SEOs affiliated with religion are more likely to maintain their original goals.
Leaders will pursue attainable goals.	A "stable" SMO is more likely to maintain its original goals.
Leaders will pursue less radical goals.	Goals may become more radical because of competition with other groups.
Leaders will be more concerned with institutional maintenance	Goals may become more radical because leaders are depersonal and more radical than their members.
Autocratic leadership will be replaced with participatory leadership	Cooperation, or a division of labor, where special competencies are required.
Complexity will increase.	Coalitions are more likely when an SMO appears close to achieving its goals.
	Leadership can be rationalizing, based upon organizational needs.

Table 1-1

Keywords Used for Content Analysis of the Washington Post, 1990-2000

Jerry Falwell
Pat Robertson
Ralph Reed
Patricia Canby
Tim LaHaye
Beverly LaHaye
Phyllis Kluft
James Dobson
Greg Gagne
Christian Coalition
Family Research Council
American Life League
American Family Association
The American Society for Traditional, Family and Property
The Rutherford Institute
Religious Freedom Coalition
Single Forum
Concerned Women for America
National Right to Life Committee
Religious Right
Christian Right
Christian Conservatives
Conservative Christian

Table 1-3
Identifying Christian Right Interest Groups*

	Conservative Christian	Policy Focus	Policy Profession
American Association of Christian Schools	X	X	X
American Enterprise Institute		X	
American Values	X	X	X
Association of Christian Schools International	X		
Center for Public Justice	X	X	
Center for Religious Freedom			
Christian Coalition	X	X	X
Concerned Women for America	X	X	X
Conservative Council	X	X	
Council for National Policy			
Eagle Forum	X	X	X
Effect and Public Policy Center	X	X	
Faith and Religious Liberty Commission	X	X	X
Family Research Council	X	X	X
Free Congress Foundation	X	X	X
H Heritage Foundation		X	
Home School Legal Defense Association	X		X
Hudson Institute		X	
Institute on Religion and Democracy	X		X
National Association of Evangelicals	X		
National Law Center for Children and Families		X	
National Right to Life Committee	X	X	
Prison Fellowship	X	X	X
Tradition, Family and Property	X	X	
Traditional Values Coalition	X	X	X

*Groups meeting all three criteria are at boldface.

Table 1-4
List of Invitations

Organization	Date
Concerned Women for America	October 2, 2000
Call to Renewal	October 3, 2000
Family Research Council	October 12, 2000
Eagle Forum	October 18, 2000
National Association of Evangelicals	January 8, 2000
National Law Center for Children and Families	January 18, 2000
Free Congress Foundation	February 8, 2000
Center for Public Justice	February 11, 2000
Institute on Religion and Democracy	March 8, 2000
The Conservative Caucus	March 13, 2000
The Lutheran Institute	March 16, 2000
Christian Coalition	April 14, 2000
Protest Fellowship/Willowbrook Forum	April 18, 2000
Religious Freedom Coalition	May 8, 2000
Association of Christian Schools International	June 2, 2000
American Association of Christian Schools	June 11, 2000

CHAPTER 1 HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT

The three dimensions of social movement theory—identity, resources and opportunity, will be used to better understand the emergence of the Christian Right in the late 1970s, but political activism among American evangelicals has a rich history. The main source of support for the Christian Right is evangelicals. As a result, the Christian Right is able to draw upon this identity and the many resources within the evangelical community to serve its interests. Understanding the source of this identity and these resources will help us understand the Christian Right.

Evangelicalism emerged out of the revival movements commonly referred to as the First and Second Great Awakenings in the middle parts of the 17th and 18th centuries. Evangelicals were defined by their revivalistic style, emphasis on personal conversion and pietistic devotion, and a set of Protestant beliefs (Marsden 1994). Evangelicals first worked to reform the established Protestant denominations, such as the Presbyterians, Anglicans, and Baptists, but eventually created some of their own denominations, which eventually became the most dominant ones. The Methodist Church is a good example. John Wesley first tried to reform the Anglican Church with his evangelical ideas in the 1720s. Later, his followers formed the Methodist Church, which became the largest denomination in the US by the 1830s (Marsden 1990, Ch. 2). Evangelicalism became an important cultural influence as well.

By the mid-nineteenth-century evangelical religion was a major force shaping dominant American values. Rather than conflict with democratic and republican ideals inherent from the revolutionary era, evangelicals combined with such values, reflected them, and reinforced them. (Marsden 1998, 155)

Evangelicals of the 1800s later became politically active on the issues of prohibition, Chinese immigration, and women's suffrage. With the issue of slavery, however, North/South splits were created within many evangelical denominations.

The Presbyterian, Baptist, and Methodist churches, the three largest denominations in the mid-1800s, all had national splits over the issue of slavery. The abolitionists of the North argued that the Bible condemned slavery while their Southern counterparts argued that the Bible takes no position on the existence of slavery. The intensity of these debates contributed to the sectionalism that led to the Civil War (Quinn 1985, 43). Eventually, the evangelism that migrated South would take on the cultural characteristics of the South and become what we know as the "Bible Belt" today (Hoyman 1997).

The Fundamentalist Movement

The early decades of the 1900s saw a split in evangelism between the modernists and the fundamentalists. The modernists began to doubt or deny many traditions, or occasionally held, Christian beliefs, such as biblical miracles, the resurrection of Christ, the authority of scripture and salvation through Christ alone. Their new approach to understanding their faith was dubbed "higher biblical criticism". The modernists also wanted to reconcile the differences they found in their faith and new scientific research. This led to the most visible battle between the modernists and

fundamentalists—the teaching of evolution in public schools. This battle, though in a different form, remains controversial today (Johannes 1980, Woodberry and Smith 1998).

The fundamentalist movement got its name after the publication of *The Fundamentals*, a compilation of 30 articles published over a six year period starting in 1908. These articles were eventually published as a four volume set in 1919 (Turney and Dixon 1917). *The Fundamentals* sought to defend orthodox Christian belief from the many challenges it faced from the modernists (Johannes 1980, Ch. 14).

Fundamentalists of this era focused their political agenda on opposing the teaching of evolution in schools, promoting Prohibition, and supporting the war against Germany. This political activism of the 1920s was not without moral controversy, however. A persistent struggle within the evangelical tradition has been, and continues to be, over the question of how much energy should be placed in promoting social reform. Time spent in political activism, evangelicals have argued, is time taken away from the important task of “saving souls.” Additionally, the diversion of time of political involvement may take people away from bearing their message of salvation. The proselytizing social reform forces within evangelicalism have tended to be more repugnant. These evangelicals prefer to focus on personal piety and are less concerned about the world outside their own institutions, except for the purpose of converting outsiders. On the opposite side is the populist evangelist. Populist evangelists are more interested in social reform and seek to be more engaged with the world around them, including, but not limited to, influencing government.

After Prohibition was repealed and the anti-evolution struggle was, in the words of opinion leaders, handed a defeat in the Supreme Court, fundamentalists went into relative

political obscurity at the national level. Thus, the reputation of fundamentalism became dominant for a while among the fundamentalist wing. While fundamentalists remained largely out of view from public controversy, their energy and enthusiasm did not dissipate but was focused inward. Fundamentalists went to work building their own institutions—Bible colleges, radio shows, conference centers, periodicals, and foreign mission agencies; and their numbers swelled. These actions would set the stage for the monopolization of fundamentalism (Linnartz 1983).

Carpenter (1997) argues that the institution building of fundamentalism was motivated by three goals: training leaders, spreading religious knowledge and evangelism (193). The motivation to train leaders is reflected in the movement's Bible schools, which Carpenter refers to as "the most important terminals in the fundamentalist network" (1997, 103). There were at least 30 of these institutions by 1938 and besides training future pastors, they held weekend conferences, established radio stations, and recruited and trained missionaries.

To feed the desire for popular religious knowledge, fundamentalists established summer Bible conferences. Bible conferences offered a combination of "vacation-style recreation, the old-fashioned camp meeting, and informal teaching from leading fundamentalist preachers" (Carpenter 1993, 12). These conferences became important for establishing social networks and reinforcing the sense of community among fundamentalists. The 37 conferences with 88 sessions in 1938 grew to 58 conferences that had more than two hundred sessions by 1940 (Carpenter 1997, 123).

Fundamentalists continued to support old institutions and established new missions for evangelism (Carpenter 1997, 14). The most important of these were

devoted to foreign missionary work. The growing fundamentalist movement put its expanding resources into foreign missions at a time when anti/low Protestant involvement waned. The proportion of fundamentalist missionaries, therefore, grew at this time. Missionary work was central to the work of fundamentalists and they devoted much of their resources to this task.

During the period between the Scopes trial and the fundamentalist/complacent split in the 1950s, the populist versus segment conflict was reflected in the battles over forming new congregations (Casper 1997). Some fundamentalists argued that there was no hope for established congregations and they wanted to leave these congregations to form new ones. Others argued that they should remain loyal to their established congregations and attempt work to reform them.

Both the segmentist and populist impulses, however, reflected a yearning for public respect (Casper 1993, 136). Among the questions that is visible in their effective use of radio communications. They adopted the style of Hollywood and Radio City and created intensely popular radio programs. This yearning came because of the lack of respect from a public that considered them strange and unusual. Casper ties this response to their construction-building actions. “[I]t became vital for their survival to build what sociologist Peter Berger has called *plausibility structures*—institutions, relationships, and so forth that could shelter them from opposing views and practices and reinforce their own way of living” (Casper 1997, 86). After building “plausibility structures” to protect their way of life, fundamentalists’ desire for public respect and acceptance influenced them to use these structures to recruit themselves into the public

spotlight in the post-World War II period (Casper 1991, 129). Thus, the period of separatist dominance was followed by a period of populist dominance.

The New Evangelicals

Fundamentalism emerged out of evangelicalism. However, fundamentalism had a strong influence over evangelicalism such that all evangelicals were influenced to some extent by fundamentalism. During the 1940s, there was a split in the fundamentalist movement. One side sought the more populist appeal, while others insisted on maintaining separation. The populists, seeking to distance themselves from the poor image of fundamentalism, ditched the label and referred to themselves as neo-evangelical, and later, simply evangelical. Most modern evangelicals can trace their roots in these populist fundamentalists (Casper 1991, Ch. 4).

These evangelicals formed the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). The NAE became influential because it was able to tie into the national structure built by the fundamentalist movement. "Fundamentalism's weblike organizational structure, linked by parish-level meetings, evolved, expanded, and exported itself to other evangelicals" (Casper 1993, 134). The infrastructure built by fundamentalism during the 1930s and 1940s became important resources for later movements. The resurgence of evangelism during the 1950s made use of it. And, the emergence of the Christian Right in the 1970s made use of it.

The New Christian Right

The Christian Right emerged in response to the social upheavals of the 1960s and 70s. To understand this emergence, I will use the three dimensions of social movement theory explained in the previous chapter. For those who believe in traditional values,

social sexual changes that occurred during this time were shocking. These changes provided the basis for the movement. The anti-war movement, feminist movement, gay rights movement, liberalizing social norms, and the drug culture were anathema to evangelical's belief about patriotism, the family, sexual norms, and for some, an aversion to alcohol and dancing.

Evangelicals have a strong sense of patriotism. This subculture is perhaps the strongest purveyor of the Puritan notion of a "chosen nation." The belief that the United States has a God-ordained destiny, though influential in many segments of society, was particularly strong among evangelicals. The belief along with their anti-communist sentiments, encouraged support for the Vietnam War. The anti-war protests, though some evangelicals participated, were an affront to the patriotism of evangelicals.

Evangelical beliefs about the ideal family include a two parent household, a husband, who is the primary bread-winner, and wife, who is the primary homemaker; and, sexual intercourse is reserved for this type of relationship. This framework is considered the most ideal for raising children and its primary purpose is for raising children. This notion was challenged in many fronts during the 1960s. The Woman's Movement encouraged more women to work outside the home. Birth-control became more readily available with the introduction of the "pill." And, divorce, pre-marital sex, and homosexuality became more widely accepted.

In addition to these shifts in the evangelical system of beliefs, the expanding role of the federal government during this time began to intrude into the realm of evangelical culture. The federal government began to encroach upon state and local government jurisdictions, where evangelicals had found refuge. Through the creation

would come much later: the Supreme Court's *Roe v. Wade* (1973) decision to allow abortion and its 1982 decision to ban school-sponsored prayer were an affront to the values of some evangelicals. Also, evangelical institutions, particularly their private schools, and telecommunications networks came under scrutiny by the federal government. In 1977, the Internal Revenue Service, under a 1955 civil rights law, began to strip tax-exempt status to private schools that were racially discriminatory. Many ministers felt threatened by this because the Internal Revenue Service argued that a ban on teachers of dancing, which some fundamentalist schools had, was racial discrimination (Johns 1989: 28-29). And, in 1979, evangelist James Dobson's regular broadcast was suspended in order to comply with the Federal Communications Commission's "equal time" provision (Moore 1985, 25). This station would have had to air a pro-homosexuality show to complement Dobson's anti-homosexuality show under the provision.

Evangelicals had built a subculture with their schools, newspapers and other media to shield them from the outer culture. But during the 1960s and 70s, they found the outer culture reaching upon them with values hostile to their own (Oldfield 1998-80).

Crusaded (1988) marks the beginnings of the Christian Right with three

incidents—the Dade County, Florida gay rights referendum, the Kanawha County, West Virginia school textbook controversy, and the conflicts over the national Equal Rights Amendment. In 1974, Alice Moore, the wife of a minister, led protests over the textbooks being used by the school system of Kanawha County, West Virginia. She was convinced that these texts were obscene, unchristian, and homophobic. In 1977, minister and vocalist Anita Bryant led a protest against a gay rights referendum in Dade County, Florida. And, beginning in 1973, Phyllis Schlafly led an effort to stop the

enfranchisement of the national Equal Rights Amendment. She argued that the amendment would require women to be drafted and institutionalize abortion rights. These women had at least two things in common—they were led by women and they were successful.

The third dimension of social movement theory—opportunity—came into play when the New Right reached out to the Christian Right to include it in its coalition. New Right activists enlisted the groups that would become the Christian Right. The New Right is a conservative movement that emerged in the early 1980s. These conservatives had grown frustrated with the Old Right's passive acceptance of the New Deal/Great Society agenda that had come to dominate the Republican Party. This passivity was characterized best by the Old Right administrations of Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford. Unlike the "old right," the New Right attacked the establishment and elites. They particularly did not like the Northeastern/Wall Street style of conservatism symbolized by the Rockefeller's. The New Right is also characterized by supply-side economics and an emphasis on social issues. The differences between the Old Right and the New Right were more a matter of style than substance. "All in all, what was new about the New Right was much less significant than what was old. Its leadership, ideology, strategy, and even rhetoric are largely all a piece with those of the Old Right" (Kleppelstein 1990, 92). In contrast to the Old Right, the New Right was activist, confrontational, energetic, and creative.

The architects of the New Right were Richard Vigorini, Paul Weyrich, Howard Phillips, John Tarr DeLoach, and Bruce Hahn. Other New Right figures include Jack Kemp, Pat Buchanan, Phyllis Schlafly, Orrin Hatch, and Phil Crane (Hirschbach 1990 87). The New Right established or took over many new magazines, mass media institutions,

and campaign organizations, such as Heritage Foundation, American Legislative Exchange Council, Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, Conservative Digest, and the National Conservative Political Action Committee, to unite its efforts to transform the conservative movement in America (Crawford 1980, Ch. 1).

In addition, the New Right was aided by Richard Viguerie's innovative and lucrative fundraising. Viguerie was the fundraising wizard of the New Right. He provided the needed funds for the New Right and New Right candidates. Initially, it was the campaign finance reforms that were created in response to Richard Nixon's "dirty" politics that made Viguerie and the New Right powerful figures. The campaign finance reforms of the 1974 post-Watergate Congress put limits of \$1,000 on individual contributions. That worked as well to campaigns sponsored by one or a few wealthy individuals. In the fundraising world, this meant power shifted from those who could raise a few large donations from wealthy individuals to those who could raise lots of small donations from middle-class and working families. That was Viguerie's talent. In the post-Watergate era, Viguerie was the first to take advantage of direct-mail fundraising from mailing lists. He had already perfected this technique in George Wallace's 1968 presidential campaign. Viguerie gave the New Right a huge advantage over their competitors because they were able to raise money in the post-Watergate era better than anyone else could (Crawford 1980, Ch. 2).

Paul Weyrich is credited with the idea of using evangelists to add numerical strength to the New Right and eventually to take over direction of the GOP (Crawford 1980, Hunschstein 1990, Byrnes 1991). Viguerie provided the funds while Weyrich provided the strategy. The Christian Right had already started its struggle by 1979, but

often in-order party were not sure what to make of them. "Various political leaders, on the whole, had not associated with them openly, personally, and fundamentally before, and they were confused and perhaps even a bit put off by them" (Glynn 1991, 89).

However, New Right leaders found the potential of the Christian Right and reached out to them to incorporate them into a new conservative coalition. "Weyrich and Howard Phillips met with Jerry Falwell to discuss their idea of building a broad coalition of social conservatives, Catholics, Jews and Protestants, which would form a "moral majority" of Americans (Glynn 1991, 95; Martin 1996, 202).

Falwell's avowed enthusiasm for political involvement would represent a fundamental change in opinion for Falwell. Falwell was among the long line of evangelists who had no previous political involvement. He was particularly critical during the Civil Rights Movement when many religious figures became involved on the side of Civil Rights. "Preachers are not called to be politicians, but soul-savers," Falwell declared in 1965 (quoted in Hammarblom 1986, 118). This change of heart was indicative of a broader change taking place among evangelists. The populist impulse was gaining ground on the separatist impulse.

Duggard (1989) notes three sets of factors that led to the increase in evangelical political activism. First, there were socio-cultural factors. Along with the post-war economic expansion, evangelicals moved into the middle-class and became more mainstream. They were now living in suburbs and participating in large congregations rather than the more isolated rural areas and small churches. Also, the social movements of the 1960s provided a model of citizen activism. Second, there were ideological factors. Evangelicals underwent a "shift in ideological perspective" to support their

unfounded optimism. Whereas the separatist impulse emphasized nativism, purity, and the end times, the shift put a renewed emphasis on "the doctrines of creation, anthropology, family, covenant, and history" (Beeman 1986, 137). These were doctrines declared God's involvement in all aspects of society and rejected notions of a distinction between the sacred and the secular. Last, there were contextual factors. There was a growing sense that there were moral crises in America along the lines previously discussed. Evangelical's way of life was being threatened by society and government. These factors, taken together, help explain how evangelicals overcome their separatist impulse.

In addition to Ray Fulwell, other televangelists became involved in the Christian Right as well, including James Dobson, Jim Bakker, Jimmy Swaggart, Pat Robertson, Paul Crouch, Oral Roberts, Ben Hamberd, Kenneth Copeland, Ernest Angley, and Tim LaHaye. Notably absent was Billy Graham who, though privately expressed support for these efforts, declined to get involved publicly. After his previous political experience supporting Nixon, he apparently had a jailed view of political involvement (Martin 1996, 286).

Reuniting televangelists was an important strategy for the New Right. They had in governing evangelicals areas that they had not before. Televangelists gave the movement legitimacy. Also, televangelists already had the attention of a wide audience. In 1980, viewership for the top four—Roberts, Hamberd, Fulwell, and Swaggart—was estimated at six million, possibly as high as ten million (Johnson 1989, 40-42). By 1985, Robertson took the lead with more than 18 million viewers and Fulwell was sixth with 1.6 million. These new political figures went on to form Christian Right organizations, with the help and support of the New Right. Of the major Christian Right

organizations, each was affiliated with a newspaper, Falwell's Moral Majority, Robinson's Religious Roundtable, and Robertson's Christian Voice.

Reagan and the Christian Right

The election of 1980 represented a hard fought victory for the Christian Right. Their candidate, Ronald Reagan, won in the White House, many liberal Democrats were defeated, and the Republicans gained control of the Senate. Even though Reagan never showed much interest in organized religion or attended church regularly (Morton 1993, 54) he was a favorite of the Christian Right for several reasons. He gave the movement political legitimacy by giving them access to the White House; he met with them on their turf, such as when he spoke at the National Religious Broadcasters Association meeting in 1980 (Johnson 1983, 51), and, he often voiced Christian Right concerns in his speeches. Reagan, however, did little else to actively promote the Christian Right agenda.

On the Christian Right's top agenda item – abortion – Reagan was a big disappointment. In his first opportunity to nominate the Supreme Court, he chose Judge Sandra Day O'Connor, a choice that the Christian Right believed lacked the pro-life credentials that it desired from a Supreme Court judge. While Reagan's choice stirred much of the Christian Right and pro-life community, Falwell kept silent on the issue after a reassuring phone call directly from Reagan (Morton 1993, 228). Whereas institutionalism theory expects moderation over time, this example shows the opposite trend. As we shall see later, today's Christian Right would not have accepted a nominee more than the current president. Falwell's "moderation" was probably more a result of survival rather than a shift in temperament. The Christian Right at this stage was excited to have a place at the table and decided to not make too much of a fuss. As Island

Majority's Ed Dobson put it, "I assumed that if you elected the right person, all your problems were solved, not realizing that one election is probably not going to make a long-term difference in anything" (Johson 1993, 228). The Christian Right had no long term strategy at this stage. It had not thought past the next election.

The Christian Right's inexperience was also exemplified in other anecdotes. It used a "blitzkrieg" approach to mobilization efforts. Rather than focus on key districts, it sent mass mailings to their entire mailing list urging members to contact their congressperson. Some of the members would grow weary contacting their congressperson only to find that they were already on their side on the issue (Moyn 1989, 154). Additionally, this was a waste of precious resources.

The Christian Right also had a tendency to be heavy handed with members of Congress. This damaged its reputation and made future efforts at working with Congress more difficult. Mickey Leland (D-GA) was with the Christian Right on most issues, but when he failed to sign a discharge petition that the Religious Roundtable favored, it was taken as standing his decision (Moyn 1989, 152). The Christian Right also alienated potential supporters with its obsessive and insular character. God was on its side, therefore, opposing it was opposing God (Johson 1989, Ch. 36). This type of language left little room for the subtleties required of legislative discourse and compromise.

Nonetheless, a growing cadre of New Rightists joined the Christian Right. In the Senate, Jesse Helms was joined by newly elected Republicans John East, Steven Symms, Jeremiah Denton, Paul Fierstone, and Don Nickles (Johson 1989, 56). In the House, there was a growing faction of conservative Republicans known as the "Young Turks." Vin Weber, Bob Walker, Bill Dannermyer and House Speaker, Newt Gingrich, led them.

Together, they formed the Conservative Opportunity Society (Moyn 1988, 37-38).

Throughout the 1980s, these congressional efforts showed some success in keeping the Christian Right's social issues on the congressional agenda.

The relationship between the Christian Right and the New Right changed during the 1980s. Early in the movement, the Christian Right deferred to the New Right for leadership because of its lack of experience. As the Christian Right gained its own political expertise, however, it began to move itself from the New Right (Moyn 1988, Ch. 4). In addition, the Christian Right grew too large and too diverse for the New Right to keep a handle on. "The Christian Right had taken on a life of its own."

While actual policy enactments promoted by the Christian Right were few and minimal, the 1980s were a successful time for the Christian Right in other ways. The social issues of the Christian Right became a part of the Congressional agenda. Even if they were not passed, time spent on these agenda items took away time that could have been spent on other items (Moyn 1988, Ch. 5).

In the late 1980s, the Christian Right took some hits and was thought, by some, to be peeling its last breath. The Republicans lost the Senate in 1986, Pat Robertson's bid for the presidency failed in 1988, the Moral Majority was dissolved, and, there were numerous "scandals" involving televangelists Jim Bakker, Jimmy Swaggart, and Oral Roberts. Scandals and defeats were confidently predicting the imminent demise (Brent 1988, 15; Antonio 1989) or severe weakening (Faulstich 1993, Walshaw 1993) of the Religious Right. Lewis (1993) predicted that the coalition would soon leave the Republican Party and bring forth "the end of the Republican era." As we have seen, these predictions were not without historical precedent. Transformed political coalitions has

tended to slide and flow in what has sometimes been described as a cyclical pattern (Wilson 1994). But the difficulties faced by the Christian Right in the late 1980s did not lead to the predicted retreat. The movement reenergized itself and emerged once again as a significant force in American party politics and the Republican Party (Moore 1992, Powell and Wilson 1996, Wilson 1994).

The Christian Coalition

While the Christian Right moved out of the spotlight for a time, it was busy building grassroots organizations much like fundamentalists after the Scopes trial, except these organizations had overtly political goals. The Christian Right returned to the national scene stronger than ever to help the Republicans take control of Congress in 1984. During this time, the most influential Christian Right organization to date emerged—the Christian Coalition. Wilson (1994) describes this period as the third stage or “institutionalization phase” of the Christian Right.

Early, the “emergence phase” ran from the rise of the Christian Right circa 1977 through the first years of President Reagan (1981), and it was marked by organizational expansion, direct-mail marketing, fundamentalist leaders, legislative agenda setting, and political inexperience. The brief “transition phase” ran from 1983–1984, and it was characterized by organizational attachment, reallocation of resources and declining agenda-setting abilities. The “institutionalization phase” ran from 1987–1994. Its hallmarks included broad membership, grassroots activism, substitution of classical liberal for apostolic language (using the rhetoric of rights and equality rather than morality), the influence of evangelical and Fundamental Christians in non-sectary fundamentalism, and the rise of the Christian Coalition as the leading organization within the movement. Finally, the “deinstitutionalization phase,” which may be short-lived because it is predicated on Republican Party control of the Congress, began with the start of the 1994 Congress (1995–1996). It is marked by the same attributes as the institutionalization phase, with the additional premise that political authority must be redevoted to the state and that compromise is necessary and desirable on the social issues (Wilson 1994a). (Moore 1996)

More explicit, nonetheless, as institutionalization becomes predict, that the Christian Right should have shown a greater willingness to compromise than the 1994 elections. As this research will later show, this has not always been the case.

The Christian Coalition was started from the dance list of Robertson's presidential campaign. It differed from earlier Christian Right groups in several ways: it emphasized grassroots organizing, it focused on elections, and it sought to work within the Republican Party (Chaffetz 1995: 189-190). Also, it showed more political sophistication than the earlier groups. The Christian Coalition, through the leadership of Ralph Reed, attempted to "mainstream" the Christian Right.

Reed, a Republican activist who returned to his family's evangelical faith while in college, met Robertson after his failed presidential bid. Though, as his late memoirs, Reed already had a lot of political experience. He had attended the Leadership Institute, a New Right organization designed to train its young activists, and he was a protégé of Grover Norquist, a conservative activist who more recently has teamed to fight heads with the Christian Right. Reed had already shown a knack for political mobilization as president of College Republicans. Though Reed supported Jack Kemp in the Republican primary, he and Robertson had a lot in common. They both had a vision of building a broad coalition of evangelicals and Catholics (Matta 1995, Ch. 12).

It was Reed who suggested to Robertson that the Christian Right needed to build a genuine grassroots organization from the bottom up. As president of Christian Coalition, Reed first organized chapters at the state and local levels and encouraged them to get involved first at the local level. They were generated with training manuals and videos giving practical advice on political organization (Matta 1995, Ch. 12). They also were

ought to not use religious language like the previous manifestations of the Christian Right. They were urged not to use "Christianese", and to "speak in the language of the people you're trying to communicate with. If you're in the public-policy arena, which it *is* not church, don't talk like you're in church" (Kearl Rodgers quoted in Martin 1999, 304).

During the 1992 Republican convention, the Christian Right played a very visible role with fiery speeches by Pat Robertson and Pat Buchanan. After losing the Presidency in 1992, many in the party accused the Christian Right of turning away many votes. As a result, Reed agreed that the Christian Right should take a less visible role in the 1994 elections. The Christian Coalition was active in mobilizing its supporters, however, the Republican religious mobilizers, the Contract with America, contained some of the social issue agenda items of the Christian Right. Reed was willing to compromise and play a less visible role in order to achieve the electoral goals of the party.

He saw the success of the Republican takeover in 1994 as part of the process of institutionalizing the Christian Right. Reed wrote in 1996, "Now, nearly two decades after the first religious conservatives broke into national politics, we are part of the country, a permanent fixture on the political landscape, treated with respect by our allies and grudging admiration by our foes" (Reed 1996, 7). Indeed, Reed received grudging admiration from at least one foe. Democratic Presidential hopeful Howard Dean acknowledged that Reed, and House Speaker Newt Gingrich, "created a real momentum for the right wing" and his campaign looked to the Christian Coalition as a model for his presidential campaign (Barton 2003, Shepard 2005).

The Christian Coalition claimed much of the credit for the Republican victory in 1994. Reed declared the Christian Coalition was influential in more than half of the 10-

votes gained at the House (Soper 1996, 113). He may have been right. When evangelists represented 26 percent of the votes cast and they voted Republican by more than three to one (Soper 1996, 113). The Christian Coalition was active in mobilizing many of these voters. It distributed 30 million voter guides (Soper 1996, 118-19). A political scientist remarked that

in 1994 the Christian Right expanded the sophistication and level of its grassroots effort to mobilize voters on behalf of Republican candidates. The Christian right appears to have judged a number of Republicans were closer than in the South and the West, and thus contributed to the GOP's takeover of Congress and seven governments. (John Clines, quoted in Wilson 1995: 14)

The Christian Right had become an important component within the Republican Party. Republican Party officials recognized that the Christian Right helped them to win elections and obtain power. The Christian Right, as one of these officials put it, "has considerable influence [because] they produce workers, voters, [and] grassroots support... That is where their influence comes from... they are a tremendous asset to the party" (quoted in Clines 1994). They were able to help bring power to the Republican Party through their electoral efforts, and, it was argued, deserved a share of that power.

With its success at the 1994 elections, the Christian Right quickly requested the national spotlight. It was designated as an important coalition partner to the Republican Party. Ford's document lay down for the 1994 elections is consistent with neoconservative theory's predictions. It endorsed its agenda. However, the Christian Right would not sit on its hands for long. It would soon take part in a rocky ride to meet a rising president.

Clinton and Impoverishment

For most of the 1990s, the Christian Right was Schismatic to have a Republican Congress sympathetic to many of its aims. In the White House, however, it found a Democratic President who was willing to block many of their aims. The Christian Right considered President Bill Clinton to be its arch nemesis, antithetical to everything it held dear. For Clinton, the Christian Right was viewed as a collection of dangerous right-wing extremists, spreading “vicious lies” about him, and ready to turn back the clock on the liberal agenda that he held dear. As we shall later see, this perception is an overstatement. Clinton had more support to the Christian Right agenda than is often realized. In this atmosphere of cultural conflict, however, differences are exaggerated while similarities are ignored by the conflict’s combatants and the media (Powers 2003, Hunter 1991, Lange et al. 2002).

The 1994 election was largely seen as a referendum on the Clinton Presidency. Clinton was one of the main targets used in Christian Right fundraising and voter mobilization efforts. The Christian Right despised Clinton. Powers (1999) puts the Christian Right perspective well:

Clinton is part of the generation of the 1960s. He smoked marijuana as a student. He dodged the draft during the Vietnam War. He’s an adulterer. He’s a Yale Law School dropout. He lacks gravitas; he even talks about his underwear in public. He is Hollywood-star-crazy. He is “politically correct” and appoints openly gay men and lesbians to high federal offices. His wife is a strong, assertive professional woman who makes more than he does. Now he logs it all off with “deviant” sex in the White House office complex and a cascade of lies to cover it up. To the moralistic Right he is a narcissistic narcissist, a hypocrite, a Prince of Disorder, a value-free postmodernist—and such an accomplished one that the American people can’t find it in their hearts to hate him for his hateful acts. To ignore intense sense of morality and decorum around his personal life, before 1994 and who thinks the nation has undergone a postmodern moral decline since, this man is a scandal whenever his policies. (2002)

For these reasons, Clinton made a perfect enemy for the Christian Right. The Christian Right could easily use Clinton's faults to motivate their supporters against him because his faults were easily recognizable and defensible to the masses. Also, as Pomeroy points out, the Right was in need of an enemy at this time:

The Right used to have communists to rally against. Communism has died, and Clinton has usurped a number of traditional conservative issues, such as capital punishment, welfare reform, sound money, a balanced budget, sufficient unions, and now a push-on-the-topper military posture. All that remains, in light of Clinton's flagrant appropriation of Republican policies, is Eli the indispensable man of the money—Clinton himself! (1996, 203)

As the symbol of everything the Christian Right despised in America, Clinton provided a convenient target for the Christian Right.

When the allegations of Clinton's affair with Monica Lewinsky, and his attempts to conceal the public about it, surfaced, the Christian Right felt they had the justification and the opportunity to remove Clinton from the presidency. It did not matter that Clinton would be succeeded by someone more liberal than he. For the Christian Right, impeachment was the right thing to do. Additionally, time spent by Clinton fighting against impeachment was time not spent on programs the Christian Right considered damaging.

The early stages of the impeachment originated in a New Right organization known as the Council for National Policy (CNP) (Clarkson 1994). The CNP is purported to play a role in developing strategies for Republicans (Clarkson 1998). Its members include many New Right and Christian Right figures, such as Senators Jesse Helms, Larch Pardoeth, Don Nickles, and Trent Lott, Representatives Doug Ament, Don Rosten, and Bill Dannerwayne, Thomas Moore, Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, Oliver North, and Paul

Wayback (Clarkson 1998). Early support for impeachment was also provided by Citizens for Honest Government and the John Birch Society (a New Right organization that provided the Goldwater campaign), who held an impeachment rally on March 14, 1998 (Clarkson 1998). Among the speakers at the rally were Representative Bob Barr, the sponsor of the initial stage of impeachment, Howard Phillips, House mayor, Representative Helms Claiborne, and John McManus, head of the John Birch Society (Clarkson 1998).

Citizens for Honest Government is under the guise of Citizens Ministries Inc., which also owns Jeremiah Film (Clarkson 1998). Jeremiah Film, known for its apocalyptic and terror and UFO videos, produced *The Clinton Chronicles*, a video that emphasizes "Clinton as cocaine sniffing, drug smuggling, money laundering, murder (of Vince Foster), and sexual harassment (of Paula Jones)" (Clarkson 1998). This film has been distributed by CNP and promoted by Jerry Falwell on his television show where 150,000 copies were reportedly sold (Clarkson 1998). Together, Christian Right and New Right organizations formed an important issue network for building support for impeachment (which perceived Hillary Clinton as guilty, not altogether incorrectly, that her husband was the target of a "vast right-wing conspiracy")

Calls for impeachment could be heard again later that year at the Christian Coalition's second "Road to Victory" convention. Robertson claimed Clinton should be impeached because he "murdered, deceived, belittled and lied" (LAF 1998). Speakers also included Republican congresspersons, such as Henry Gonzalez, Trent Lott, Tom DeLay, Dick Armey, and presidential hopefuls, such as Gary Bauer, John Ashcroft and Steve Forbes, assuring the members that they would support impeachment. Many repeated

Clinton with the country's perceived moral decline. Issues called the scandal "the equivalent of a cultural oil spill . . . it is not an oil spill waiting up on shore covered with garb, it is in our beds". Robertson accused Clinton of turning the White House into the "playpen for the sexual freedom of the poster child of the 1960s" (Fidell 1998) and *Atlantic* "described Clinton as the crowning product of the 1960's culture" (Sewyer 1998).

Thirty years later, we know that the "Great Society" is a great tragedy . . . From the zenith of the self-indulgent '60s, our nation has slipped into "Great Society" burnout: sons who can't identify their fathers, daughters who are too young to be mothers, teens again raised by television, conformed by drugs and accustomed to violence. My friends, no more. Their utopian programs have failed, their utopian values are bankrupt and their days are numbered. And, my friends, the sun is setting on the last son of the '60s – Bill Clinton. (Kakutani quoted in Sewyer 1998)

Later that year, Majority Whip Del'ay, a favorite of the Christian Right, took the lead in pushing impeachment through the House. Del'ay spoke out often and early to keep the drive for impeachment going (Peters and Merkle 1998). When it came to the actual vote on impeachment, however, there were no efforts at "whipping," or encouraging members to vote along party lines, from either side of the aisle (Peters and Merkle 1998, Stone and Barnett 1998). However, there was a tremendous effort from outside lobbyists, including the Christian Coalition, to influence congresspersons. The Christian Coalition collected 250,000 petitions urging impeachment and mailed them to the congresspersons of the district from which it was signed the week of impeachment (Stone and Barnett 1998). "According to a Christian Coalition lobbyist, Del'ay's whip operation, which has close ties to the Christian Right, was kept almost out of the petition effort" (Stone and Barnett 1998). Some of the unsolicited members were also worried by

Christian Right lobbyists that they could face a primary challenge if they voted against impeachment.

For example, Paul M. Weyrich, the longtime head of the Free Congress Foundation, talked to Kathy Riedersfeldt, a conservative DCF activist, about mounting a primary challenge to Rep. John Edward Porter, a moderate Illinois Republican, if he voted against impeachment. Riedersfeldt wrote to Porter, warning him that she might challenge him. (Stone and Barnes 1993)

Weyrich also listed the names of undecided congressmen on his television show and urged his viewers to contact them (Stone and Barnes 1993).

Clinton Support

In other areas, the Christian Right found success despite having a Democrat in the White House. In 1993, Clinton supported, and gave strong rhetorical support for, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which was lobbied for by many Christian Right groups. Also, in 1985, Clinton released federal guidelines regarding religious discrimination in the schools. While these guidelines did not go as far as some in the Christian Right may have liked, such as allowing school-sponsored prayer, they were largely supported by the Christian Right. In 1993, Clinton released similar guidelines regarding religious freedom in the workplace. They would only apply to federal workers, though they were expected to be a model for the private sector. Clinton considered the views of a broad range of interest groups when compiling these guidelines, including the Christian Legal Society. The Clinton administration received praise from some Christian Right groups for this move (Morgenson 1997). Also, in 1993, Clinton gave his "strong support" to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. After the Supreme Court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, this bill was designed to achieve much of the same while considering the Court's objections. The Christian

Coalition and the Family Research Council lobbied heavily for it. Many of their opponents, including People for the American Way and Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, also supported the bill (Klarfeld and Rove 1995).

Clinton also found some common ground with the Christian Right on the issue of media violence. In 1993, Clinton came out in support of the "V-chip." This would require television manufacturers to put a computer chip on all televisions that would enable parents to block out programs that contained too much violence. In explaining his support for the V-chip, Clinton stated, "if we're going to change the American culture, we have to somewhere change the media culture, and we have to do it without finger-pointing" (Clinton, quoted in Friedman 1993). Clinton sounded some of the same themes of the Christian Right in suggesting that violence is a "cultural" problem.

Christian Right leaders had long been providing the idea of a \$100 per child tax credit for parents. While Clinton disagreed with certain bills containing a \$500 per child tax credit, Clinton proposed a \$100 per child tax credit for middle-income families in his nomination acceptance speech at the Democratic Convention in 1992. Also in that speech, he made several other proposals that had been championed by the Christian Right, such as tax-free education savings accounts, reducing out-of-wedlock teen births, tax credits for parents who adopt children, and tougher enforcement of drug related crimes. In addition, Clinton praised one of the most significant victories of the Christian Right in the 1980s—the Welfare Reform Bill of 1986, which he had signed a week earlier.

Reforming welfare was one of the promises House Republicans made to their constituents in their "Contract with America." While Republicans agreed on the need to

welfare reform, there were many different ideas about how it should be reformed. These differences can be thought of as four different groups:

- those who emphasized “workfare” or the requirement to work or go through job training in order to receive benefits
- those who believed welfare was the cause of many social ills and want to tighten eligibility requirements
- those who wanted devolution to the states in the form of block grants
- and those who wanted to cut welfare in order to save money to reduce the deficit (Boyer 1995, 132)

The eventual bill signed by Clinton in 1996 contained elements of all of these. The Christian Right was supportive of welfare reform for all four of these reasons, but mostly they focused on the moral ill aspect and “workfare” aspect of welfare reform.

House Budget Committee Chairman John Kasich, a freemason of the Christian Right, opened the debate on the welfare reform plan by claiming it is “based on the Judeo-Christian ethic that people should help those in need but should not make them dependent on our help” (Boyer 1996). He continued to use Christian language by claiming, “it’s a sin to continue to help people who need to learn to help themselves” (Boyer 1996).

Clinton vetoed the Welfare Reform Bill twice before signing it. Nonetheless, the final bill that passed in August 1996, held many of the ideas of the Christian Right. It ended welfare as an entitlement, limited benefits to five years, required work activities, gave states bonuses for reducing illegitimacy without increasing abortions, denied benefits to married couples not living with as husbands not attending school, gave states the option to deny benefits for additional children, included stronger enforcement of child support (Boyer 1995, 133-38), and made \$50 million available for abstinence education (Pattish 2004).

George W. Bush

The election of 2000 saw other important changes to the Christian Right. During the Republican primary, there was a split in Christian Right support. Gary Bauer, formerly head of the Family Research Council, emerged from the ranks of the Christian Right to run for president. He did not receive complete support from the Christian Right, however. Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell backed George W. Bush. There was further contention when Bauer withdrew and backed John McCain.

McCain received much criticism from Christian Right circles for his campaign finance reform proposals, which, presumably, would limit the efforts of Christian Right activist groups. Also, there were some heated exchanges between the Christian Right and pro-life groups, and the McCain campaign during the Michigan, South Carolina and Virginia primaries. McCain was accused of being soft on abortion and his campaign chairman, former Senator Warren Rudman, was accused of being a "recruiting agent" because he called some Christian conservatives "anti-abortion radicals, would-be assassins, homophobes, bigots and full-on-gay Elmer Gantry". Later, during the Virginia primary, McCain called Robertson and Falwell "agents of extremism" (Cain 2000). Lois Ruppel, chairman of the Myrtle Beach Christian Coalition, resigned from her position because she disagreed with the tactics used against McCain during the South Carolina primary (Burris 2000). In the general election, however, the Christian Right gave full support to George W. Bush, who became the President most closely aligned with the Christian Right yet.

During the presidency of George H. W. Bush, his father, George W. Bush served as a liaison between the White House and the Christian Right. He developed close relationships with Christian Right leaders at the time and admits to being influenced by

them. Unlike his father, George W. Bush is an evangelical Christian and speaks openly of his conversion experience, particularly in relation to his battles with alcoholism. He often uses language that evangelicals relate to. For example, when asked who has become political philosophers via during a primary debate he answered, "Jesus, because he changed my heart." For many evangelicals, who are accustomed to talking and listening in religious stories, this was an answer that seemed natural and understandable. Also, George W. Bush's personal political ideology is closer to the Christian Right than his father's or Reagan's. Yet, the general impression of Bush's close alignment with the Christian Right can be overstated, much like Clinton's dissent with the Christian Right. As we will see, the Christian Right sometimes grew impatient with Bush's lack of attention to its agenda. At other times, it opposed Bush's agenda.

This issue is unique in the history of the Christian Right. The Christian Right has evolved from an uncomplicated, antiscientific, and reactive social movement to a segmented, politically sophisticated, and institutionalized organization with an insider presence in the White House and Congress. This combination of events has generated unique opportunities and challenges for the Christian Right. The behavior of the Christian Right during this time will be telling.

CHAPTER 3 THE BEHAVIOR OF CHRISTIAN RIGHT INTEREST GROUPS

The behavior of Christian Right interest groups challenges theories of institutionalization and interest group behavior. While some of the expectations, summarized in Table 3-1, inferred by these theories were confirmed, others were only conditionally or partly confirmed, while others raised serious doubts or were not confirmed by observing the behavior of Christian Right interest groups. This chapter will take a closer look at these hypotheses and decide whether they accurately predict the behavior of Christian Right interest groups. First, we will look at institutionalization theories. Have Christian Right interest groups replaced charismatic leadership with bureaucratic leadership? Have their original goals become more moderate? Do they avoid risky behavior? Next, we will look at interest group theory. Do Christian Right interest groups deal with the free-rider problem in the way that interest group theory predicts?

Institutionalization Theory

Bureaucratic and Charismatic Leadership

Institutionalization theory suggests that as organizations institutionalize, bureaucratic leadership will replace charismatic leadership. Weber defines charismatic leaders as "holders of specific gifts of the body and spirit, and these gifts have been believed to be supernatural, not accessible to everybody" (Gerth and Mills 1973 [1946], 243). For Weber, this type of authority allows the structure and discipline necessary for a

hierarchical organisation, and they will not survive. Also, institutionalised leadership is expected to be mobilising rather than stimulating. They seek to strengthen rather than expand their base. Rather than only use leaders who can mobilise followers through their passion and communication skills, Christian Right leaders would be expected to have leaders who persuade their base through deception and organisation, rather than through the Christian Right interest groups choose leaders who are master savvy and will mobilise followers through their public speaking skills, or do they prefer leaders who are skilled organisers, focused on mobilising core supporters? Hypotheses one and two can be disconfirmed if I find the former, confirmed if the latter.

Some of the Christian Right interest groups have not yet replaced their leadership. The charismatic figure who founded the organisation remains at their helm. For others, however, the charismatic responsibilities have been handed over to others while the original leadership remains as a mostly figurative capacity. For still others, leaders have been replaced entirely, and for some, more than once.¹¹

All the leaders of the Christian Right interest groups that are the focus of this study are hierarchical leaders in at least one sense: they lead a hierarchical organisation and receive a salary from that organisation. Some Christian Right leaders are critics of them. Jerry Falwell, for instance, has not led a Christian Right organisation since the collapse of the Moral Majority, but is still looked to for guidance by at least some of the Christian Right's core constituency. Since the focus of this study was Christian Right organisations, those types of leaders were not examined closely for this study.

¹¹ See Table 1.1.

In other ways, however, the leaders of these Christian Right activist groups are charismatic. Beverly LaHaye, wife of evangelist and author Tim LaHaye, started Concerned Women for America in 1979. She served as president until 1998. Since then, LaHaye has served as chairman of the Board of Directors, while three presidents followed her—Karen Foss, Sandy Rice and Wendy Wright¹². With Foss, Rice, and Wright, CWA chose media savvy presidents. Foss had experience in communications and served as CWA's Vice-president of Communications. After leaving CWA she frequents no less of the radio talk show *Point of View*. Rice hosted a radio talk show at Chicago's Italian garage CWA. She has a robust personality, quick wit, and feels comfortable in front of a microphone or video camera. She was an occasional guest host on the political news program *Crossfire* and she became a Fox News contributor after leaving CWA. Wright was chosen internally from CWA to succeed Rice. While not as experienced with the media as Rice, Wright gained experience by hosting CWA's nationally syndicated radio talk show, *Concerned Women Today*. She knows the public face of CWA and has become adept at responding to questions on television news programs.

Family Research Council has replaced its leader three times. Most recently, Tony Perkins replaced Ken Cuccinelli in the midst of my research. Both presidents came with political experience and both had run for political office. The board members of Family Research Council have looked for, and found, leaders with public speaking and media skills that were based on attempts to prohibit individuals in action.

The Christian Coalition, one of the younger groups, seems to have gone in the opposite direction. Pat Robertson started the organization from the dinner list of his

1988 presidential campaign and chose Ralph Reed, someone with political savvy and an amiable personality to run the organization. Reed also came with broad political skills obtained from stints at New Right organizations. Reed presented a more moderate image than previous Christian Right leaders. Robertson and Reed seemed to make a good combination with Reed presenting the public face of the organization while Robertson mobilized the activists. This meant save the Christian Coalition through its most successful period. But after Reed left in 1997, it began facing difficulties.

To replace Reed, two political insiders were chosen, Dan Riedel, who served as President Reagan's Energy Secretary and Secretary of the Interior, and Randy Tate, who had served in the Washington State House of Representatives (1988-1994) and the US House of Representatives (1993-1997). Roberts-Combs, the current president, has led a restructuring of the organization. Here, rather than trying to expand the base of the Christian Coalition beyond merely churches and schools, the Christian Coalition is focused on mobilizing that base of supporters. At the Christian Coalition Road to Victory 2002 Conference, Combs was introduced as the person who will put "the Christian back in Christian Coalition" (Bill McCormick, public speech, October 16, 2002). Also at the Convention, its "church partners," pastors who agreed to realign with the Christian Coalition, were introduced.²⁴ It was pointed out that this new, restructured, Christian Coalition would work through these congregational leaders. In her closing speech, Combs said she was excited at the changes taking place with the Christian Coalition, noting that this conference was the first time it had a "prayer and worship" service and

²⁴ Sandy Rose and Wendy Wright were both working at CCA during my field work.

²⁵ Interestingly while the Christian Right has not shown an ability to mobilize that much as a large scale,

expected her closer to evolution more directly with church leaders (Christian Coalition Road to Victory 2002 Conference, October 12, 2002). While Center is not a polished public speaker like Flood, she has much experience in the nuts and bolts of voter mobilization. While Flood was well suited to expanding the base of the Christian Coalition, Center is better suited to maintaining the current base. So in this case, leadership has changed from articulating to maintaining, as predicted by Weber-Michels, but this organization has not become successful under Center. It has continued to have financial hardships and may have to declare bankruptcy in the future.

Free Congress Foundation, Eagle Forum, and Prison Fellowship all have their aging founders, Paul Weyrich, Phyllis Klotzky, and Chuck Colson, respectively, still active in their organizations, but have handed most of the day-to-day operations of their organizations over to younger leaders. These three organizations in particular will face difficult challenges in replacing their founding leaders when it becomes necessary to do so. Each organization appears to be greatly influenced by the personalities and interests of these leaders.

Prison Fellowship, for instance, tackles a full range of Christian right issues that are not directly linked to its primary mission regarding prisons. An interviewee in the organization acknowledged that the issues they address are whatever Colson has an interest in (Prison Fellowship, personal interview, April 18, 2002). Prison Fellowship has formed additional organizations under its umbrella to address most of Colson's interests. *Witnesses Forum*, a division of Prison Fellowship, was designed to help Christians understand the world, including political issues, from a biblical perspective. The Council about half of its poster presentation topic is "shorts program" over black.

for Bioethics Policy is a Wellcome Forum program that focuses on bioethics issues, such as stem-cell research and human cloning. There are several possibilities for the future of Prison Fellowship when Colson is no longer actively guiding it. Since Prison Fellowship's head now speaks directly to the interests of its founder, it may become more narrowly focused on its primary to prisoners and, in the political arena, prison reform issues.¹² Secondly, since organizations are being designed to address the broad range of issues, the head may increasingly continue through these institutional structures. Another possibility is that Prison Fellowship would split up its policy arm and prison ministry, thus becoming two separate organizations. Prison Fellowship staffers have already begun to struggle with what the future of the organization entails without Colson (Prison Fellowship, personal interviews, April 18, 2003).

The Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission (ERLC) and the American Association of Christian Schools (AACS) are the only institutional groups among the Christian Right interest groups. At such, they are the most likely to follow the intransigent leadership model. Yet, charismatic preachers lead both of these organizations. Dr. Richard Land, ERLC President, authors books, and speaks frequently at public events and at a conference or guest on the radio. As a Southern Baptist preacher with a Ivy League education (a B.A., master's and thesis from Princeton and a Doctorate of Philosophy from Oxford), Dr. Land can comfortably give a moving message in a crowd of evangelicals or thoughtfully answer pointed questions on a Sunday morning talk show.

¹² In this scenario, Prison Fellowship would no longer be considered a Christian Right interest group, as I have defined it.

Carl Hirsman, former President of AACCS, is the senior pastor of Tri-city Ministries in Independence, MO, a mega church with its own private Christian school, Bible college and seminary. While not as publicly visible as Land, he, like Land, is politically active and well connected to some in positions of power (American Association of Christian Schools, personal interview, June 11, 2003). Dr. Keith White, senior pastor of Jesus Gospel Church in Huntington, West Virginia, followed Hirsman.

In January 2006, Webster was a signatory on a letter to Ford Motor Company asking it to stop supporting groups that promote homosexuality. This letter was also signed by representatives of Christian Right organizations, indicating that the recent change in leadership at AACCS will not change its political activities or close ties to other Christian Right organizations.

Goal Transformation

Internationalization theory also suggests that the original goals of Christian Right activist groups will become more moderate. Has the Christian Right lost sight of what the movement originally wanted to accomplish? Is it satisfied with small, mostly symbolic, victories? If this is the case, hypothesis three and four will be confirmed.

Some may suggest that this has occurred with the issue of abortion. The original goal of the movement was to make abortion illegal at all stages of the pregnancy and in all circumstances, except to save the life of the mother. With its focus on limiting or regulating abortion through such things as a ban on partial-birth abortions, parental consent and waiting periods, the Christian Right would seem to have moderated its stance on abortion. A closer look, however, reveals that these efforts are merely a tactical shift rather than a shift in the goals of the movement. The Christian Right's concerns about

the legal status of the unborn have also broadened its issue domain to include other issues that impact the treatment of fetuses.

The 100th and 101st Congresses saw a lot of action on what the Christian Right would broadly define as “life” issues. These issues stem from a belief that all human life begins at conception and ends at death, this life is created by God and is deserving of dignity. It is the role of government to protect this life from abuse and harm. The political agenda of Christian Right interest groups on this issue included the Born Alive Infants Protection Act, the Abortion Non-discrimination Act, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban, the Child Custody Protection Act, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, the Parent’s Right to Know Act, government funding of stem-cell research and the Human Cloning Ban. The Child Custody Protection Act would make it illegal for anyone besides a parent to transport a minor across state lines for an abortion for the purpose of circumventing state law. The Parent’s Right to Know Act of 2001 would prohibit federal funds for any family planning program that provides contraceptive drugs or devices to a woman without parental consent, parental notification with five days notice, or a court order.

The Abortion Non-discrimination Act would allow health care providers who objected to abortion to refuse to perform an abortion. The bill was passed by the House during the 107th Congress, but never came up for a vote in the Senate. In the 104th Congress, the act was added as an amendment to a spending bill for the Health and Human Services department (HHS) and became law. As a result, any government agency or program that receives funds from HHS may not discriminate against a health-care provider who refuses to perform, pay for, or provide coverage for an abortion.

The Born Alive Infants Protection Act. One of the strategies within the

Christian Right with regards to abortion policy has been to pass laws that help them to debate the issues of abortion. In other words, the national debate created by the passage of these laws is a response to passing the law because it helps them to frame the debate before the American people in their favor. The Born Alive Infants Protection Act (BAIPA) is a good example of using the passage of a bill to set the framing of the debate over abortion policy. BAIPA would make illegal the killing of any person, or fetus, that is born alive. The intent of the bill was to preserve the life of a survivor of a "botched abortion," and make illegal the practice of "induced labor abortions." Testimony concerning the bill revealed cases where abortions were attempted but the fetus was accidentally separated from its mother during the operation. Testimony also revealed that Christ Hospital in Illinois was performing abortions by inducing birth, delivering the infant intact, and allowing them to die.

BAIPA also was inspired by a series of court decisions declaring that an infant born alive, but marked for abortion, had no rights under the law. In 1977 the question of whether the law is obligated to protect the life of a fetus that survives an abortion came before a US district court in the state of *Florida v. Anderson*. The judge in the case decided that the law does not protect a fetus that had intended to be aborted even if that fetus had remained alive after being separated from its host, because the mother had decided on abortion. "If a state may not legislate for the protection and preservation of the life of such a fetus, it surely cannot make the surgical separation of the fetus from the womb murder under state law" (*Florida v. Anderson* 1977). In other words, the right is no-abortion.

mean the right to an effective abortion. Though the case was thrown out, BAIPA proponents found the legal reasoning behind *Roe* among other justices. In the Supreme Court case of *Stenberg v. Carhart* (2000), Justice Ginsburg and Stevens wrote a concurring opinion claiming that the state has no right to regulate the types of procedures used to perform abortions. BAIPA proponents felt that the opinions of these justices, the occurrence of botched abortions and the actions of Christ Hospital provided sufficient reason to pass a law to protect a fetus born alive, though marked for abortion.

While these events provided the legal reasons for passing such a law, there were not the only reasons that BAIPA proponents wanted to pass such a law. Christian Right interest groups saw BAIPA as a way to advance their arguments on abortion. By arguing for the protection of a fetus when an abortion "failed," meaning the abortion failed to result in a dead fetus but rather resulted in live baby separate from its mother, Christian Right interest groups felt that they were moving the debate to their playing field. Rather than debating the question of "right", Christian Right interest groups wanted the debate to focus on the question of life, when it begins and when it should be protected. The proponents of BAIPA, including Christian Right interest groups, made their intentions clear. They were looking for a fight on this issue. When there was none, they were disappointed.

The idea for BAIPA originated, not within a Christian Right Interest Group, but with an academic. Hadley Arkes, a political science Professor at Amherst College, first had the idea of putting a law that protects the life of an abortion survivor as what he calls a "modest first step" in the fight to end abortion (Arkes 2002). Arkes had become concerned that politicians were avoiding the issue of abortion because it was so

negotiations. These politicians had been so unwilling to engage the issue, Adair "even suggested [him] been to engage the question at the simplest point, with the most modest measure of all" (2002, 129). The point of BAIPA was to engage a conversation that would lead to the question of the legality of abortion. "The mere statement of an end, or an objective, does not supply the reasons, and the main point behind the simplest of proposals is to start launching the conversation and bringing forth those reasons" (Adair 2000, 129). Merely passing a law was not the goal, though the law was deemed necessary. The goal was to create a platform for discussing the reasons for passing the law.

While most pro-life organizations supported the bill, the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) did not initially support it because they thought it was too modest and unnecessary (Adair 2002, 130). The new Christian Right group came to see the utility of BAIPA earlier and used their resources to get it through Congress. While President Bush did little to support its passage, he had a public signing in which many leaders in the Christian Right and Adair were invited.

Adair became an official adviser to Family Research Council's Center for Human Life and Bioethics in 2003 and has presented lectures at their events at the Family Research Council. Ron Carson, President of Family Research Council, got Adair's strategy to use when he wrote an op-ed for *The Washington Times* on the 10th Anniversary of Roe v. Wade. He used NARAL's opposition to BAIPA to further his argument.

NARAL even opposed the Born Alive Infant Protection Act, signed into law last year by President Bush, until it dropped the issue out of political expediency. Imagine NARAL actually argued that the right to an abortion guaranteed a dead baby. Survivors were not welcome. (Carson 2003)

Christian Right leaders had hoped there would be more pro-choice members of Congress who would have opposed ROPA as they could use a similar argument in the next election.

The passage of ROPA shows a Christian Right that is more politically sophisticated than its early days. The ROPA strategy shows recognition of the importance of effective political rhetoric and the use of long-term strategies. It is also a strategy whose end goal is to end all abortions, except to save the life of the mother. Therefore, the Christian Right's efforts to pass ROPA should not be seen as moderation or goal transformation, but simply a tactical maneuver.

Partial Birth Abortion Ban. Like ROPA, the Partial Birth Abortion (PBA) Ban was seen by Christian Right activist groups as a way to further their argument. The PBA Ban would make illegal a particular method of abortion used in late-term pregnancies. With this method, called intact dilation and extraction, I D & E, D & E or D & X by the medical community, the physician would induce birth and extract the legs and upper torso of the fetus from the birth canal, puncture the back of the fetus' skull with a pair of scissors and suction the brain of the fetus through the punctured hole. After this, the remainder of the fetus is pulled from the birth canal.

The impetus for a ban on this procedure came when members of the pro-life community obtained a copy of a paper describing how to perform the procedure delivered by Martin Harkall, M.D., a doctor who performs abortions, at a medical conference in 1992. The procedure sounded particularly gruesome when described in the technical language of a medical doctor and shocked many who read it. For instance, Harkall wrote,

Clamp (D&L) is accomplished by dissecting the fetus inside the uterus with instruments and entering the pincers through an adequately dilated cervix.

However, most surgeons find dismemberment at twenty weeks and beyond to be difficult due to the toughness of fetal tissues at this stage of development. Consequently, most late second trimester abortions are performed by an induction method...

Ensuring proper placement of the closed suction tip and safe elevation of the cervix, the surgeon then forces the uterine into the base of the skull or into the foramen magnum. Having safely entered the skull, he spreads the uterine to enlarge the opening.

The surgeon removes the uterus and introduces a suction catheter into the hole and evacuates the skull contents. With the catheter still in place, he applies traction to the fetus, removing it completely from the patient. (Shepard 1993)

Pro-life groups correctly calculated that even if the public were not at large as all put

but an abortion they may be convinced to ban a certain type of abortion procedure

Though a ban on D, E, & L would not achieve the ultimate goal of banning abortion, it would keep the issue of abortion in the public spotlight, chip away at the legal grounds for abortion rights, and give supporters a partial success.

After the 1994 elections, the PAA, too, had strong support in the Republican controlled House and Senate and was passed twice during the Clinton administration, but always failed to override Clinton's vetoes in the Senate. Clinton argued that he would sign the law only if it included an exception for the health of the mother. While the law had an exception to save the life of the mother, there was no health exception because, supporters argued, the Supreme Court had defined "health" as broadly, "emotional stress" for instance, that such an exception would essentially make the law obsolete.

The Christian Right could have easily had a PAA law, if it included this health exception. Though not preferable, it would have at least been something. There was a

risk involved that by holding out for a stronger bill, they may end up with nothing. The Christian Right preferred to hold out. They would wait until they could combine the needed votes in both houses of Congress with a President willing to sign the no health-exception PBA law.

It was not until after the 2002 elections, when Republicans had regained control of the Senate while maintaining the House along with a President willing to sign the legislation, that pro-life leaders had the wherewithal to pass the PBA law. When the PBA law was again addressed in the House there were competing bills over the health-exception issue. The Christian Right pushed strongly for a no vote on the bill with the health exception and a yes vote on the bill with no health exception. The Christian Coalition warned House members that it would use the vote on the bill including the health exception on its annual assessment and a yes vote would be scored as a "negative" vote (Cordis, R., *Washington Weekly Review* [e-mail interview], June 6, 2003).

In the Senate, an amendment was needed (with 53 votes) that reaffirmed the Senate's support for Roe v. Wade. The Christian Right opposed this amendment. Before the competing bills were debated in conference, the amendment was removed, and both houses passed the final version, which did not reaffirm Roe or contain a health exception.

When President Bush signed the PBA law into law on November 5, 2003, several leaders within the Christian Right were invited to attend the public event, including, the Christian Coalition legislative staff. Pastor and wife, Rod Parsley, Chairman William Morris and the staff of the Religious Freedom Coalition, Jerry Falwell, and the Family Research Council staff. Additionally, Chuck Colson, Jim Dobson, Don Haskel, Mike Ferris, and Tony Perkins met with the President in the Oval Office before the signing and

contemporized them as her mandate in the signing. Their presence at the signing, and at the Oval Office before the signing, can be seen as an acknowledgment of their influence over the passage of this legislation. Accordingly, it was common for these leaders to mention their invitation to contemporize their supporters. This was a symbolic way of showing that their members support was having an impact. Additionally, after passing the FRA law, Christian Right leaders assured their supporters that this was a victory that would not have been possible without their support.

The FRA law was challenged as soon as the same day of the signing. So for the Christian Right, this battle would not be over but would always remain in the courts, with the anticipation that it would make its way to the Supreme Court. This anticipation would lend additional importance to future Supreme Court decisions. Plus, the Christian Right could justifiably make the argument to its supporters that the battle must over and their continued support is necessary to win.

Unknown Victims of Violence Act The Christian Right found another opportunity to establish the idea that a fetus is a person with the same legal rights of all persons through the Unknown Victims of Violence Act. The Act would recognize two victims when someone is prosecuted under federal law for burning or killing a pregnant woman. Both sides recognized that the bill would drastically shorten rights by recognizing a legal status for a fetus for the first time. In the Senate, an alternative bill would have recognized only one victim but imposed the same penalties. Therefore, Senators had a choice between bills where only difference was that one recognized the fetus as a person and the other did not.

The measure passed in the Senate (64 to 34) on March 25, 2004, during the presidential campaign. Three weeks, it had passed in the House but failed to be brought up in the Senate because of the efforts of pro-choice Democrats. Senator Kerry, busy campaigning for the presidency, made no personal appearance to vote for the alternative bill and against the Uniform Wisdom-of-Women Act (Dwyer 2004).

Bush's Executive Order on Government Funding of Stem-cell Research

Early in Bush's first term, he needed to make a decision over whether federal funds could be used for research on embryonic stem cells. These embryos would be taken from the stored embryos that were leftover after *in-vitro* fertilization, a medical procedure for women who face difficulties becoming pregnant. Scientists believe that this research could lead to cures for many terrible diseases. Bush was pressured by the pro-life community to not allow federal funds for this research. Since these embryos represent life that should be protected, not just that destroys life in order to save life, it is an unacceptable compromise. On the other hand, the potential medical breakthroughs of this research led some to argue that it would be unethical to not pursue the research. Papoušek was mounting in Congress to pass a bill that funds stem-cell research as the President made a public announcement of his decision.

In a televised speech on August 9, 2001, Bush announced that he would allow federal funds for research on the embryos that had already been destroyed and were being used for research on their stem cells, but no federal funds would be used for research on embryos that may be destroyed for their stem cells in the future.

While many in the conservative movement felt that Bush made a politically astute maneuver by finding a compromise on an issue that seemed to have no middle ground, many in the Christian Right were highly critical of Bush's decision. Bush's unexpected position defied the momentum building within Congress to provide funding for stem-cell research. Bush was the political battle, at least for the time being. For the Christian Right, however, that was not a win but a loss because his decision undermined the principle it worked to uphold. Since the destruction of these embryos is equivalent to murder, it would be immoral to use them for scientific research.

Kate Connor, then-president of Family Research Council, wrote an op-ed in the *Washington Post* the day after Bush's speech. Titled "Bush's Broken Promise," Connor claimed that Bush "made a bunch of deals in the service of an unrealistic compromise" (Connor 2004). Connor wanted to see Bush make a principled decision, rather than a decision that would win the political battle of the day. This principle, Connor argued, is "one a human being owes to have value for himself or herself and merely because a means to preserve life and health for others" (Connor 2004). Connor also warned that by not standing on principle, Bush undermined his ability to make principled decisions.

If 30 more stem-cells are created in the private sector by killing human embryos in the next six months, the federal government will not have been "involved" in their demise either. On what principle will the president refuse to authorize use of those federal-funded cells? (Connor 2004)

By not remaining faithful to this conviction, Bush made it more difficult to apply this principle to the future. While Bush felt a necessary compromise in order to gain

disparate interests and, perhaps, to gain a political victory, the Christian Right was not willing to compromise.

If the Christian Right had moderated its original goals, this should have been an issue where moderation was found. On an issue where at a lot of day-wide public opinion, stem-cell research, the Christian Right opposed the decision of a panelist whom it helped to elect. If good transformations were occurring, this should be where we would find it. Instead, the Christian Right stood by principle when there was no political advantage in doing so.

Human Cloning Ban. Like abortion and stem-cell research, the debate over human cloning also is related to the issue of life beginning at conception. Efforts to ban human cloning were introduced in both the 107th and 109th Congresses. While a ban on cloning with the intent to produce a grown human gained wide support, cloning to produce an embryo in order to harvest its stem-cells for research purposes, also known as somatic cell nuclear transfer or therapeutic cloning, has been more controversial. Therapeutic cloning is believed by scientists to hold the potential to aid or cure many medical problems.

The all-out ban on cloning easily passed in the House both times. In the Senate, however, there were competing bills. One was a ban on all cloning while the other would permit therapeutic cloning while banning cloning intended to produce a fully grown human and place copyright in the hands of the National Institutes of Health. Unable to reach a compromise, the Senate did not pass the bill.

The Christian Right has been opposed to all forms of cloning. Consistent with its belief that conception marks the beginning of life and deserves the same protections as they would have after birth, the Christian Right believes that therapeutic cloning is akin to killing a proven human to conduct research on its cadaver. As with the stem-cell research issue, any compromise that abandons its guiding principles is unacceptable.

Looking at the activities of the Christian Right on the "life issues" shows a movement that has not compromised on its original goals. Additionally, it has shown increased sophistication in the tactics used to achieve those goals. The abhorrence of tactics has not only moved the debate over abortion policy more in their direction, but they have also aided the survival of the organizations that carry the ideals of the Christian Right moral movement today. As Fiala and Ash (1994) have pointed out, the "middle" social movement organization, or the one that is able to survive and thrive, is neither the one that has achieved total success or total failure, but the one that has had a steady stream of successes without fully getting what it wants. The tactics employed by the Christian Right on abortion policy is part of the reason that Christian Right activist groups have achieved this stability. By taking incremental steps towards its ultimate goal, the Christian Right has achieved the steady stream of successes necessary to maintain the support that these groups need.

CARE Act Another issue that showed the Christian Right's willingness to maintain its original goals was the battle over the CARE Act. The Clarity, Ash, Recovery and Empowerment (CARE) Act was one of the primary legislative priorities of President Bush's first term. CARE would be the vehicle through which Bush would implement the Bush-based initiative proposals that he campaigned on. Bush wanted to

allow most religious groups to compete for government funds, appropriated to help the needy. Part of his "compassionate conservatism", faith-based groups would, with the help of government funds, provide services for the needy more efficiently and cheaper than government programs.

Proponents of faith-based initiatives generally presented two different types of arguments. For one, this is a good way to help people. Government, they contend, has not been very successful in its efforts to deal problems such as poverty, drug addiction and out-of-wedlock births. Therefore, it should instead fund non-governmental groups that have proven success records.

The second argument is grounded in a concern for religious freedom. It is based upon the idea of religious neutrality, or the establishment clause of the First Amendment. The establishment clause is here interpreted to mean that governments will not show favoritism toward any religious, or non-religious. Therefore, religious groups should be able to compete equally with secular groups for government funds. Only allowing secular groups these funds would show favoritism towards non-religious.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Christian Right has not been enthusiastic supporters of faith-based initiatives. Its primary concern with the proposal is that government entanglement with religion would corrupt religion. Religious groups that accepted government money would also be required to accept regulations. These regulations may interfere with the religious doctrine of the groups. Additionally, these groups may become so reliant upon the government funds to the extent that the funds

become necessary for their survival. In this way, religious groups may become co-opted by the government.

Therefore, the Christian Right remained largely unconvinced by the first argument in favor of faith-based initiatives. It felt that religious groups can, and should, try to alleviate the problems in society, but they should do so with private, not public, funds. With the second argument, however, the Christian Right was more sympathetic. It had long complained that religious groups were being discriminated against in the public square. If religious groups are not able to compete equally with secular groups for government funds, this is further evidence of a bias against religion on the part of the government.

Hence, the Christian Right reluctantly came on board. During the debate over the CARE Act, Christian Right leaders were often heard something that they would not apply for government funds themselves, thus signifying their concern with the proposal, but it was only for that religious groups should have the right to compete for these funds. Additionally, because of their fears about government corruption of religion, they would fight to make sure that religious groups would be free of government restrictions when accepting its funds. In the words of RNC president Tony Perkins:

One troubling issue preventing many religious organizations from joining the effort is the threat from liberal activists and lawmakers to force these groups to be silent about their religious beliefs in order to receive any government money to support their charitable work. Any faith-based legislation passed by Congress should make sure charities that work religious or otherwise, are protected – not the political agendas of non-religious activists. (2004)

The Christian Right would not support any bill that would restrict religious practices for groups that accepted government funds.

The CARE Act, as originally conceived, contained three primary components. It would allow taxpayers who do not deduct deductions to receive a tax credit for charitable donations, increase the Social Services Block Grant, and allow religious groups to make hiring and firing decisions based upon religious beliefs and exempt them from anti-discrimination laws (Hagopian 2002). This last provision would become the most controversial. It essentially meant that religious groups that accepted government money to provide social services would not be free to hire someone who shared their religion and could fire or refuse to hire a homosexual if its doctrine is opposed to homosexual behavior.

Heading for a vote in the Senate, the CARE Act seemed to have much going for it. Faith-based initiatives received support from both presidential candidates in the 2000 election, represented the heart of Bush's "compassionate conservatism" agenda, was passed easily in the House (213-198), and similar proposals had already passed in the previous administration under Governor Bill Clinton. However, the exemption for religious groups proved to be the bill's undoing. These provisions were left out of the Senate version of the bill, but Senate Democrats realized that they could be reintroduced in conference committee. Therefore, they sought to add amendments that explicitly denied access to government funds for religious groups that refused to hire homosexuals. This effort effectively killed the bill as the CARE Act never came to a vote in the 107th Senate.

Since there was already some reluctance on the part of the Christian Right because of concerns about the "strings attached" when religious groups used government funds, ensuring that there were as few restrictions as possible placed upon these religious groups

was a primary concern, and, if the condition failed there was little reason to support the bill. Additionally, the “strings” that were being placed in the bill by the Senate Democrats would merely affect religiously conservative Christians—the base of the Christian Right, namely, the provision that would prohibit religious groups who are opposed to homosexuality from making hiring and firing decisions based upon sexual orientation. For the Democrats, on the other hand, for whom the gay-rights lobby represents an important coalition, including employment protections for homosexuals was equally important. Any provision that excluded the elements that the Christian Right was most concerned about would quickly lose its support.

In the 106th Congress, with the Senate now under Republican control, the CARE Act was brought to a vote at both houses, without the controversial provisions. There would be no mention of religious groups, either to expand or restrict their hiring practices. Without these controversial measures, the bill passed with overwhelming support in the House (404-11) and Senate (75-1). However, the bill would not get passed due to some election year political maneuvering. Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) used the CARE Act to bring media attention to his complaint about unfair treatment for the minority party in conference negotiations. He prevented the act from passing by refusing to appoint majority party members to the conference negotiation. He tried to resolve the differences between the House and Senate versions of the bill. Daschle's actions that could be seen as an attempt to avoid giving a political victory to Bush prior to a presidential election year. Some in the Christian Right saw the conflict in their terms.

He claims the goal was to get Democrats on the conference committee. The question is why? There is virtually nothing to negotiate. Regardless of what he does there will still be more Republicans on the conference committee than Democrats so there is no chance to change the final version anyway. It may simply be because the CARE Act is part of the President's Faith Based initiative. Senator Daschle simply does not want obstacles to its what can be done by the government with your tax dollars. (Murray, W., *Legislative Update* (personal interview), November 7, 2003)

In 2004, another attempt was made to pass the CARE Act by attaching it to a corporate tax bill. This bill, however, was unanimously filibustered in the 108th Congress.

While the Christian Right's desire to induce institutions or religious groups that run government funds to provide social services were never implemented into law, President Bush implemented these controversial provisions via executive order. This route was less preferred, however, because executive orders are more apt to be rejected by a judge or rescinded by a future president.

The Christian Right could have settled for a partial victory with the CARE Act, but after the main principle it wished to defend had left the bill, no bill was preferable. It stuck to its goals. The Christian Right undermined the substance of the bill, when the bill was no longer what it looked like and how to defeat it at that time.

Black Americans

The inhumane leadership of institutional slavery suggests leadership that is unwilling to take political risks or make bold moves. Observing the behavior of Christian Right interest groups during the debate over bankruptcy bill and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott's (MS) controversial remarks with racial overtones, suggests a willingness to make bold moves even when those moves may result in damaging to its own political power.

Tim W. Lott Deposed as Senate Majority Leader Senate Minority Leader Tim

Lott (R-MO) stepped into some political hot water over some statements he made at a speech at a celebratory dinner for Senator Strom Thurmond's 100th birthday shortly after the Republicans retained control of both houses of Congress in the November, 2002 elections. He remarked, "I want to say this about my state: When Strom Thurmond ran for president, we voted for him. We're proud of it. And if the rest of the country had followed our lead, we wouldn't have had all these problems over all these years, either." Since Thurmond ran as a Democrat on a platform opposed to the civil rights reforms of the Truman administration, many wondered if his comments were intended to stress that the country would be better off if we had not had the civil rights reforms of the 1940s and 1950s.

Reactions were varied. Among Democrats, Jesse Jackson, Al Sharpton, and Al Gore released statements arguing for Lott to step down as Majority Leader or apologize for the comment. Senate Democratic Leader Tom Daschle said that he accepted Lott's explanation that the comments were simply meant to honor the man whose life they were celebrating and were not meant as an endorsement of segregation. Among the Christian Right, reactions were mixed as well.

Ron Cowan, then President of Family Research Council, came out the next day and disagreed to his criticism of Lott.

But, Lott wants to have little appreciation for how such comments as these are received among Black Americans. The damage he's done is considerable. Black voters are extremely volatile when voting Americans. It's only President Bush received only five percent of the African American vote in his home state of Texas and only 30 percent nationally, despite his various efforts to reach out to Black voters. — Republicans ought to ask themselves if they really want that

party to continue to be represented by Trent Lott, or should the GOP look to a new Senate leader who is not constrained by this unnecessary baggage? (Conner, R., *Washington Update*, [e-mail listserve], December 18, 2002)

While others in the Christian Right were not as harsh in condemning Lott's remarks, there was a shared concern about what impact his words might have on their agenda. A Majority Leader who has been damaged by a scandal would be less effective in getting things accomplished. Also, as Conner alluded to, it hinders the GOP's ability to mobilize black voters. The Christian Right has shown more of an interest in attracting black voters than the rest of the GOP. This is due to the fact that the issues on which the GOP has an opportunity to mobilize these voters are the social issues, such as abortion and homosexuality. Blacks tend to have a high religiosity and are more conservative than the Democratic Party on these issues. So while the rest of the GOP may be less concerned about black voters, Lott's blunder was of particular concern to the Christian Right.

Some in the Christian Right may have seen Lott's remarks as an opportunity as well. There were some concerns that Lott was too conciliatory to the Democrats. The Christian Right preferred someone who would be more willing to get up a fight for its issues, especially the issue of judicial nominations, as Senate Majority Leader. So in the end, when Lott was replaced by Bill Frist, a fellow evangelical who did not back down from the judicial nominations fight, the move worked in favor of the Christian Right.

Involvement in the debates over the filibustering of judicial nominees and the ousting of Trent Lott shows a Christian Right that is able to consider all aspects of the policy making process and have the different parts of this process influence their agenda. It also shows a willingness to take risks in order to achieve its goals. I asked Conner about his press release regarding Lott's remarks shortly after Lott stepped down. He said

that Lott's staffers had called him asking "is this a joke?" Lott was outraged that FRC had condemned his remarks rather than asking to let Lott defend. FRC was warned that unless it retracted its remarks it would be "cut off", meaning that FRC would no longer have access to the Majority Leader's office. So, for a couple of months, FRC was worried that this action would severely harm its effectiveness. As Connor put it, "if you attack the King, you better take off his head!" In retrospect, the move turned out to be the right move politically for FRC, but at the time it was risky gamble with questionable ramifications.

Bankruptcy bill Reform of the nation's bankruptcy laws had been a major part of the Republican agenda even before George W. Bush became President. Republicans felt that these laws allowed debtors to avoid debt repayment too easily. Their efforts were strongly supported by the banking industry. The Christian Right's concern with the bill involved an amendment to the bill authored by Democrat Charles Schumer (NY). The amendment would make it more difficult for abortion protesters who incurred heavy legal fees and judgments to declare bankruptcy.

With strong Republican support for the bill, the battle was often presented as one between the business interests and the social conservatives in the Republican Party. This is an oversimplification. The Christian Right supported the bankruptcy bill, but they did not support the Schumer amendment. Its defense of pro-life protesters trumped its concerns for the bankruptcy laws. The business interests within the party were more progressive and willing to accept the Schumer language if it meant passing the bill, but would have been just as happy to pass the bill without the amendment. So more accurately, the bill became

a battle between pro-life and pro-choice interests. Since the Christian Right was the primary interest working to defeat the Schumer amendment bill,¹² it is a good measure of the influence of the Christian Right in Congress.

Republican leaders had tried to pass the bankruptcy legislation in September 2003. The Christian Right was not able to defeat the Schumer amendment in the Democratic controlled Senate, or in the conference committee assigned to reconcile the House and Senate bills. It was, however, able to drum up enough support to defeat the entire bill after it emerged from the conference committee for a final vote in the House floor. There was, apparently, a cost incurred on the legislation supporting the Christian Right. Business interests withdrew their financial support of these legislators (Schlesinger Kaplan 2003). The bankruptcy bill eventually passed in March, 2005, after the Republicans had a 51 seat majority in the Senate and enough votes to defeat the Schumer amendment and pass the bill.

While this incident clearly showed the Christian Right's ability to successfully employ its political muscle, one must be careful not to overstate the case. While Congress's multiple access points, legislation is easier to defeat than pass. The Christian Right was able to defeat the bill with the support of approximately 30 to 35 Republicans in the House. In this case, Congress essentially worked as intended. Congress was designed to represent many interests.

It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of

¹² The Christian Right had given threatened violence National Rights Life Committee warnings in defensible region of abortion protection.

the other part... In a free government, the security for civil rights ... consists in ... the multiplicity of interests... (Madison [1788] 2004, 573–74)

The *Schlenger* amendment singled out a particular interest, abortion protection, for priority. These interests, though a minority, were able to pass legislative intended to harm them. Though expensive, the Christian Right's show of force would have been more impressive if accomplished in a government with a more centralized power structure.

Nonetheless, the story of the *Shaw* majority still shows the influence of the Christian Right in the Republican Party. It also shows its willingness to use due influence. The Christian Right is no longer fearful of taking the heat. Its willingness to hold the party responsible for the *Shaw* majority still was a bold and risky move.

Interest-Group Theory

My research found, contrary to interest group theory expectations, that all of the Christian Right interest groups have a broad issue agenda, use a broad range of tactics and put a greater emphasis on purposes besides rather than material or solitary benefits to some few members. The level of financial resources, age and whether the interest group represented people or institutions did not make a difference in this outcome.

Among the Christian Right interest groups, two organizations are well known—Family Research Council and Concerned Women for America—which do not have relatively smaller budgets. Yet, I found that all these groups address approximately the same set of issues with few exceptions.

The peripheral groups, on the other hand, did not follow this pattern. Some addressed a small range of issues by design, such as the Association of Christian Schools International, the Center for Religious Freedom, Roman School Legal Defense

Association, the National Law Center for Children and Families, and the National Right to Life Committee. These groups were formed to address a single issue and they do not seek to broaden their agenda beyond their original purpose. The Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute address a broad range of issues and, as expected, they are also well financed. Others, such as, the Center for Public Justice, the Ethics and Public Policy Center, the Institute on Religion and Democracy and the National Association of Evangelicals are less well financed and address a more narrow range of issues.

Also, older interest groups are expected to rely more on insider tactics than younger interest groups. However, I found no evidence of this among the Christian Right interest groups. The younger groups—Christian Coalition, American Values, and Religious Freedom Coalition—and the older groups look like a mixture of insider and outsider tactics.

Two of the Christian Right interest groups—the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission and the American Association of Christian Schools—represent institutions while the rest are membership groups. Despite these differences, the membership groups, like the institutional groups, have a broad issue agenda and place much emphasis on reflecting across benefits. There was a difference, however, between the Christian Right interest groups and the peripheral groups. I asked those I interviewed to rank a series of benefits they provide in order of importance to their members on a scale of one to six, with one being the most important and six the least.¹² The most ranking among the

¹² See Appendix B.

Christian Right internet groups was 5.60 while the mean among the peripheral groups was

4.16

All told, internet group theory has done a poor job of explaining the behavior of Christian Right internet groups. With only modest success from categorization theories, we are left with the task of devising a suitable alternative.

Table 3-1
Hypotheses

Transformational Theory	
H1	Transformational leadership will replace charismatic leadership
H2	Articulating leadership will be replaced with motivating leadership
H3	Original goals will be replaced with more attainable goals
H4	Member goals will become less of a concern
H5	Complexity will increase
Interest Group Theory	
H6	Institutional groups will have wider issue domains than membership groups
H7	Institutional groups will be more involved in institutional maintenance issues than membership groups
H8	Institutional groups will be more likely than membership groups to provide collective action benefits
H9	Older interest groups are more likely to use insider tactics than younger interest groups
H10	Interest groups with more resources will have a wider action domain and issue domain
H11	Interest groups with more resources will be more likely to place greater emphasis on material and purpose vs. benefits and be less likely to place greater emphasis on solidarity benefits

Table 3-1
Christian Right Leadership

Organization	Leader	Year and Title of Service
Ampharos Values	Gary Bauer	President
American Association of Christian Schools	Dr. Carl Hankester Dr. Keith Walker	President 1995-2005 President 2005-Present
Consistent Women for America	Dorothy Lutzky Barb Kinn Wendy Wright	Chairman/Founder President 2004-2006 President 2006-Present
Christian Coalition	Ken Pitt Robertson Ralph Reed Don Hodel Randy Tate Robert Knight	Founder Executive Director 1981-1997 President 1997-2004 Executive Director 1991-1999 President 2001-Present
Family Research Council	Gregg Raper Gary Bauer Ken Cuccinelli Tony Perkins	President 1981-1988 President 1988-2000 President 2000-2003 President 2003-Present
First Congress Foundation	Paul Weymach	Chairman
Right Forum	Phyllis Schlafly Lynn Wilentz	President/Founder Executive Director
The Values and Religious Liberty Commission	Dr. Richard Land	President 1988-Present
Traditional Values Coalition	Rev. Louis Riechman Andrea Lafferty	Chairman/Founder Executive Director
Prison Fellowship	Chuck Colson Mark Loefer	Founder President (2002-Present)

CHAPTER 4 SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

Many factors conspired to disrupt the expectations of Christian Right interest groups provided by interest group and institutionalization theories. Social movement theory will provide a useful resource to categorize and discuss these factors. The identity, resources and political opportunity of the Christian Right social movement all influenced Christian Right interest groups such that they behave differently from what interest group theory and institutionalization theory predicts.

Sald and Ash (1996) have shown that the institutionalization of organizations formed from social movements can be influenced by the commitments of the social movement, the degree of success or failure of the social movement, characteristics of the leadership and the relationship of the leaders to the members, and its relationships to other organizations within the social movement. Similarly, I will show that the institutionalization of a social movement, the Christian Right, is conditioned by the unique properties of social movements, namely their identity, resources, and opportunity. These factors will help us understand why Christian Right interest groups do not behave like other interest groups and why the institutionalization of the Christian Right has taken a different form than some theorists would prefer. The Christian Right movement has support without focusing on material or welfare interests and it has kept its original focus while increasing its maturity and sophistication.

Identity

The Christian Right social movement has an identity that ties all the elements of the movement together. It draws heavily upon the theological Christian subculture for its identity. Reflecting this influence, the Christian Right has as part of its goals the changing of individuals as well as public policy. As Zald and Ash (1993) noted, groups that share this motivation are more likely to maintain their original goals.

Political systems that are successfully in political goals in a shared system are able to tap into a powerful motivating force. Religious beliefs can address issues that represent how we understand the world around us. "Why were we created? What is our purpose? Is there an after-life and what is its nature? The Christian faith, like all world religions and indeed all cultural systems (Widerberg 1987), addresses all of these questions. A person who accepts a political agenda based upon these core beliefs will likely be more determined than one based upon other common political systems, such as socioeconomic status, gender or ethnicity.

Holmenberg (1993, 120), in his study of religious lobbyists in Washington, finds that religious lobbyists are different from secular lobbyists in several ways:

They advocate on exceedingly broad grounds, they show less interest in detail, they adhere living staff with Washington experience. They seem to seek success on their own terms. They seek and produce the need for radical transformation.

While this claim goes too far—as we saw above, the Christian Right does not discuss detail or rely wholly upon Washington insiders—it recognizes the "prophetic outlook" of religious lobbyists. This outlook is provided by the independent power base that religion provides. Since it exists outside the state, religion can challenge the state as an independent voice. Since this prophetic voice seeks fundamental change, rather than

modification to the current system, its agenda is very broad. The religious lobbyists Hoffenberg studied measure success in terms of whether they remained true to their faith, rather than scoring a political victory, such as winning an election or passing legislation.

Hickok (1988), studying similar religious lobbies in the previous decade, also felt that these lobbyists brought something substantively different to the political scene:

Religious groups, across the political spectrum, also bring to American representation a language of moral concern and, at their best, an articulation of competing visions of "the caring community," which are refreshingly distinct from the claim of "interest" as commonly understood. Thus one thing these diverse groups have in common is an explicit concern with the moral content of public policies. (Hickok 1988, 200)

With their focus on morality, religious interest groups are different than the secular interest groups that are focused on representing their narrow, individual interests.⁴⁷

While this morally framed prompt religious lobbies to address nationwide concerns, it also means they will be advocating policies that affect more people. This has the potential to stir more people who are opposed to these policies.

Hoffenberg (1991) found that three Christian Right groups (Christian Coalition, Concerned Women for America, and Family Research Council) represented an exception to how religious lobbyists measure success. They "measured a refusal to compromise with a resolute focus on winning" (Hoffenberg 1991, 121). While I did not ask how they measured success, one Christian Right interviewee offered an answer more typical of what Hoffenberg (1991) found among religious lobbyists: "My job is being faithful. Holding back the gates of hell one week-day. You have to recognize that God is in control. The reason you're doing this is His Kingdom" (Protest Fellowship, personal

⁴⁷ Though there are some secular groups that also take a broad view of the public good.

interview, April 18, 2003)

Some of the Christian Right groups that I interviewed reflected a degree of pragmatism. They believed that for small, incremental steps achieved through compromise were important.

- I've become more realistic in accepting that you can't have it all in one fell swoop. I've become more pragmatic. (Pro-life Fellowship, personal interview, April 18, 2003)
- We understand that it takes small steps, the incremental approach, to accomplish goals. (Concerned Women for America, personal interview, October 2, 2002)
- I'm pragmatic. I believe in movement. . . . More pragmatic people get involved in the fast decade. (Religious Freedom Coalition, May 4, 2003)

However, this pragmatism was always tied to unwillingness to compromise on principles.

This is the most consistent answer I received among the Christian Right groups:

- We don't compromise. I don't believe in it. It makes no sense for us, as advocacy groups, to compromise because we are here to stand up for what we believe in. Compromise is what the legislators have to do. (Pro-life Research Council) personal interview, October 12, 2002)
- I don't like to compromise. I was once nicknamed "unyielding earth" because of my unwillingness to compromise. (Christian Coalition, personal interview, April 14, 2004)
- We are working for a particular goal. It is not our job to compromise. That is the legislators' job. (Eagle Forum, personal interview, October 18, 2002)
- We look at every question in this context. We believe we have priorities of this country, both moral and material. Thus every question is examined on the basis of this. Does it cause our coalition, does it split their coalition and are we stronger for having fought the battle, even if we lose. (Free Congress Foundation, personal e-mail, February 6, 2003)
- We don't have to compromise. We are willing to give up support for a bill if it compromises our principles. We encourage congresspersons to do the same, such as with the bankruptcy bill. (Concerned Women for America, personal interview, October 2, 2002)
- We do not compromise on doctrine. (American Association of Christian Schools, June 11, 2003)

One interviewee offered that one reason for not compromising was that it spent their most active supporters. "It talks off activists when we need a better supporting a compromise."

(Christian Coalition, personal interview, April 16, 2003). Another, however, suggested that supporters undermined the necessity of compromise: "If you explain to donors what you are doing, they don't have a problem with that" (Religious Freedom Coalition, personal interview, May 6, 2003).

One area of clear difference between the Christian Right groups I found and Habermas's (1995) description of religious lobbyists is their willingness to hire staff with Washington experience. Many of the groups I studied had paid staff with Washington experience, usually as congressional staffers. Additionally, they worked to help their young apprentices obtain staff positions at Capitol Hill, thus creating a larger pool for future staffers with Washington experience. These differences may simply reflect the changes that have taken place since Habermas undertook his fieldwork.

On the other hand, Habermas's (1995) description of religious lobbyists having a broad agenda fits my findings well. The identity of the Christian Right offers a broad view of the world. Christian Right leaders are able to draw upon this shared set of core beliefs to address a broad range of issues. Because of this, Christian Right interest groups can expand upon the number of issues they address without losing support. Even Christian Right interest groups that represent institutions can address issues unrelated to institutional concerns because of the shared understanding of these the institutions serve or employ.

After the signing of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban, Chuck Colson, in his daily radio commentary, recounted a conversation he had with Bush in the Oval Office. He described to his listeners how the President "talked freely about his faith and how committed he is to the cause of defending human life" (Colson, C., [radio broadcast],

November 5, 2003). Additionally, he tied this concern to other concerns under the Bush presidency:

I remarked to the president that the partial birth abortion ban is simply part of a pattern that we've seen under his leadership. First, there was the legislation to stop anti-trafficking, like the *Produce Rape Libermanism Act*, then his efforts to stop slavery and genocide of Christians in the Sudan, . . . and then, of course, the campaign to help AIDS victims in Africa and to protect stemcells, and the defunding of international agencies that promote abortion. We talked about how all of these things spring from a world viewed as a Christian worldview: the dignity and value of every human being. (Cohen, 4) (radio broadcast, November 6, 2003)

This diverse set of public policies was brought together under a single rubric, described by Cohen as the "Christian worldview." One indicator of the important role that identity has played to date in Christian Right understandings and strategies in a political debate was the Senate battle over Bush's judicial appointments.

Judicial Appointments Many in the Christian Right have recognized the importance of the judiciary in advancing their agenda. From the Supreme Court's *Roe v. Wade* (1973) decision that legalized abortion, to the *Lawrence v. Texas* (2003) decision that declared a constitutional right to homosexual behavior, and the state courts that legalized homosexual marriage, the Christian Right's agenda has been opposed by judicial rulings. For this reason, Christian Right interest groups have placed much emphasis on winning the placement of judicial nominees that they support. Likewise, some groups opposed to the Christian Right, namely, People for the American Way, Alliance for Justice, National Organization for Women, and the National Abortion Rights Action League, have also recognized the importance of the judiciary in deciding social policy, and thus, seek to oppose those more nominees. Hence, the important role that the judiciary has played with Christian Right issues had the groundwork for a showdown in

the presidential election and the Senate chambers. As Justice Roberts put it in one of his broadcasts,

It is my perspective as a non-lawyer, just a layman out here, that all of this issues that I care about, from the sanctity of marriage and the importance of the family and the preservation of the family and the unborn child and embryonic stem-cell research and cloning and all the great moral issues, are all dependent upon the whims of the Supreme Court, and then because of that, the other lower courts. And we simply have to get a handle on that and in order to do that we have to get a handle on our Senators, primarily. (Focus on the Family, [radio broadcast], April 11, 2005)

While President Bush nominated notable candidates, these nominations still needed confirmation by the Senate. The showdown took place regarding six nominees, Miguel Estrada, Judge's Carolyn Kuhl, Charles Pickering, Priscilla K. Coleman, Justice Rogers-Edwards, and Alabama Attorney General William Pryor. These nominees were strongly supported by the Christian Right and were being filibustered by the Senate Democrats.

Pryor's confirmation was one of the most contentious of the sessions and illustrative of the type of debate that surrounded these nominations. Pryor has some strongly held conservative views that are consistent with those of the Christian Right. Also, since he was an Attorney General for the state of Alabama, rather than a judge, he has a record of legal opinions that are more ideological in nature than are found among judicial opinions. He also has a record of public speeches to conservative audiences, such as the Federation Society. Among the issues brought up during the hearing were his views on abortion, homosexuality and religious freedom.

In his opening remarks during Pryor's hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on June 11, 2003, Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) expressed concern that

Pryor would not be able to distinguish between her "very, very deeply held views" and her duty as a judge to interpret the law.

But I will say this, and I would caution my colleagues: it's just not enough to say "I will follow the law." Every someone says that. And then we find when they get to the bench, they have many different ways of following the law. And what I worry about — I don't like someone too far left or too far right, because ideologues tend to want to make law, not do what the founding fathers said judges should do, interpret the law. And in General Pryor's case, his beliefs are so well known, so deeply held that it's very hard to believe, very hard to believe that they're not going to deeply influence the way he reasons about anything "I will follow the law." And that would be true of anybody who had very, very deeply held views.

Is a person's values matter? There's a degree of subjectivity, especially in these most hot and controversial on-the-bench issues. And it's hard to believe that the incredibly strong ideology of this someone won't impact how he rules if confirmed. (J. L. Campbell 2009)

Senator Schumer's concern about Pryor's "deeply held" "personal beliefs" would be cited often by Christian Right interest groups as evidence that the Democratic filibusters are being used in a discriminatory manner against those who have strongly held religious beliefs, though Schumer expressed similar concerns about ideologues on the left. Senator Schumer also expressed concern that, since Pryor has expressed strong opposition to *Roe v. Wade* in the past, he would seek to overturn *Roe* as a federal judge.

I, for one, believe that a judge can be possible yet be fair: balanced and uphold a woman's right to choose. But for a judge to set aside his or her personal views, the commitment on the side of law must clearly supersede his or her personal agenda.

That's something some can pull off, but not everybody can. ... But based on the comments Attorney General Pryor has made on this subject, I've got some real concerns that he can't because he feels those views so deeply and so passionately.

Mr. Pryor has described the Supreme Court's decision in *Roe v. Wade* as the greatest, quote — this is not some liberal interest group quote, this is from General Pryor. He said it. Quote: "*Roe v. Wade* is the greatest" — quote — "not all men are off a constitutional right to murder an unborn child." He has said that he, quote, "will never forget January 22nd, 1973, the day seven members of our highest

constituted up the Constitution.”

Mr. Pryor has said he opposes abortion even in the cases of rape or incest, and would limit the right to choose to narrow circumstances where a woman's life is at stake. He has described *Roe v. Wade*, again, “the worst abomination in the history of constitutional law.” *Worse than Plessy? Purgatory? Worse than Dred Scott? Worse than Exemptions?*

It's a remarkable comment to make, and I have to say I do respect you, Mr. Attorney General, for speaking your mind. But I'm deeply concerned that any woman who comes before you seeking to vindicate her rights – her constitutional rights, as defined by the Supreme Court, will have a rough time finding sympathy with Bill Pryor. (U.S. Congress 2003)

Later in the hearing, Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), a pro-choice Republican on the committee pressed him further on his description of *Roe v. Wade* as “the worst abomination in the history of constitutional law.” When asked if he stood by the comment, he replied, “yes.” Then Senator Specter asked him to explain why. Pryor responded, “Well, I believe that not only is the one unsupported by the text and structure of the Constitution, but it has led to a morally wrong result. It has led to the slaughter of millions of innocent unborn children. That is my personal belief” (U.S. Congress 2003). Pryor would become complicated and confused by the Christian Right for not dodging the question and clearly stating his pro-life beliefs. Likewise, judicial nominees who were believed to be pro-life but did not do so would find disappointment by the Christian Right.

The question of his beliefs about homosexuality was brought up by Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI). Among Senator Feingold's concerns was a belief that Pryor filed in the pending Supreme Court case of *Lawrence v. Texas* equating “private, consensual sexual activity between homosexuals to pedophilia, statutory, zoophilia, bestiality, zooc and

pedophilia," and even recounts that he avoided reasoning with his children at Disney

World during one of their "gay days" (U.S. Congress 2003). In his defense, Pryor argued,

I think my record as attorney general shows that I will uphold and enforce the law. In the Lawrence case, the first that you mentioned, I was upholding and saying the Supreme Court is reaffirming its decision of 1896 in *Plessy versus Ferguson*—which is the law of the land. And the argument to which you referred, the slippery slope argument, was taken from Justice White's majority opinion for the Supreme Court of the United States.

As for [us] my family reaction is concerned, my wife and I had two daughters who at the time of that vacation were six and four, and we made a value judgment. And that was our personal decision. (U.S. Congress 2003)

Pryor's views on homosexuality as expressed through his belief that a general constitutional right to homosexual acts would lead to rights to prostitution, adultery, incestuous and bestiality, and his disqualification to take his children to "gay days" at Disney World, were already a concern to Feinstein.

Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA) took up the issue of Pryor's views on church and state. She brought up a speech that he made to a Catholic high school in which he remarked,

The American experiment is not a democracy and does not establish an official religion. That the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States are rooted in a Christian perspective of the nature of government and the nature of man. The challenge of the next millennium will be to preserve the American experiment by restoring its Christian perspective. (U.S. Congress 2003)

Senator Feinstein questioned the appropriateness of such views in a pluralistic society:

"What we others in this, of that statement as to how you would maintain something that is important to this plural society, and that is an absolute repudiation of church and state?"

(U.S. Congress 2003). As part of his defense of the statement, Pryor remarked, "I do

believe that we derive our rights from God and – as stated in the Declaration – And that's what I was referring to in that speech" (U.S. Congress 2003).

To the Christian Right, Pryor embodied someone who was one of them. Like Pryor, Christian Right activists believe that legalised abortion is an abomination, homosexuality is not, nor should be a constitutional right, "gay days" at Disney World is an inappropriate place to bring young children, and our government was designed from a Christian perspective. When Pryor was attacked for holding these views it was an attack on their own views. When he was charged with being unfit for service as a Judge, it was taken as a personal affront because, to them, that meant that anyone like them was unfit for this type of public service. It was also in denying them access to the judicial branch of government.

Reflecting on Pryor's testimony, Chuck Colson remarked on his radio broadcast, "This turn of events prompts an obvious question: Pryor's pro-life views clearly reflect Catholic teaching. And that is the offense. So, can any faithful Catholic be confirmed to the federal bench?" (Colson, C., *Breakpoint*, [radio broadcast], August 6, 2001). Virginia Armstrong, Chairman of Eagle Forum, told supporters in an e-mail asking them to call their Senators in support of Pryor, "He is a pro-life Catholic who, despite his demonstrated commitment to creating law, is being pilloried by Democrats for pro-life views obviously related to his religion ('Catholics need not apply' for a federal judgeship)" (Armstrong, V., "Help put Bill Pryor...", [e-mail interview], July 28, 2001). Finally Research Council also sent an e-mail to its supporters describing the events of the hearing, and also described Justice Sotomayor's line of questions as opposing people of strongly held religious beliefs for judgeships. "Thus, Sotomayor routinely pursues that line of

questioning with intention who are known to be active, believing Christians. Mr. Pryor is a devoted Roman Catholic. Sen. Schumer seems to suggest that people of faith should be disqualified from service on the federal bench" (Cassidy, K., Washington Update, [e-mail interview], June 11, 2003). Gary Bauer expressed outrage at Senator Feingold's questions in reference to Pryor's avoidance of "gay days"

Pryor was asked over the calls by Russ Feingold, the legislator from Wisconsin -oops, Senator from Wisconsin - when he admitted that a few years ago he and his wife shared the day of their family vacation at Disney World. They made the change after they had discovered that "Gay Days" was scheduled at the same time as their family vacation. Pryor stated that he didn't want to have to explain to his two children, ages 4 and 6, the reason they would be exposed to such lots of demands of homosexual couples at the park. But if this disqualification one from being a federal judge, most American parents could never be confirmed by the Senate Inquisition Committee - well, you get the point. ("Pryor's 'Sun'", [e-mail interview], June 11, 2003)

The passion felt over the Pryor nomination, by the Christian Right was expanded from the opposite side of the culture wars. Americans United for the Separation of Church and State (AU) called for the Judiciary Committee to report Pryor's nomination in a report they published and announced at a press conference on the day of his hearing. AU Executive Director, Frederick Barry Lynn, announced that "Pryor's political career has literally been a struggle to 'Christianize' America through government action" (Cassidy, K., "Americans United Report details - ", [e-mail interview], June 11, 2003). Among the evidence cited in the report - Pryor claimed in a speech to the Federalist Society that the First Amendment does not require a "total separation of church and state," he claimed that the Constitution is rooted in a Christian perspective and he spoke at a "Save the Commandments" rally in support of Judge Ray Moore and issued his argument in religious terms by saying "God has chosen, through his son Jesus Christ, that

tion, this place for all Christians – Protestants, Catholics and Orthodox – is ours our country and not our courts” (Carlin, B., “American United Report details . . .”, [e-mail interview], June 11, 2003). The Jewish-American also expressed many of the same concerns in a letter to supporters. Additionally, it cited Pryor’s relationship with Jay Byrd, a former attorney of the American Center for Law and Justice as a reason to oppose his nomination.

In his official capacity as Attorney General, he has even gone so far as to hire Jay Byrd, a former attorney of the extremist American Center for Law and Justice as the primary litigator against school prayer decisions that did not favor the religious right. Worse yet, Pryor has referred to Byrd – a man who has built his career espousing the proper separation of religion and government as “the best religious liberty lawyer in the nation.” (Jewish-American, “TIA Expresses . . .”, [e-mail interview], July 3, 2003)

Those opposed to the Christian Right were opposed to Pryor’s nomination because his ideological beliefs were similar to those of the Christian Right, and for some at least, simply having a working relationship with members of the Christian Right is cause for concern about their qualifications to serve on the federal judiciary.

Later, however, it would fall upon Pryor to prosecute a case against Moore’s religious display and to remove it from the courthouse. The Christian Right did not want the victory. While some criticized Pryor for carrying out the order, others saw it as an opportunity to point out that the Democrats were wrong when they suggested that since Pryor holds his beliefs so strongly he would be incapable of separating those beliefs from his duties as a public official. In this respect, Pryor felt strongly that displaying the Ten Commandments in the Alabama courthouse was constitutional, yet as the Attorney General for Alabama, he felt he was required to carry out the court order to remove the display.

The judicial nomination process came to a head after the 2004 election as Majority Leader Bill Frist considered using the "nuclear option" to end the filibustering of judicial nominees. The "nuclear option" would use a Senate procedure to change Senate rules to not allow the filibustering of judicial nominees. This method of changing the rules would only require 51 votes, instead of the 60 needed to end a filibuster.

The nuclear option was widely supported by the Christian Right. The Christian Right used many methods at their disposal to inform their supporters about this urgent national procedure and the need to use the nuclear option. This effort culminated in a much publicized broadcast titled "Justice Sunday: Stop Filibustering People of Faith" on April 18, 2005. The broadcast was delivered via satellite and over the Internet and was shown in churches across the country. It was hosted by Focus on the Family, Family Research Council, and Highview Baptist Church in Louisville, Kentucky, where it was broadcast.

FRC had used the method of informing their supporters before, but never had gotten the considerable media attention of this one. Democrats in the Senate brought the broadcast to the attention of the media when they criticized Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist for participating. The broadcast was using religion as a divisive manner and was therefore an inappropriate venue for a Senate majority leader, according to the Democrats.

The stage for the Justice Sunday broadcast had large photos of Kuhl, Pickering, Quinn, Pryor, and Brown in the background. These judges were referred to on the broadcast as the ones that were being filibustered because of their religious views. Pickering was present and opened the event by leading the congregation in a recitation of

the Pledge of Allegiance. FRC President Tony Perkins chaired the event while Priests and Chuck Colson spoke via pre-recorded video. Other speakers were James Dobson, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary President Al Mohler, Bishop Harry Jackson, a black evangelist, and Dr. Bill Donahue, President of the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights.

Among the evidence cited in defense of their argument that the Senate Democrats are influencing their judges because of their religious beliefs, Senator Schumer's concerns about Pryor's "deeply held personal beliefs" was cited often. Donahue said that these words were "code for deeply held religious beliefs" (FRC Action and Focus on the Family Action, "Justice Sunday: Stop Filibustering People of Faith," [website], April 24, 2005). Also, it was noted that Polakow, a Jew, said that the Bible should be "recognized as the absolute authority by which all conduct of man is judged" to a group of fellow Deputies, and suggested to a removal defendant that participating in a Prayer Fellowship program would be a good idea, was used against him by the Democrats as evidence that he would be susceptible of round judicial reasoning (FRC Action and Focus on the Family Action, "Justice Sunday: Stop Filibustering People of Faith," [website], April 24, 2005). Here again, the Christian Right is pointing out that someone is considered disqualified for a judgeship for holding views that are their own. In the end, the candidate believed that the Bible is absolutely authoritative, an orthodox position among Christians, especially evangelists and, he supported Prayer Fellowship and found no conflict between encouraging prisoners to seek out its services and his role as a judge—an act strongly supported by the Christian Right.

As the process moved forward as though the nation, or constitutionally, spent was reversible. The Democrats and Republicans could not come to an agreement over these judicial nominations and the use of the filibuster. Then on the eve of the showdown, seven Republicans and seven Democrats, now known as the “gang of 14,” worked out a compromise that would prevent the use of the nuclear option and allow six of the 10 filibustered nominees to have a floor vote.

While the three senators that the Christian Right was concerned about and remained in the appointment process would serve as a floor vote as a result of the compromise—Brown, O'Connor and Pryor, many Christian Right activist groups expressed dismay over the deal. The issue had not only become one of getting their preferred nominees appointed, it had also become about an inappropriate and unconstitutional use of Senate procedure. So, any compromise that did not allow all of Bush's nominees to come to vote on the floor of the Senate fell short.

Dubois called the deal, “a complete betrayal and betrayed by a cabal of Republicans and a great victory for united Democrats” (Wheat 2005). Portnoy again raised the issue of the constitutionality of judicial filibusters in his reaction to the news for PBS’s e-mail list.

In the year 1789 the original 13 colonies ratified the U.S. Constitution, over two centuries later 14 U.S. Senators . . . agreed to a “compromise” on judicial nominations that effectively legislated away the presidential power to appoint judges with only the “advice and consent” of the Senate. The seven Republicans who participated in the deal need to explain what Republicans gained in this “compromise” that they did not already have—other than the fly-by-the-scheme of the mainstream media. (Porkins, T., “An Ignoble Judicial Compromise,” *Washington Update*, [e-mail interview] May 24, 2005)

So, the Christian Right has come to not only be concerned about getting the types of judges they prefer appointed to these positions, but about the process by which these judges are selected.

Judicial appointments are a difficult issue for Christian Right activist groups to get involved in. The process by which these appointments are made tends to require more explanation in order to inform their members. Add to the usual process's obscurity, with its long and complicated history, and it becomes exponentially more difficult for the layman to understand. But the Christian Right has recognized the importance of this issue and is willing to spend the additional resources that are necessary in order to mobilize their members on this issue.

Resources

The Christian Right social movement has a number of resources that it has been able to draw upon over the years, including, colleges and universities, radio and television stations, conference centers, periodicals, and weekly donors. Another resource that has been particularly influential for the Christian Right activist groups involved in this study is social networks. The newspaper and radio-type of interaction discussed by Zald and Ash (1964) were both found present in the Christian Right. Popular meetings are used by the right in Washington community to debate, plan and implement the strategies used for their various goals. These meetings mean that they are getting timely information and that everyone is on the same page when pursuing their goals. These networks of interaction also help newcomers become acclimated to Washington politics, thus speeding the learning curve of neophyte politicians. Also, harassment from the meetings has been used to punish members whose decisions have been judged

inappropriate and damaging to the Christian Right social movement community.

Therefore, the social networks of the Christian Right social movement community in Washington provide an important resource to explain the behavior of Christian Right activist groups.

Social Networks. There are many types of social networks that the Christian Right interest groups do each other, and to some of the peripheral groups, in Washington, DC. Most of these groups commonly hold events, such as symposiums and conferences. While these are mostly held for the benefit of the press, it is common for staffers from other groups to attend such events, as well as congressional staffers and various interest. They also gather for end-of-the-year meetings and a Fourth of July picnic. The most important source of social networks, however, is the weekly meetings attended by these groups.

There are five weekly meetings—VAT House, VAT Senate, Family Forum, Heritage, and Weyland. The Greater Heritage meeting focuses on economic issues, not the social issues that most concern the Christian Right. The Christian Right groups generally attend this meeting along with a broader spectrum of conservative organizations. However, there seemed to be a boycott of this meeting by Christian Right groups for a time. Concerns were raised that Heritage, in its attempts to encourage the Republican Party to reach out to Modern organizations, was building ties to nonChristian-linked organizations. The Weyland meeting on Wednesday and the Family Forum meeting on Tuesday meeting have more of a focus on social issues. The Family Forum

meeting used to be the most popular and well-attended of these meetings, until the Values Action Team (VAT) meetings started.

The VAT meetings spring from a concern in the Christian Right that the Republican Party was ignoring its agenda.¹⁹ Christian Right members felt that they had worked hard, and deserved some credit for helping the Republican Party to power in Congress, yet they had little to show for it. In 1998, James Dobson publicly expressed the frustration of the Christian Right by suggesting that conservative Christians should leave the party. He met with Republican congressmen to try to resolve their differences. Both parties saw a need for better communication between members of Congress and the Christian Right (Congressional Women for America, personal interview, October 14, 2003). House Integrity Whip Tom DeLay (R-TX) and Rep. Joe Pitts (R-PA) took the initiative to establish the VAT meeting for two purposes. Pitts became the Chair of the meeting in the House. A VAT meeting was later established in the Senate chaired by Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS).

The VAT meetings do several things for the Christian Right. For one, they allow the Christian Right and the Republican Party to air their differences in private. When VAT was formed, there were many public criticisms of the Republican Party by Christian Right leaders presented in the media. These displays could serve to hurt the interests of both parties. Private discussions would help avenge. Since the VAT meeting was started, these public attacks have become rare.

¹⁹ Table 4-1 lists the groups that are members of VAT.

Secondly, the VAT meetings allow the Christian Right to coordinate strategy. When all the Christian Right groups are working on the same agenda at the same time, while coordinating with House or Senate members who are bringing a bill to floor at the same time, they multiply their strength. Before the VAT, the Christian Right did not do this well. The groups would individually work on their own separate issues, regardless of what the others were doing, or at what stage a relevant bill would be in Congress (Pence Fellowship, personal interview, April 18, 2006). The Christian Right has learned, through the VAT, that political timing is important. It had learned this lesson well by the time I was observing them. I repeatedly witnessed firsthand how these Christian Right groups would simultaneously issue press releases, hold press conferences, and send letters and e-mails to their members at the right time to build support for a bill that was coming to a vote in the House or Senate.

Thirdly, the VAT meetings help the Christian Right understand the political process in Congress. There have been many occasions since the VAT meetings when a bill desired by the Christian Right did not pass. Whereas before that may have been a source of frustration, now there is more of an understanding. As long as the Republican leadership is giving an agenda a fair hearing, the Christian Right has no reason to become disgruntled with them. Rather, its frustrations can be directed towards the Democrats or the moderate Republicans.

Fourthly, the VAT meetings help newcomers to quickly become acclimated to the political scene. This scene is complicated and can be difficult to navigate without some guidance. When inexperienced lobbyists arrive in DC, there can be a steep learning

never. If a new lobbyist is introduced in VAT, however, the learning curve is greatly shortened. These meetings can efficiently provide a wealth of information. First, one can get assistance from fellow, more experienced, lobbyists and staffers. A lobbyist discussed with me how he was very confused about the whole process in DC, but, after discovering VAT, he quickly learned how the process works (Association of Christian Schools International, personal interview, June 1, 2006).

Fifthly, the VAT membership can be an avenue for achieving proper behavior among its members. With such close ties between Christian Right interest groups, any public gaffe by one of these groups reflects poorly on the rest. Therefore, it is in the interest of all the groups to keep these events to a minimum. Outside of a public disavowment, there is little that these groups can do to correct good behavior among each other, except to drop membership in the VAT. This occurred when Film revealed the Traditional Values Coalition's membership for a year after it misleadingly described a drug re-importation bill as increasing the availability of the abortion drug RU-486. It turned out that after Christian Right groups were offered large sums of money from a pharmaceutical lobby in order to make the same claim, but, TVC was, apparently, the only group to take the money (Petersen 2003a). In Paris' letter to TVC, he said, "your recent conduct has embarrassed the pro-life community in Washington... your attitude shows a lack of regard for the truth" (Kaplan 2000b). Additionally, he said that the suspension of membership is based upon "misconduct" and "several repudiations" (Petersen 2003a). Other public condemnations come from FRC and CWA. Michael Schwartz of CWA remarked, "I am reluctant to be in the same business with these people [Shelton and

Falwell). It is [help] to the grassroots by people whom they believe are sincerely interested in the cause, not in payoffs to tell lies" (Olson 2003).

These social networks do not only bring together Christian Right activist groups. They also bring together Christian Right sympathizers in Congress and other conservative interest groups. In Congress there is a social network of conservative evangelical Congressional staffers. This network is facilitated in part by the numerous prayer groups and Bible studies. Additionally, *Prison Fellowship* hosts two lecture series, one for members of Congress and one for their staff. It brings in speakers such as Michael Novak and Rev. Richard J. Doerflinger to "provide their intellectual side" (*Prison Fellowship* personal interview, April 18, 2003).

Many of the peripheral groups have staffers with Christian Right sympathies. At the Heritage Foundation several policy experts specialize in issues important to the Christian Right. Joseph Lonsdale was the William E. Simon Fellow in Religion and a Free Society, Jennifer Marshall, Director of Domestic Policy Studies, had previously worked at Family Research Council. Patrick Fagan studies issues related to families and religion, and Robert Rector and Ruth Sidelman are experts on welfare. Michael Novak is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, his importance in crafting the Prison Rape Bill will be noted later. The American Enterprise Institute has scholars Michael Novak, Leon Kass, and Christine Hoff Sommers. Novak, a Catholic, studies the intersections of religion and public policy. Kass, a Jew, is an expert on bioethics and Chairman of the President's Council on Bioethics. And Sommers specializes in studies on feminism,

In her book, *Who Stole Feminism?* she argues that the feminist movement has been captured by extreme leftists.

In addition to the populist groups, the Christian Right works with sympathizers in academia. We have already seen the important role that Dr. William F. Buckley played in the Dutch Allen Indiana Pentecostal Act. In addition to Arlen, Professors Robert P. George and J. Budziewski have been influential. George, a Catholic, is the McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton University and heads its James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions. He is on the board of Family Research Council and has worked from with several conservative think tanks. Budziewski is a political science professor at the University of Texas at Austin. He is a confidante of Chuck Colson and has been involved in the Focus on the Family radio program. This is a notable change from the Christian Right of the 1980s. Moore (1995, 137) found only one relevant non-scholar that provided assistance to the Christian Right during this time: University of Texas Law Professor Gerard Kuen helped with a school-prayer amendment. Yet another reason for maintaining social conservatism is government appointments within the executive branch.

Governmental appointments. The Christian Right has several ways of influencing government decision making through getting its own members or those sympathetic to its movement into governmental positions. After Reagan was elected, he could not keep his promise to add evangelists to his administration as members proportionate to the population. There were not enough qualified evangelists to take three posts. The Christian Right had to settle for James Watt as Interior Secretary, Robert Bork as special assistant to the Secretary of Education, Jerry Falwell as Director of the

Office of Families, and C. Everett Koop as Surgeon General (Maurer, 1996, 221-22, 239).

After more than twenty years of political activism, the Christian Right had a much better paid for the new president to draw upon than in their early days.

The most visible Christian Right appointment was Attorney General John Ashcroft, who served during George W. Bush's first term. But there were many other lower profile positions that were also of importance to the Christian Right, including Kay Cole James, Michael Gerson, Dr. Wade Horn, Tim Geagan, Dr. David Hogg, and Jerry Thacker.

Kay Cole James was appointed the Director of the Office of Personnel Management in 2001 and served in that capacity until 2005. She had previously worked with Family Research Council, Regent University, and the Heritage Foundation. She also has written books on marriage and family that are sold at Christian bookstores and has been a guest on the Focus on the Family radio show and has served on its board (<http://www.opm.gov/newsroom/bio.cfm>).

One of Bush's most influential appointments was Michael Gerson, an evangelical and Wheaton College graduate. He is often credited with the many biblical allusions and religious language in Bush's speeches. His position at the White House went beyond writing speeches, however, to include policy formation. Gerson's policy interests tended to focus on caring for the poor. He was once referred to as the "second compass" of the White House by Bush for his advocacy of spending for AIDS in Africa.

Dr. Wade Horn, a clinical child psychologist, was appointed Assistant Secretary for Children and Families for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). He

was formerly President of the National Fatherhood Initiative. This non-profit organization's mission is to increase the employment of fathers in the lives of their children. Hens oversees much of the Bush administration's agenda that the Christian Right was most concerned about, including child care, welfare, adoption, and human trafficking. Hens was also influential in implementing the "Healthy Marriage Initiative," a program to encourage marriage among welfare recipients using the money saved on welfare programs after implementation of the 1996 Welfare Reform Bill. The Christian Right actively promoted this program. While Assistant Secretary, Hens participated in lectures and press conferences on abstinence programs, the state of marriage, and the "Healthy Marriage Initiative" funded by Family Research Council. After Tammy Thompson stepped down as HHS Secretary in 2006, Family Research Council suggested that Hens would make a good replacement.

Tim Geoghegan's official title is White House Aide. His primary duty, at least as understood by the Christian Right, is known as the Christian Right. He attends regularly with and attends many functions of Christian Right interest groups. The presence of this position signifies the importance of the Christian Right to President Bush.

In December of 2003, Bush appointed Dr. David Hager, an obstetrician and gynecologist, to the Food and Drug Administration's Reproductive Health Advisory Committee. This 11 member panel was of particular importance to the Christian Right because of its recommendations to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regarding the approval of RU-486, otherwise known as the "morning-after pill" or "abortion pill." The pill would cause a crisis in delivery of fetus within 24 hours after conception. Hager had previously visited Concerned Women for America with information on the adverse

health effects of RU-486 for their Culture's Progress to the Flib, regarding the drug in August of that same year. Opponents of Rugar's nomination argued that his evangelical Christian beliefs were too influential in his understanding of women's health issues. They pointed to his opposition to abortion and RU-486, refusal to provide contributions to unmarried women and his recommendations to pray and read the Bible for a look on women's health (Fugas 2002). For the Christian Right, the opponent's charges were another example of an attempt to keep this place at the table. To deny someone a governmental position because they look to their religious beliefs for guidance on policy issues, and are opposed to abortion and RU-486, is equivalent to saying that anyone in the Christian Right is unqualified for those posts.

While these appointments marred the backing of the Bush administration, another contest raged between Bush and the Christian Right. Jerry Thacker was initially appointed to the 15 member Presidential Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS. An evangelical Christian and employee of Bob Jones University, Thacker contracted AIDS after his wife taught the disease from a biased institution. He is president and founder of the Baptist Institute, a nonprofit organization designed to educate people on the dangers of AIDS. In this capacity he had made public speeches to mostly evangelical audiences and written a book about his family's personal experience with the disease. Thacker's appointment was part of an effort to bring more diversity to the panel by appointing more minorities and evangelical Christians. His appointment became controversial when a Washington Post story revealed that he had referred to AIDS as a "gay plague" on his website and believed that homosexuality is a sin and not a genetic characteristic (Connelly 2001a). The quote, it turns out, was taken out of context. The original

sentence read, "Indeed, 1986, Jerry Thacker was probably a lot like you. He had a beautiful family, a good church and networking ministry. He knew vaguely about the gay plague known as AIDS, but it seemed a distant threat" (Pierce 2001). Since "gay plague" is a quote, the website is attributing the term to what others were calling it. Also, most the sentence is making reference to the fact that AIDS does not only affect homosexuals, it is clearly emphasizing that AIDS is not a "gay plague." On the other hand, that Thacker believes homosexuality is a sin and not something one is born with, he is clearly guilty, and in agreement with the Christian Right.

Shortly after the story broke, the White House was asked about it during the daily press briefing. The President dissociated himself from the opposition. "The President has a totally opposite view; that remark [AIDS is a "gay plague"] is far removed from what the President believes," said White House Press Secretary Art Fletcher (Connolly 2002). While the Christian Right was disappointed in the *Washington Post* story, it was not surprised. The *Washington Post*, a left-leaning newspaper, already had a history of covering stories sympathetic to the Christian Right. But when the President came out against the narrative, rather than coming to his defense, the Christian Right was outraged. *Concerned Women for America* issued a press release calling for an apology from Fletcher:

"With words of his Thacker's words does the president disagree?" [CWA President] Roca asked. "Does he not believe that homosexual behavior is sinful and dangerous? Does he not know that homosexuals themselves called the AIDS epidemic 'the gay plague' during the 1980s? Does he think a man with the AIDS virus and whose wife and child have the AIDS virus lacks compassion for AIDS patients?"

"Thacker's comments were what you might expect from the character assassin and religious bigot of the far left, not from a spokesman for President Bush."

[Concerned Women for America, "CWA's Root Calls —", (press release), January 24, 2003]

Many in the Christian Right felt that the President would so quickly distance himself from someone they considered one of their own without, apparently, first checking the *Washington Post* story. In truth, the Christian Right clearly wanted more than a President that would sign, or not veto, its preferred legislation and veto, or otherwise a veto fix, undesirable legislation. Christian Right leaders wanted someone who would publicly stand by them and defend them. "Walking the walk" is as important as "talking the talk."¹⁷

Federal Marriage Amendment. The push for a Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA) is a good example of how the social networks of the Christian Right were used to build collaboration among its groups. While there was initially much debate within the Christian Right over the best course of action over the issue of homosexual marriage, all of its groups eventually came out together in support of amending the US Constitution to define marriage as the union of one man with one woman.

While support for an FMA can be found earlier, the primary impetus comes after the Supreme Court's decision in *Lawrence v. Texas* (2003). This case was asked to decide the constitutionality of a Texas law that made homosexual sodomy a crime. While there were disagreements within the Christian Right about whether this was a good law or not, there was a shared desire to do something about the decision. The court not only struck down the law, but found that there is a constitutional right to homosexual acts based upon

¹⁷ I want to be clear that this is the problem with George W. Bush, then the Christian Right's point of view is that he "walked the walk" but didn't "talk the talk", implying that he supported their goals but did

a right to privacy. The Christian Right had urged the court not to go that far in their appeals. The concern was that a constitutional right to homosexuality would lead to a right to homosexual marriage.

One fallout of the disagreements over the best tactics to combat homosexual marriage was the resignation of Ken Connor as president of the Family Research Council.²⁰ Connor believed that amending the Constitution was not the best course of action. This put him at odds with FRC's Board of Directors, chaired by James Dobson. FRC had not clearly defined who would have authority in the event of the sort of disagreement and Connor stepped down in order to resolve the impasse.

The Arlington Group, named for the city across the Potomac where its meetings were first held, is a coalition formed to fight for a marriage amendment. Christian Right organizations and social conservatives from across the country form this group. The biggest point of contention within the group is over the wording of the amendment. Would the amendment allow states to form civil unions? This conflict is a good example of the classic pragmatist versus purity debate. On the pragmatist side, an amendment that allowed civil unions would be able to garner more congressional votes and would have a better chance of passage. On the purity side, civil unions give same sex couples the same privileges as marriage, but simply call it something else.²¹ Since they wish to preserve the institution of marriage, not simply the name "marriage," no amendment would be preferable to an amendment that allows civil unions. For the purists, defeat is preferable

get the message across more easily publicly.

²⁰ Randy West may have resigned from FRC for the same reason, but this could not be confirmed.

²¹ In reality, which privileges would be allowed for civil unions would depend on how the law would be written. While arguing regarding the federal income tax, some marriages already exist where one partner is Christian and the other is not. If civil unions were created, would there be any change in their taxes?

to, what they would consider, a hollow victory. Mitt Daniels, president of the Alliance for Marriage, forced the propagandist argument. He left, or was ordered back from, the *Arlington Group* to represent the parent corporation (Cooperman 2003).

Regardless, the Federal Marriage Amendment did not garner the two-thirds vote required in either body of Congress in 2004 or 2006 (a period after my fieldwork). The Christian Right knew there were not enough votes but worried all the members of Congress on the move so they could use their vote in the pending elections. The Christian Right clearly sees this as a long-term fight. It will continue to try to build support among the grassroots and policy makers as well as try to help supporters win elections. The social networks built for this purpose will likely continue to play an important role in these endeavors.

Another important consequence of the social networks is they have helped facilitate an expansion of the issue domain of the Christian Right. When a single group takes on a new issue, it brings the new issue to the rest of the Christian Right groups for their support. These new issues can come from the core groups or peripheral groups. This happened for the *Global Family Act* and the *ADA in Access Initiative*. Another good example of this process includes the *Prison Rape Bill*.

Prison Rape Bill. Recognizing the influence of the Christian Right, there are times when peripheral groups will reach out to the Christian Right to gain its support for their goals. The *Prison Rape Elimination Act* of 2003, commonly referred to as the *Prison Rape Bill*, was one such instance. The original impetus for the bill came from Michael Horowitz, of the *Horizon Institute*. The idea for the bill was suggested to

Hawkins during a lunch conversation with Linda Chavez, a conservative activist and former secretary for Labor secretary under George W. Bush (Kaplan 2003a). Hawkins set out to build a broad coalition for support. Prison Fellowship, with its interest in prison reform, was a natural spot through which to reach the Christian Right with this proposal.

The Prison Rape Bill authorized an annual survey of sexual assault in prisons, set up a National Prison Rape Elimination Commission to analyze the results of the survey, established grants for reform programs, and would revoke federal funds from prisons that did not show improvements. The bill, sponsored by Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy and Republican Senator Jeff Sessions, had broad support, including the NAACP, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and National Council of La Raza (Kaplan 2003a, Tucker 2007).

Prison Fellowship brought the bill to the attention of the Christian Right and became the "lead" group for the bill. Through this coordination, Christian Right groups brought the bill to the attention of their supporters during key votes in the House and Senate, asking them to notify their congressional representatives and signifying their support. When the bill was signed into law, they congratulated their supporters for contributing to its passage. The Prison Rape Bill would continue to be listed as one of its and the Bush administration's accomplishments. Though the bill had strong bipartisan support and faced objections from some in the White House (Kaplan 2003a), Bush would mention particular praise for passage. During his radio commentary on the day the bill was signed, Clinton stated,

Why does Bush care so much about prayer? Most politicians look the other way. Well, the president is a Christian. He reads his Bible. He knows that men behind bars are the ones Jesus called "the least of these my brothers." And the president doesn't stop with reading the Bible—he acts.

Bush's support was tied to the faith held in common with Clinton's longevity. At the same time, Bush's actions were described as a premiere model of Christian behavior.

Prison Fellowship would continue to be involved in supporting the enactment of this legislation. Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert appointed Pat Nolan, president of Justice Fellowship, an arm of Prison Fellowship, to the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission.

Opportunity

The opportunity structure, or changes that have taken place outside of the movement, also has had influence on the nature of Christian Right activist groups. Changes in technology have lowered the costs of internet group activities. The availability of e-mail and internet websites has meant that activist groups can keep in touch with a large number of members on a very small budget. In addition, the advent of C-sites, a non-profit website network that covers political events, has helped create a larger audience for the activities of Christian Right activist groups. Together, these changes mean that activist groups are better able to have a wider reach and action domains with minimal resources.

Another factor in the political opportunity structure of the Christian Right social movement is the degree to which the policies and goals of the Christian Right social movement have been accepted and implemented by the larger society. The Christian Right social movement best fits Zald and Aidi's description of the stable SNMO in that

right (1998, 333). It has had a steady stream of successes while never fully achieving its goals, thus giving the movement strategy. This has helped the Christian Right to maintain its original goals.

Another influence on the Christian Right's opportunity situation is its relationship to the Republican Party. Republicans used the Christian Right to stay in power and the Christian Right needs the Republican Party to enact its policy agenda (Chaffetz 1998; Bevil and Wilson 1996). As we have seen, this situation can sometimes make for an uneasy alliance. Republicans who do not share the agenda of the Christian Right would still like to maintain its support. The Christian Right, on the other hand, tries to use its mobilization abilities as leverage to influence moderate Republican officials.

The Christian Right's close working relationship with the Republican Party has influenced its issue and action domains as well. As a coalition in the Republican Party the Christian Right becomes exposed to issues of concern of other Republicans. This exposure has brought more issues to their attention than otherwise. And since it is an integral part of the Party, any Christian Right interest group will be using considerable resources regardless of the age of the group.

Table 4-1

Valiant Action Team Members

American Family Association
Coalition for Working Families
Christian Action Network
Association of Christian Schools International
Christian Coalition
Coalition for America
Concerned Women for America
Council for National Policy
Eagle Forum
Empower America
Family Research Council
Liberty and Religious Liberty Conservatives
Focus on the Family
Free Congress Foundation
Home School Legal Defense Association
National Law Center for Children and Families
PACF, People Advance Christian Education
National Right to Life Committee
Religious Freedom Coalition
Prison Fellowship
Republican National Committee
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops
Tradition, Family, and Property, Inc.
Traditional Values Coalition
Values America

CHAPTER 3 CONCLUSION

I set out to understand the effects of institutionalization on the Christian Right. I found that the Christian Right has become more knowledgeable and skilled in democratic politics. It has moved from an outsider to an insider status. It has built coalitions as easy as it stands forward. It has become a part of the political scene. And despite its institutionalization, the Christian Right, essentially, has not lost its original sense of purpose. It has not, as some have suggested, become "captured" by the Republican Party, shaping its demands while receiving nothing in return, or become more concerned with maintaining its institutions than the original goals of the movement. The Christian Right has shown a willingness to stand by the principles it holds dear and use its leverage to move the Republican Party in an desired direction. This was shown through my participant observation and depth interviews with Christian Right interest groups.

This conclusion is explained by, I have argued, the Christian Right's ability to maintain its status as a social movement. Tarrow (1994) suggests that an outsider status is a necessary component for social movements. This study suggests a need to rethink this requirement. The Christian Right, a social movement, has achieved a degree of political power, an insider status. Christian Right interest groups are able to draw upon the identity resources and opportunities provided by the Christian Right social movement for strength beyond what its numbers and demands would normally entail. Its identity, rooted in evangelical Christianity, provides a more coherent vision and helps it to address

a broad range of issues without losing support. Social networks provide the movement with a venue through which to strategize, work together, and carry up the workload. And, the Republican Party continues to provide the opportunity structure that gives the movement access to governmental power. As this study shows, social movement theory does not need to be limited to studies of the beginnings of social movements or political outcomes. It can be useful for studying social movements in a more advanced stage, when they have obtained political power, and for understanding why they endure.

This study also highlights the importance of distinguishing interest groups that are part of a social movement from other interest groups. In fact, just as we expect major differences between membership and institutional groups (Julianney 1984) and between those groups that principally rely on insider versus outsider techniques (Kobrin 1980), this study suggests that we may need to develop a similar distinction for groups attached to social movements and other types of interest groups. Christian Right interest groups clearly behave differently than other types of interest groups. While other interest groups often appear to moderate goals and emphasize organizational maintenance above all else, the interest groups associated with the Christian Right appear to remain loyal to the vision that first brought the movement together. As I have argued, the strong identity of the Christian Right, rooted in the social movement, and the close ties between the insider and outsider elements explain, in part, this difference. I would expect to find a similar pattern among interest groups with ties to other social movements. For example, much of the agenda of the Gay Rights Movement is driven not by national organizations but by local gay activists who put issues on the national agenda, as the gay marriage debate illustrates. Similarly, Greenpeace appears to have maintained the same balance between insider and

outside politics that we have seen in the Christian Right. In both cases, the "morning" of the interest groups within the larger movement provides a defense against including or excluding evidence of oligarchy. To better answer this question future large-scale studies of interest groups should include a social movement variable. A collective study of many social movement interest groups compared with many other types of interest groups would help us understand whether the results of this study are generalizable to other social movement interest groups.

The inadequacy of institutionalization theories are also illustrated by this study. These theories were developed more for bureaucratic organizations than social movements. Scholars continue to describe social movements as institutionalizing, yet the theories they have to draw upon are inadequate to adequately measure that institutionalization. Reasonable measures of social movement institutionalization would help scholars compare the levels of institutionalization between social movements and the relative degree of institutionalization of a single social movement over time. For instance, if we were to compare the institutionalization of two different social movements, such as the Civil Rights Movement and the Gay Rights Movement, what measures would we use to decide which is the most institutionalized? Or, if we wanted to know which period of time the Civil Rights Movement underwent the most rapid rate of institutionalization, what measures would we use?

This study begs many questions that it is unable to answer. Since I only observed elite behavior, an important area of research, the interaction between activists and elites, went largely unnoticed. While some of the theories I discussed suggested possible patterns, I was unable to look for these patterns systematically. For instance,

- Are movement leaders more radical than their followers, or vice-versa?
- Do movement leaders represent the views of their members?
- Are movement activists more or less pragmatic than their leaders?

Future research in this area could help enlighten some of my findings. A study of this type would depend on the generosity of the groups I studied. However, it would seem to require access to the mailing lists of these groups. Some of the conversations I have had suggest that most groups would be unwilling to share this information. This inconsistency that highlights the importance of political scientists maintaining their professionalism and carefully explaining the importance of their work. Our traditions will influence our future ability to access valuable data.

The Future of the Christian Right

Since much of the Christian Right's success has come from its ability to influence the Republican Party, much of its future success will depend on this relationship as well. As long as it continues to be effective at mobilizing votes for Republican candidates in election days, the Republican Party will continue to seek its support by working on behalf of its agenda. If the Republican Party were to find itself in the minority, the Christian Right would still be effective at pressuring legislation it opposes from passing. But since the Christian Right has tied its success to the success of the Republican Party, it needs Republicans to continue to win elections and provide it with access to the government, in order to actually implement its agenda, a much more difficult prospect. Since the Christian Right has political opposition on powerful governmental positions and its agenda is highly nebulous and complex, it needs the Republican Party in order to achieve success (Santora and McGowan 1997). As Santora and McGowan's (1997) study suggests, a critical item in its present course is an important condition within the Republican Party (a

claim a third party for the sake of purity, for instance), would run the movement's policy goals. This can be a difficult tightrope to walk, especially on the parts of its agenda that lack public support. If the Christian Right places overly ambitious demands on the Republican Party, it runs the risk of minimizing the Party's chances of winning election.

Recent events also remind us how the Christian Right can suffer in the face of Republican Party setbacks. The lobbying scandals associated with Jack Abramoff have taken a toll on the Republican or public approval of the Party has dropped. Ralph Reed's association with Abramoff, and perceived fundraising misconduct, has harmed his public image, as his recent failure to secure his party's nomination for Lieutenant Governor of Georgia indicates. Even if Christian Right figures were not directly involved, simply an association with the Republican Party could damage the movement. Religion that receives the support of republican governments often loses support because they are held guilty by association. Likewise, Republican Party scandals may further diminish the public image of the Christian Right.

The Christian Right's greatest weakness is its poor public image. Candidates that are too closely linked to the movement have difficulty winning election. This will continue to be a hindrance to the movement. Repairing that image could be a significant benefit in the future. This repair may come at a cost to its conservatism, however. In order to repair its image, Christian Right leaders would need to find a way to punish or disassociate themselves from other candidates who act in ways that are damaging to its image. Some in the Christian Right have shown great willingness to do this, such as Sheldon's disavowment regarding the drug re-importation bill and when Pat Robertson said that

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's stroke was God's punishment for giving every Israeli Israeli to the Palestinians. These incidents are possible for their unity, however.

The Christian Right will be with us well into the foreseeable future. Strangers are in place to help it maintain its stability. A change in outlook has taken place among the likes of the Christian Right—evangelical Protestants. They no longer seek to isolate themselves from the world, but to engage the world. And, the Christian Right thinks about and plans for its future. It develops its young members with programs to recruit and train them and then to find them opportunities for service. The survival of the movement, history has shown, is not tied to the survival of any particular organization or the fortunes of any particular political party or presidential candidate.

The Christian Right of today bears little resemblance to the early Christian Right. It was once a movement merely built around fundamentalist Christians with little organization or the grassroots, mainly focused on a couple of key issues—abortion and homosexuality, and with little understanding of the political system. Today it has broadened its base, created a vast network of organizations working at the local, state and national levels, expanded its concerns to a broad range of policy issues, and increased its political sophistication. What remains to be seen is what the future of the Christian Right will look like.

Politics makes friends of enemies and enemies of friends. The Christian Right has found itself in coalition battles with evangelicals who share many theological convictions yet have different political convictions, such as Jim Wallis, Tony Campolo and Dr. Ben Sider. On the other hand, it has also built bridges between groups with a history of conflict. The Christian Right has not only brought together many streams of

Protestants—mainstream, fundamentalist Evangelicals, neo-Orthodox, charismatic, Calvinists, and Anabaptists (Carpenter 1997; Mendon 1995, 1996, 1998, Fall 1997; McLaughlin 1999)—it has also brought these Protestants together with Catholics, Mormons and Jews.²²

The increasing diversity of the Christian Right, while a source of strength, can also present challenges for the Christian Right. I have placed much emphasis on the identity of the Christian Right as relevant to its success. What will happen to this identity as the Christian Right becomes more diverse? Much will depend on the Christian Right's ability to find common ground among its separate theological convictions. While the claim that a consensus may render importance of this effort, increasing that loss of consensus may be a difficult challenge. In one interview I was told that the, mostly Baptist, pastor who supports her organization had expressed concern that she was working with Catholics (American Association of Christian Schools, personal interview, June 11, 2004). An effort to find cohesion among its various constituent groups may change the Christian Right and determine its future orientations. Keeping its coalition together by emphasizing the commonality of its different groups will find the Christian Right in a strong position into the future. Another possibility is that the Christian Right will be unable to hold its coalition together and it will splinter into different factions.

A generational change is taking place within the Christian Right. The direction of tomorrow's Christian Right will be determined by this new generation. Since this new generation will likely be introduced to the political sphere at a younger age than many of

²² The reader should not assume that all Catholics, Mormons, and Jews have been supporters of the Christian Right. Some, especially Jews, have been repulsed with its movement.

dark professions, I expect changes in style from the next generation. In a more moderate tone, they will be better able to speak about their concerns to a broader range of the public and opinion leaders, much like Ralph Nader. Substantively, the generation that became politically aware during two Persian Gulf wars, the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the AIDS virus in Africa, will, like their peers, be concerned about issues outside our borders. They are unlikely to change their views on most of the social issues that the Christian Right is most known for, but they will likely become more accepting of the compromises necessary for a political system. But the success of this generation will ultimately rest upon its ability to substantively address the problems and concerns of their fellow citizens without deviating from the core values that called the movement forth.

APPENDIX A GROUP DESCRIPTIONS

Core Groups

Family Research Council

Measured by staff size, Family Research Council (FRC) is the largest Christian Right interest group in Washington, DC. It has 41 full-time staff housed in their own 6-story office building centrally located near the MCI center in Northwest DC. Rick Warren and Edgar Pierce funded construction of the building. The annual budget of FRC is about \$5 million per year (Family Research Council, personal interview, October 13, 2002).

FRC was founded in 1963 by James Dobson, who originated the idea in 1960 at the White House Conference on Families (<http://www.frc.org/pet.cfm?c=FOCUS&P=FOCUS10>). Since its founding, four people have headed the organization as President—Gary Regier (1963–1968), Gary Bauer (1968–2000), Ken Cosentino (2000–2003), and Tony Perkins (2003–Present).

FRC is an entity in itself, but they have a sister organization, American Response, that is a 501(c)3. Donations to a 501(c)3 are tax-deductible but these organizations are restricted from election activities, such as endorsing or helping to elect a candidate. A 501(c)4 can engage in election activities, but donations to these organizations are not tax-deductible. Two network centers were begun under the leadership of Ken Cosentino—the Center of Human Life and Bioethics and the Center for Marriage and Family Studies. In

addition, FRC has student academic fellowship program for college students called The Waterspeare Fellowship.

FRC has five core principles:

1. God exists and is sovereign over all creation. He created human beings in His image. Human life is, therefore, sacred and the right to life is the most fundamental of political rights.
2. Life and love are inextricably linked and find their natural expression in the institution of marriage and the family.
3. Government has a duty to promote and protect marriage and family in law and public policy.
4. The American system of law and justice was founded on the Judeo-Christian ethic.
5. American democracy depends upon a vibrant civil society composed of families, churches, schools, and voluntary associations.

http://www.frc.org/pressroom/choice-ABORT_FRC

At approximately \$5 million, FRC has by far the largest budget of any of the Christian Right groups for which data is available.

Concerned Women for America

Concerned Women for America (CWA) is the second largest Christian Right oriented group with a staff size of 40 and about 100,000 members (Concerned Women for America, [personal interview], October 3, 2002). Their offices occupy a floor of a high-rise office building a few blocks from the White House in Washington, DC. Beverly LaHaye founded CWA in 1979 in order to present a conservative alternative to the more liberal women's group, the National Organization for Women (NOW).

The majority of support for CWA comes from individual donations. There are approximately 500,000 members and you must donate any amount of money within a 2 year period to be considered a member (Concerned Women for America, [personal interview], October 3, 2002). Other sources of financial support include a CWA Way

credit card, for which a percentage of every purchase goes to CWA, and Pre-Paid Communications, which offers cellular phone service, local phone service, long-distance phone service and Internet service with all profits going to CWA. These services may signify an important attempt to bring across financial stability to the organization. If successful, it may become a model for future fundraising, but currently, there is no indication that it represents a significant source of income. Additionally, CWA sells books and videos at their conferences and on their website.

CWA has many advisors including the CWA Legislative Action Committee and a Political Action Committee—CWPAC. Also, the Beverly LaHaye Institute tends to follow the think tank model by focusing on research and publications.

Christian Coalition

Christian Coalition (CC) was started in 1989 from the donor list of Pat Robertson's presidential campaign. Currently, CC has 14 staff members and they have 2 million members, which include protest signs as well as donors.

In an interview with CC in 2003, the primary issues addressed are child pornography, judicial nominations, banner-burning, the pledge of allegiance in schools, Internet gambling, abortion, local and tax relief (Christian Coalition, [personal interview], April 18, 2003). One of the primary issues worked up at the time was the House of Worship Speech Provision Act. After Roberts Corder became President, there was a new emphasis on issues related to Israel (Christian Coalition, [personal interview], April 16, 2003). This earned resources among other supporters, but most supporters appreciated it (Christian Coalition, [personal interview], April 16, 2003).

Free Congress Foundation

Paul Weyrich Founded the Congress Foundation after he left the Heritage Foundation. Weyrich is considered by many in the conservative movement to be one of the "fathers" of the movement. He helped the New Right to get off the ground in its early years. Today, he hosts a meeting every Wednesday that is attended by conservatives, including Christian Right staffers. FCF gets most of its support from foundations followed by individuals and corporations, respectively. It has a budget of \$1 million (Free Congress Foundation, [e-mail communication], February 6, 2003).

Like Eagle Forum, FCF is a New Right organization, addressing a number of New Right issues, such as privacy and opposing political correctness, in addition to the core Christian Right issues. FCF has also been involved in urban transportation issues. FCF considers its closest allies to be the Traditional Values Coalition, Tradition, Family and Property, Religious Freedom Coalition, Family Research Council, Eagle Forum, Concerned Women for America, American Values, American Family Association, American Conservative Union, and Americans Come (Free Congress Foundation, [e-mail communication], February 6, 2003). Moreover, it is involved in a 400 group coalition to fight judicial activism and an 800 group coalition to deal with privacy issues (Free Congress Foundation, [e-mail communication], February 6, 2003).

Eagle Forum

Phyllis Schlafly formed Eagle Forum in 1972. Schlafly had gained notoriety in the 1964 Republican primary for her self-published book *A Choice Not an Echo*, which contributed to the revolt against establishment Republicans that led to the nomination of Barry Goldwater.

Eagle Forum's first major battle was fighting for the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Belchick argued that ERA would require that women not be excluded from a military draft. To defeat ERA, Belchick mobilized her supporters to write and visit their legislative representatives.

Eagle Forum's headquarters are in Alton, IL, with an "Education Center" in St. Louis, MO. It has a small satellite office in Washington, DC located a few blocks from the Capitol. The office space contains a couple of offices, what looks like a storage or mail room, and a small conference room. The furniture looked old, commercial, and possibly second-hand. There were lots of bookshelves with publications, and books.

The DC office is staffed by Lynn Waters, the executive director, who is primarily responsible for the legislative action arm of Eagle Forum. While only Ms. Waters and a secretary staff the DC office, Eagle Forum has approximately 15 staff divided between three DC, St. Louis, and Alton offices.

Eagle Forum consists of a NEF, a NF, and a PNC. The annual budgets for these are approximately \$1 million, \$1 million and \$225-250, respectively. It has about 80-90 members and a \$25 contribution is required to become a member. Some affiliates are funded at 75% state.

Unlike most of the other neo-cons groups, Eagle Forum, along with Free Congress Foundation is a significant part of the New Right. This difference is reflected in the types of issues that Eagle Forum tackles. While Eagle Forum addresses the issues of the Christian Right, it also takes on a host of New Right issues, such as, immigration reform and privacy from government and business.

The Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission

The Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission is the public policy arm of the Southern Baptist Convention, the largest Protestant body in the United States. As such, it is only one of two such groups that is an institutional group. Most of the other large denominations in the United States are also represented by lobbying organizations in Washington, DC. But the ERLC is the only one that can be classified as Christian Right.

The current President, Dr. Richard Land, has been in his position since 1993. In 2000, he stated in, "An American society that affirms and practices Judeo-Christian values rooted in biblical authority." In another statement is, "To maintain, enlarge, strengthen, equip, and motivate Christians to be the catalysts for the biblically-based transformation of their families, churches, communities, and the nation" (www.erc.org)

The ERLC features a weekly radio broadcast hosted by Land. Its website claims 1.5 million weekly listeners on 500 radio stations. The show can also be heard on XM satellite radio or via Internet broadcast from its website.

Traditional Values Coalition

Rev. Louis Sheldon, who currently serves as its Chairman, founded the Traditional Values Coalition (TVC) in 1980. The Executive Director is Sheldon's daughter, Andrea Lafferty. Lafferty formerly worked to the Reagan administration. TVC has offices in DC and Anaheim, CA, where Sheldon resides. The membership of TVC is composed of 40,000 churches. TVC is non-denominational and member churches are from 17 different denominations. TVC focuses upon the issues of "education,

homosexual advocacy, family tax relief, pornography, the rights of life and religious freedom" (Empowering, 2002).

American Values

American Values, the newest Christian Right group, was started by Gary Bauer after he ran for the Republican gubernatorial nomination in 2000. Bauer was formerly Domestic Policy Advisor under Reagan and President of Family Research Council. He has worked closely with former Defense and formerly an anti-life school with him in 1992—*Children at Risk: The Battle for the Hearts and Minds of Our Kids*—which discussed some of the impact, largely negative, that public policy was having on children. Bauer also chairs a political action committee—*Campaign for Working Families*. American Values highlights five issue areas on its website—human life, marriage and the family, culture and religion, education, national security, and international affairs. http://www.americanvalues.org/issues_areas.php

Prison Fellowship

Chuck Colson founded Prison Fellowship in 1986 as a ministry to prisoners. Colson had formerly worked at the White House under President Nixon. Known as a cunning and malicious political operative, Colson was nicknamed the "hatchet man". Though his name was associated in Watergate, Colson was sent to prison as a result of the Watergate investigations. During his ordeal, Colson was "born again."¹²

Since founding Prison Fellowship, Colson has become an important figure among evangelicals. He has written several books that reached the top of the Christian

¹² How does it fit the role of Colson as biographical account of his religious conversion experience.

testament but and he has become a popular speaker. His Breakpoint radio show is heard on more than 1,000 Christian radio stations across the country.

Most of the resources of Focus Fellowship are devoted to prison ministry. In recent years, however, some resources have been diverted for political advocacy. Focus Fellowship also includes The Wilberforce Project, which includes Justice Fellowship, Breakpoint, and the Council for Biotechnology Policy.

American Association of Christian Schools

American Association of Christian Schools (AACS) was founded in the early 1970s to represent the interests of Christian schools. Unlike the Association of Christian Schools International, AACS tends to represent more conservative, and mostly Baptist, Christian schools. Their website notes that members are not allowed to be members of "the World Council of Churches, the National Council of Churches, the Modern Christian Movement, or the Ecumenical Movement."

The main office of AACS is located in Chattanooga, Tennessee, but it has a small office in Washington, DC that carries out its advocacy efforts. This office is located in a townhouse a block away from the House office buildings. Two full-time staff and two summer interns occupy this office. Less than 10% of the overall budget of AACS is devoted to its DC office (American Association of Christian Schools, [personal interview], June 11, 2003).

Education tax credits have been the primary focus of AACS's advocacy efforts for the past three to five years. (American Association of Christian Schools, [personal interview], June 13, 2003). While AACS does not oppose school choice, it prefers education tax credits because the money goes to the parents rather than the schools. Also,

AACS members are concerned about the additional requirements ("strings attached") that might come with school choice proposals. (American Association of Christian Schools, [personal interview], June 11, 2005).

While AACS is concerned with issues directly related to private Christian education, it is also concerned more broadly with many of the same Christian Right issues, notably, the "family issues" and religious freedom. (American Association of Christian Schools, [personal interview], June 11, 2005).

AACS does some lobbying, but most of their advocacy efforts are devoted to grassroots lobbying. The DC staff sees themselves as a conduit through which information about what is going on at the federal level is transmitted to their members. AACS has 11 regional legislative directors. If Congress is acting on legislation that concerns AACS, the Washington office will contact the regional directors who will, in turn, contact members or their representatives who live in pivotal districts. These members will urge others in their district to contact their representative regarding the legislation. In addition, members can attend an annual conference in Washington where they can listen to speakers discuss political topics of the day and meet with their representatives. (American Association of Christian Schools, [personal interview], June 11, 2005).

The AACS Washington office also works directly with the students of the member schools through a summer camp called the "Youth Legislative Training Conference." Students learn more about the political process by listening to speakers, observing committee hearings and taking tours of the Capitol. The students are encouraged through this experience to get more involved in the political process.

Peripheral Groups

Association of Christian Schools International

Many of the AACSB schools also are members of the Association of Christian Schools International (ACSI). Like AACSB, ACSI represents private and K-12 Christian schools. Most ACSI schools are evangelical, but they represent a broader spectrum of the evangelical community than AACSB. Some Mainstream and Protestant schools are represented by ACSI, for instance.

ACSI is headquartered in Colorado Springs, CO and has 14 regional offices. It represents over 1,000 schools in 70 countries. The Washington office has a regional office consists of a lobbyist and a secretary.

The Conservative Caucus

Howard Phillips founded the Conservative Caucus (TCC) in 1979. In 1990, according to Phillips, it is "the federal government to the powers explicitly given to it by the Constitution." Phillips disagrees with the reigning Supreme Court decision in *McCullough v. Maryland* (1819) that Congress has "implied" powers beyond those explicitly given to it in Article I, Section 8. Phillips was a leader of the New Right. As such, he continues to have a close relationship to Paul Weyrich, "a hero of the movement," and Phyllis Schlafly, "the greatest woman in American history" (The Conservative Caucus, [personal interview], March 13, 2002).

Phillips is accountable to a Board of Directors and polling of constituents is used to determine TCC's priorities. Its methods include a weekly TV show, hosted by Phillips, publications, including a bimonthly newsletter, interviews, advertisements, and grassroots mobilization, but no direct lobbying of members of Congress. TCC also hosts "po-

strategic trust” of different parts of the world for its members. It has 12 full-time staff and its budget comes mostly from approximately 75,000 small donors (The Conservative Caucus, [personal interview], March 13, 2003).

Ethics and Public Policy Center

Though originally designed in 1976 to address foreign policy issues, the Ethics and Public Policy Center now mainly addresses issues concerning religion and public life (Ethics and Public Policy Center, [personal interview], January 14, 2003). EPPC generally does not take positions on these issues, but sees its role as fostering public debate on these types of issues (Ethics and Public Policy Center, [personal interview], January 14, 2003). To do this, the EPPC publishes books, newsletters, and op-eds, hosts luncheons, seminars and conferences (Ethics and Public Policy Center, [personal interview], January 14, 2003). “Whatever of the issues they host are open to the public, they also host some private events. At some of these private conferences, for instance, they may invite reporters to listen to scholars and experts discuss the role of religion and public life on specialized topics (Ethics and Public Policy Center, [personal interview], January 14, 2003). In this way, they are helping those who report information in this topic to become better informed.”

Most of EPPC’s approximately \$2 million budget comes from foundations such as Pew Forum, the Bradley Foundation, and the Smith Richardson Foundation. It has a few individual donors and would like to have more, but has found that making the case for research in individual donors is challenging (Ethics and Public Policy Center, [personal

interview), January 18, 2005). It has no official membership but a mailing list of about 5,000. A \$25 donation is asked for, but not required, to be on the mailing list.

EPFC has 11 programs. The most relevant to the Christian Right is the Evangelicals in Civic Life program. Its director is Michael Cromartie. The program examines the role of evangelicals in public life and paid some attention to the role of the Christian Right. It published a book about the Christian Right, *No Longer Strangers: The Religious Right in American Politics*, in 1990. Christian Right leaders often attend EPFC events and vice-versa. The EPFC does not qualify as a Christian Right interest group because its policy goals are not the same, and it does not have a strong focus on changing public policy.

The Institute on Religion and Democracy

The Institute on Religion and Democracy (IRD) works to bring a conservative voice within mainline Protestant denominations. Its primary interests focus on the United Methodist, Presbyterian (USA) and Episcopalian denominations. About half of its approximately \$1 million budget goes toward an United Methodist work. Small donors make up about half of its overall donations, with the other half coming from foundations and large donations. This budget supports eight full time and one part time staff. There is no official membership, but its mailing list numbers about 100,000 (Institute on Religion and Democracy, [personal interview], March 4, 2005).

The formation of IRD in 1981, was a reaction to the liberal theological stances, and associated liberal political activities, of the leaders of these denominations. It was formed by a group of clergy and laypersons that included Richard J. Neukirch. Other

early supporters included the EPPC's George Singsh and ARI's Michael Nerek. Both are current board members (Institute on Religion and Democracy, [personal interview], March 4, 2005).

Most of IRI's work involves monitoring the activities, especially political, of various Protestant denominations and reporting this information to its supporters within those denominations. By bringing together these supporters, they can work together in their own congregations or at denominational meetings to bring about desired changes or oppose unwanted change. Historically, IRI has not been involved in lobbying governmental institutions. One exception was the Sudan Peace Act. IRI was the "lead" group on the Sudan Peace Act within the U.S. IRI's involvement in the Sudan Peace Act may signal an increase in future political activism.

APPENDIX B BENEFITS SURVEY

For each of the following factors, please indicate on the scale provided your best estimate of the importance of that factor for attracting members to this association.

1 = This benefit is not provided.

2 =

3 =

4 =

5 =

6 = One of the most important benefits or activities provided

conferences	___
professional contacts	___
training	___
advocacy	___
representation before government	___
participation in public affairs	___
branding	___
influence	___
insurance	___
discount on consumer goods	___
publications	___
coordination among organizations	___
research	___
legal help	___
website	___
e-mail alerts or updates	___

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Happ-Macworth was born July 12, 1939 in Jacksonville, Florida. Along with his younger sister, Nyla, Happ spent his early childhood years growing up in Gainesville, Florida, near Norman Park, Georgia and Valdosta, Georgia. At age 13, Happ moved to Orlando, Florida, where he graduated from Boone High School in 1959. He earned his B.A. in Political Science from the University of Florida (UF) in 1964. Prior to entering a Master's program at The University of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida in 1967, Happ spent a year in Houston, Texas as a youth worker at Covenant House, Texas.

Upon successfully defending his Master's Thesis, "The Effects of Discriminational Prejudicialities on Support for Israel and Christian Jewish Relations in the United States," Happ earned his M.A. from the University of Central Florida in 1969. Upon graduating with his M.A. in Political Science, Happ entered the graduate program of UF's Political Science Department to pursue his Ph.D. Happ's primary areas of focus are American Politics and Religion and Politics. The discrimination topics (Christian Right interest groups) afforded Happ the opportunity to conduct more than two years of research in Washington, D.C.

Currently, Happ lives in Corpus Christi, Texas where he is a visiting instructor of Political Science at Texas A&M University -Corpus Christi. Happ and his wife Angela have been married for seven years. They have a two-year-old daughter named Nyla.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy



Kenneth G. Walt
Distinguished Professor of Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy



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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy



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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



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This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

August 2006

Dean, Graduate School